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THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT "REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY"
JEFF L. LEWIN*
This Article traces the history of the creation and dissemination
of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty," which attorneys rou-
tinely employ in questions eliciting opinion testimony from physi-
cians. In disputes ranging from mundane slip-and-fall cases to
complex toxic tort class actions, the outcome of litigation frequently
hinges on the willingness of physicians to express opinions about
causation or damages with a "reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty. " Although judges expect, and sometimes insist, that expert
opinions be expressed with "reasonable medical certainty," and
although attorneys ritualistically intone the phrase, no one knows
what it means! No consensus exists among judges, attorneys, or aca-
demic commentators as to whether "reasonable medical certainty"
means "more probable than not" or "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
something in between.
© Copyright 1998, Jeff L. Lewin.
* Professor, Widener University School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D.,
Harvard University.
This Article is dedicated to Donna M. Byrne for her courage in confronting the ab-
sence of "reasonable medical certainty."
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am grateful to attorney Fred Lane of Illinois, Kevin Leonard of the Northwestern Univer-
sity Archives, and Pegeen Bassett of the Northwestern University Law Library. Fred Lane
persisted in several months of voice-mail tag in order to share the insights and information
gained through his years of collaboration with Judge Goldstein. Kevin Leonard deserves
special thanks for sending me copies of several items from the Northwestern University
Archives and for patiently reading me excerpts from documents that could not readily be
photocopied.
In order to verify the results of the numerous database searches described in the Arti-
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emotional support and her usual editorial insight, while Gregory Pearce Lewin tolerated
my monopolization of our personal computer.
"REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY"
This inquiry into the origins of the phrase grew out of efforts to
determine the "best" interpretation of the phrase in current usage.
Whereas previous commentators concluded that its origins were "ob-
scure" or "somewhat of a mystery," this Article concludes that the
phrase originated in Chicago, Illinois, sometime between 1915 and
1930, and that a singular Illinois opinion served as both the inspi-
ration and the template for the creation of the phrase. The Article
then traces the appearance of the phrase in published judicial opin-
ions and analyzes the judicial interpretations of the meaning and
legal significance of the phrase prior to 1970.
The history depicts the genesis and dissemination of the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" as an evolutionary process involving
the dynamic interaction among various components of the legal sys-
tem. Without proposing a theory of legal evolution, the Article sug-
gests that the emerging field of Complexity Theory, the science of
nonlinear dynamic systems, may illuminate our understanding of
the mechanisms by which legal change occurs. While the phrase was
generated by the efforts of Illinois attorneys to comply with legal doc-
trine, litigators in other states adopted this curious phrase through
unreflective imitation of models provided in a best-selling manual on
trial technique. The phrase was then incorporated into legal doctrine
through the judiciary's uncritical acceptance of this attorney usage.
The judicial response to the phrase thus exemplifies the generation of
legal rules by chance instead of by deliberate judicial choice. This
history tends to refute the Panglossian adaptationist notion that ap-
propriate legal rules inevitably evolve as the legal system progressively
responds to changing social needs.
Consistent with Complexity Theory, this evolutionary process
was "chaotic" insofar as it was highly contingent on chance events,
and it manifested "path dependence" insofar as it irreversibly altered
the legal landscape to generate a stable equilibrium of doctrine and
usage. Although developments in evidence and tort law since 1970
have raised questions about the appropriateness of the phrase as a
legal standard, it remains firmly entrenched in legal practice, and its
incorporation in dozens of statutes assures that attorneys, physi-
cians, and judges will continue to wrestle with this oxymoronic
phrase into the next century.
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INTRODUCTION
"Doctor, do you have an opinion with reasonable medical cer-
tainty as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries?" In disputes ranging
from mundane slip-and-fall cases to exotic toxic tort litigation, attor-
neys throughout the United States routinely request that physicians
express their expert opinions with "reasonable medical certainty" or
"a reasonable degree of medical certainty" (hereinafter "the
phrase").' As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized,
"[w] ithin the medical discipline, the traditional standard for 'factfind-
ing' is a 'reasonable medical certainty."'' 2
Physicians provide essential opinion testimony on the issues of
causation and damages in virtually all civil actions for wrongful death
1. For ease of exposition, "the phrase" refers to "reasonable medical certainty," "rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty," and other variant forms, such as "reasonable cer-
tainty from a medical viewpoint" or "a reasonable degree of medical and surgical
certainty." Reference in certain contexts to "the precise phrase" is meant to exclude all
variant forms other than "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical
certainty."
2. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).
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or personal injury,3 actions which generate well over half of all civil
trials.4 Likewise, in workers' compensation claims, which frequently
'are handled in administrative proceedings, physicians must supply re-
ports or testimony to establish the extent and permanence of each
claimant's injuries and the crucial element of the causal connection to
a workplace accident.5 In all such proceedings, the outcome may
hinge on the willingness of a physician to express an opinion with
"reasonable medical certainty."6
Persuasive opinion testimony with "reasonable medical certainty"
was crucial, for example, to the plaintiffs' victories in two of the most
controversial toxic tort cases from the 1980s,7 while physicians' inabil-
ity to express opinions with "reasonable medical certainty" was fatal to
plaintiffs' claims in other high profile toxic tort litigation.8 In the pro-
tracted litigation over birth defects allegedly caused by the anti-nausea
drug Bendectin, experts on both sides expressed their opinions about
3. In a 1985-1986 study of civil jury trials in Califomia, expert witnesses, primarily
physicians, testified in 95% of all trials involving wrongful death or personal injury. Sa-
muel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1119.
4. In studies of civil jury trials in Califomia in 1985-1986 and 1990-1991, over 70% of
the cases involved personal injury claims of one sort or another. Samuel R_ Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rv. 1, 5-
6, 11 & n.32 (1996).
5. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Wis. 1958) (discussed
infra note 305).
6. See, e.g., infra notes 7-9, 68-78, 415-416, 426-435.
7. See Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266, 272, 286, 292-95 (N.D. Ga.
1985) (relying on expert testimony with a "reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the
spermicide Ortho-Gynol caused birth defects), affd and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741, 743,
745 (l1th Cir. 1986); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (D.D.C.
1982) (mem.) (noting doctors' testimony with a "reasonable degree of medical certainty"
that the herbicide paraquat caused decedent's illness), affd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.
1984). But cf Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FoiDRuA L. REv. 595,
670-74 (1988) (criticizing Wells and Ferebee); Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in
Public Policy Decisionmaking 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 375, 390 (1990) ("The scientific community
responded to this case [Wells] with great vigor .... The [New York] Times labelled Judge
Shoob's and the Court of Appeals' position an 'intellectual embarrassment'. .. ."); id. at
393 ("If one assumes that the judge accurately and fairly characterized the testimony of the
experts, his conclusion about these matters seems to be sound and reasonable, although
not necessarily correct."); Gross, supra note 3, at 1121-24 (criticizing Wells); Marc S. Klein,
After Daubert: Going Forward with Lessons from the Past, 15 CA.RDozo L. REv. 2219, 2222 &
n.18 (1994) (stating that 90journal and law review articles cite Wells, frequently in conjunc-
tion with Ferebee, and that "[miost commentators agree that the trial judge in Wells...
clearly erred in his factual finding. .. ").
8. E.g., Brown v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig.), 35
F.3d 717, 750-72 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Tennessee law); Johnston v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) (mem.) (applying Kansas law).
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the drug's teratogenicity with a reasonable degree of medical or scien-
tific certainty.9
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appears in roughly
4000 state court appellate opinions1° and nearly 1000 opinions from
the federal trial and appellate courts, 1 while the equivalent expres-
sions of "reasonable [you-name-it] certainty" by non-physician experts
appear in hundreds of other cases.12 These published opinions repre-
9. E.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943-44 (3d Cir. 1990);
Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737, 739 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (mem.), aff'd,
959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 574-
75 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (mem.), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579
(1993); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D.D.C. 1986)
(mem.), affd, 857 F,2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., No.
CIV. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1996) (mem.); Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W.2d 535, 556-57 (Tex. App. 1994), rev'd, 953 S.W.2d 706
(Tex. 1997).
10. Search of WESTLAW, Allstates Database (Oct. 16, 1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & "rea-
sonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 3987
cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allstates-old Database (Oct. 25, 1997) ("reasonable medical
certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 22 cases). These search
results are broken down on a year-by-year basis in Appendix A and on a state-by-state basis
in Appendix B.
The narrow search for these precise phrases excludes several significant variant forms,
such as "reasonable certainty from a medical viewpoint" or "reasonable degree of medical
and surgical certainty." Broader searches capture most of these variants but also include
many opinions in which these words were not used in the sense of "reasonable medical
certainty." Search of WESTLAW, Allstates Database (Oct. 16, 1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) &
reasonable /s medical /s certainty) (retrieving 4521 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allstates-
old Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (reasonable /s medical /s certainty) (retrieving 85 cases);
Search of WESTLAW Allstates Database (da(bef 1/1/1997) & reasonable /6 medical /6
certainty) (retrieving 4228 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allstates-old Database (Oct. 20,
1997) (reasonable /6 medical /6 certainty) (retrieving 39 cases).
11. Search of WESTLAW, Alifeds Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & "rea-
sonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 896
cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds-old (Oct. 20, 1997) ("reasonable degree of medical
certainty" "reasonable medical certainty") (retrieving 3 cases); see also Appendix A
(presenting year-by-year figures). Broader searches yielded a few additional cases, not all
of which use the words in the sense of "reasonable medical certainty." Search of
WESTLAW, Allfeds Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & reasonable /s medical
/s certainty) (retrieving 1015 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds Database (Oct. 20,
1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & reasonable /6 medical /6 certainty) (retrieving 957 cases);
Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds-old Database (Jan. 26, 1998) (reasonable /s medical /s cer-
tainty) (retrieving 9 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Ailfeds-old Database (Jan. 26, 1998) (rea-
sonable /6 medical /6 certainty) (retrieving 4 cases).
12. The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" has spawned numerous variants for non-
physician experts. The WESTLAW Allcases database contains hundreds of cases in which
experts expressed opinions with a "reasonable (degree of) _ certainty," with the
blank filled by "scientific" (479), "professional" (62), "psychological" (97), "psychiatric"
(40), "chiropractic" (24), "dental" (23), or "nursing" (6). Search of WESTLAW, Allcases
Database (Oct. 27, 1997) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & "reasonable degree of certainty"
"reasonable - certainty") (retrieving numbers of cases indicated for each variant).
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sent only a minute percentage of cases in which physicians have been
asked to express opinions with "reasonable medical certainty" in trials,
depositions, or expert reports.1 3
Because these "magic words"' 4 have achieved "occult""5 or "talis-
manic"16 status in the interrogation of medical witnesses, one would
expect the phrase to have a definite and ascertainable meaning. Yet,
the phrase seems to have various meanings in different jurisdictions
and different contexts,' v generating substantial confusion among the
As a teacher of trial advocacy, my personal favorite was attorney Thomas Demetrio's at-
tempt to elicit an opinion "based upon a reasonable degree of nuclear radiation safety
certainty" in NITA's "Training the Advocate" videotape series. See ROBERT E. OLIPHANT,
TRAINING THE ADVOCATE: PROGRAM PLANNER'S GUIDE 6-20 (1983).
13. See infra notes 231-232 and accompanying text for a discussion of the empirical
shortcomings of using reported cases as evidence of the actual practices of lawyers in pre-
trial and trial proceedings.
14. Opinions referring to the phrase as "magic" or "magical words" include Redland
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 55 F.3d 827, 852 (3d Cir. 1995),
Blake v.Juskevich, No. 92-2514, 1993 WL 281668, at *3 (4th Cir. July 28, 1993) (per curiam),
Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1969), Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,
552 F. Supp. 1293, 1302 (D.D.C. 1982) (mem.), affd, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
Aspiazu v. Orgera, 535 A.2d 338, 342 (Conn. 1987), Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So. 2d
1280, 1282 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1981), Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 172 (N.D. 1994),
Williams v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 562 A.2d 437, 440 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),
and Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
15. See Breidler v. Industrial Comm'n, 383 P.2d 177, 179 (Ariz. 1963) (referring to the
phrase as "occult words").
16. Opinions referring to the phrase as "talismanic" include Holbrook v. Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., 80 F.3d 777, 785 (3d Cir. 1996), Aspiazu, 535 A.2d at 342, Thornhill v. City of
Detroit, 369 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam), Bynote v. National Super
Markets, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 117, 125 (Mo. 1995) (en banc), Loura v. Adler, 664 N.E.2d 1002,
1005 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam), Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Campbell 372 S.E.2d 411,
416 (Va. CL App. 1988), and Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 164 n.9
(Wyo. 1989) (quoting Aspiazu, 535 A.2d at 342). See also Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 136, 168 (1992) ("[T] he talismanic formula for establishing causation in any
suit for bodily injury is a probabilistic one: the expert's opinion must be to a 'reasonable
degree of medical certainty.'" (emphasis added)).
17. W LLIAM J. CuRRAN & E. DONALD SHAPIRO, LAw, MEDICINE, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
265 (3d ed. 1982) ("The minimum degree of certainty with which a medical expert must
speak varies according to the subject matter of the case and according to the jurisdic-
tion."); Marvin Firestone, With Reasonable Medical Certainty (Probability): The Correct Answer Is
Not the Right Answer, but the Best Answer, LEGAL AsPECrs MED. PRAC., June 1984, at 1, 1
("The exact meaning of medical certainty and medical probability varies somewhat from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and on the circumstances involved."); Jonas R_ Rappeport, Rea-
sonable Medical Certainty, 13 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 8 (1985) ("Again, there are
different rules in different jurisdictions. The standard of certainty required also varies
depending on whether the issue is causation, present condition, or future problems."); cf
Richard Rogers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 149, 155-56
(1987) (noting the "considerable variability in the definition of 'reasonable degree' and
'certainty'" when courts review expert opinion under the "reasonable degree of medical or
psychological certainty" standard, and providing "a tentative model for ascertaining the
MARYLAND LAW REvIEw
bench and bar,18 as well as for physicians who are called upon to pro-
vide expert testimony.1 9
Existing legal confusion about the meaning and purpose of the
phrase represents a potential trap for unwary attorneys and their cli-
ents. Courts frequently exclude reliable and probative medical testi-
mony or treat it as legally insufficient because physician witnesses fail
to express their opinions with "reasonable medical certainty" or are
unable to do so when asked.2" Conversely, the rhetorical power of the
phrase may seduce judges and jurors into accepting conclusory ex-
pressions of certitude in lieu of meaningful analysis of the underlying
methodology and data.2
Although the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" has no defin-
itive meaning today, it must have meant something to those who first
used it. My research into the origins of the phrase began as part of a
degree of certainty [that a court may require] in comparison to legal analogues and repre-
sentative criteria"). The cases are discussed infra notes 375-471.
18. Black, supra note 7, at 669 ("[R]easonable certainty adds nothing to the law except
the opportunity for confusion."); James E. Hullverson, Jr., Reasonable Degree of Medical Cer-
tainty: A Tort et a Travers, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 577, 577 (1987) ("The phrase has been a
source of confusion, frustration, and endless interpretation for litigants, trial judges, and
appellate courts.").
19. See Mark D. Howard, Proving Causation with Expert Opinion: How Much Certainty Is
Enough?, 74 ILL. BJ. 580, 584 (1986) ("Most experts, other than professional witnesses, are
unfamiliar with the 'reasonable certainty' language used in court."); Rappeport, supra note
17, at 5 ("Doctors testify to it daily, but they do not know what it means."); Edward R. Stein,
The Direct Examination of the Expert Witness, in FAUST F. RossI, EXPERT WITNESSES 193, 220
(1991) ("[P]ractically nobody knows what it means. Many experts can be frightened off
the witness stand if they have not been prepared for a question that includes the word
'certainty.' They think it means 'for sure,' a concept that does not exist for most expert
witnesses."). For examples of witnesses' different interpretations, see infra notes 87-88, 92,
426-431, 461-467 and accompanying text.
20. See Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (deeming testi-
mony as to 90% probability insufficient because it was not expressed with "reasonable med-
ical certainty"); see also infra notes 426-434 and accompanying text (discussing Bertram).
Appellate courts have reversed judgments resulting from witness confusion about the
meaning of "reasonable medical certainty" that misled trial courts into ruling that their
testimony was inadmissible or insufficient to support a verdict. E.g., Dellenbach v. Robin-
son, 642 N.E.2d 638, 648 & n.6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (reversing ajudgment for a defend-
ant, because the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a physician who
misunderstood the meaning of "reasonable degree of medical certainty" and therefore
failed to express his opinion using those exact words). Although a reversal corrects the
unjust outcome in such cases, the flawed initial trial imposes unnecessary costs on the
parties and taxpayers. More fundamentally, because appellate courts cannot correct all
such errors, the confusion associated with the phrase undoubtedly yields unjust results in
many cases.
21. Black, supra note 7, at 667-74. For example, expressions of "reasonable medical
certainty" contributed to the courts' acceptance of arguably unreliable expert testimony in
Ferebee and Wells. See supra note 7.
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quest for the "best" interpretation of the phrase in current usage.22 I
suspected that an inquiry into the "original intent" of the creators of
this phrase might shed some light on its current meaning. 23 In partic-
ular, I hypothesized that certain current usages might be consistent
with the phrase's original meaning, while others might represent ex-
tensions or distortions thereof.2 4 An alternative hypothesis was that
the phrase had been created to meet a need which no longer exists.
25
22. That inquiry continues. See Jeff L. Lewin, Toward the End of Legal Uncertainty About
"Reasonable Medical Certainty" (current working draft manuscript, on file with author).
(The concept of the "best" interpretation derives from RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
225-28 & passim (1986).)
23. Of course, there is substantial controversy among both constitutional scholars and
literary theorists about the relevance of authorial intent and the possibility of ascertaining
it. See generally Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981) (arguing that no defensi-
ble criteria exist to assess theories of judicial review as "non-originalist, substantive, value-
oriented constitutional adjudication"); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAIN.
L. REv. 739, 750-51 (1982) (explaining "how objective interpretation becomes possible in
the law" and how "adjudication [as] an interpretive activity... possesses an objective char-
acter"); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982) (discussing autho-
rial intent in the context of the Constitution); Symposium, Interpretation Methodologies from
Other Disciplines, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985) (describing interpretation problems in four
nonlegal disciplines-science, literature, anthropology, and theology-and discussing her-
meneutics and legal interpretation); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1983) (discussing the
shortcomings of interpretivism and the search for the Framers' intent).
24. That certain usages were inconsistent with the original meaning of the phrase
would not necessarily render them invalid or inappropriate, however, for common law
courts frequently use a single term to serve multiple purposes in diverse contexts. See, e.g.,
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTIY 37 (3d ed. 1993) (citing cases holding that
government "owns" wild animals for purposes of hunting regulation but does not "own"
wild animals with respect to liability for damages they cause to farmers); id. at 736 (discuss-
ing the proposition that A's late-recorded deed may not give C constructive notice but may
preclude C from being first-to-record in a notice-race jurisdiction: "Why should the word
.recorded' be given one meaning when the problem is whether A's deed is recorded so as
to give constructive notice and another when the problem is whether C has recorded
first?").
25. Again, this would not necessarily render current usages invalid so long as they
could be justified in relation to contemporary applications. Oliver Wendell Holmes noted:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In
the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and inge-
nious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground
of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the
present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which
have been found for it, and enters on a new career. ...
... But just as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some earlier
creature to which a collar-bone was useful, precedents survive in the law long
after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been
forgotten....
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A third possibility was that the phrase was generated and disseminated
by a series of historical accidents and never served any purpose
whatsoever.26
Whereas previous commentators concluded that the source of
the phrase was "obscure"27 or "somewhat of a mystery," 28 1 believe that
I have discovered its roots. With the aid of on-line computer
databases, I traced the phrase back to Chicago, Illinois, in the early
1930s, and I pinpointed a 1916 case that, with reasonable certainty,
inspired the creation of the phrase.29 Even more significantly, I dis-
covered how the phrase spread beyond the borders of Illinois after
1935 and took root in the legal lexicon by the end of the 1950s.
While the history of the genesis and propagation of the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" is crucial to understanding its current
meaning, it also provides a fascinating case study of the evolution of
legal doctrine in relation to the actual practice of trial attorneys.
Moreover, this history illustrates the relative influence of "scholarly,
versus "practical" legal publications as exemplified in the works of two
members of the Northwestern University law faculty: John Henry Wig-
... [I] t will be found that, when ancient rules maintain themselves... , new
reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, and that they gradually
receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds to which they
have been transplanted.
... When we find that in large and important branches of the law the various
grounds of policy on which the various rules have been justified are later inven-
tions to account for what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a
right to reconsider the popular reasons, and, taking a broader view of the field, to
decide anew whether those reasons are satisfactory. They may be, notwithstand-
ing the manner of their appearance.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 5, 35-37 (1881).
26. Cf Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 71-125 (1984)
(criticizing the legal functionalist view, which posits that legal rules are progressive adapta-
tions to changing social needs); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLEC-
TIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 19-26 (1980) (explaining that the evolution of the panda's
thumb is inconsistent with the adaptationist view of evolutionary biology, which purports to
justify all anatomical structures in terms of their original contribution to evolutionary fit-
ness); Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution: The Pleasures of Pluralism, N.Y. REv. BooKs, June 26,
1997, at 47, 52 ("[E]ven the strictest operation of pure Darwinism builds organisms full of
nonadaptive parts and behaviors.").
27. See Hullverson, supra note 18, at 578 ("The origins of the phrase are obscure, its
evolution accidental .... "); cf Michael M. Martin, The Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analy-
sis and Proposalfor a Federal Evidence Rule, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 781, 786-808 (1974) (tracing the
development of the "rule of certainty," without focusing on reasonable medical certainty, as
a standard of admissibility in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York).
28. Walter E. Smith & S. Victor Tipton, A Quest for "Reasonable Medical Certainty" in
Forida, 30 FLA. BJ. 327, 327 (1956).
29. See Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 111 N.E. 499 (Ill. 1916); see also infra
notes 137-138, 152-160 and accompanying text (discussing Fellows-Kimbrough).
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more,3 0 the dean of the law school and the author of the definitive
scholarly treatise on American evidence law,3 1 and Irving Goldstein,
32
an adjunct instructor at the law school3 3 and the author of a best-
selling practical manual on trial technique. 34 Because the history of
"reasonable medical certainty" raises jurisprudential issues that do not
bear directly on the significance of the phrase in modern evidence
and tort law, this Article will focus on the evolution of the phrase prior
to 1970, leaving questions of current doctrine for consideration in a
subsequent piece.35
This Article depicts the genesis and dissemination of the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" as an evolutionary process involving
the dynamic interaction among various components of the legal sys-
tem, including the interplay between legal doctrine and legal practice
and the influence of practical legal publications as well asjurispruden-
tial theory. Without proposing a theory of legal evolution, this Article
suggests that the emerging field of "Complexity Theory"  may illumi-
30. John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) joined the faculty of the Northwestern Univer-
sity Law School in 1893. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE 32 (1977). He ac-
cepted the position as dean in 1901, id. at 45, serving in that capacity until 1929. Id. at 78-
80.
31. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRILS AT
COMMON LAW (1st ed. 1905) [hereinafter WIGMORE, first edition] (4 volumes);JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON
LAw (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter WIGMORE, second edition] (5 volumes); JOHN HENRY WIG-
MORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter WIGMORE, third edition] (10 volumes). Subsequent to Wigmore's death, a
revised fourth edition of 11 volumes was published between 1961 and 1988.
32. Irving Goldstein (1897-1968) graduated from John Marshall Law School in 1919
and was admitted to the Illinois bar later that year. He practiced with several Chicago firms
between 1919 and 1924 before founding the firm of Cohon & Goldstein, of which he was a
member until 1954. From 1926 to 1928, he served as Assistant State's Attorney in Cook
County. Goldstein became an associate judge on the Circuit Court of Cook County in
1964, serving on the court until his death in 1968. 5 MARQUIS WHO'S WHO, W"HO WAS WHO
IN AMERICA, 1969-1973, at 276 (1973); Northwestern University Archives Series 17/13; Edi-
torial, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q., Summer 1972, at iii.
33. Goldstein taught trial technique at Northwestern University's School of Law for
many years as an instructor (1934-1947) and later as a professorial lecturer (1949-1964).
He also served as a lecturer on medical jurisprudence at Northwestern's School of
Medicine (1944-1951). 5 MARQUIS WHO'S WHO, supra note 32, at 276; Northwestern Uni-
versity Archives Series 17/13.
34. IRVING GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE (1935). Working with attorney Fred Lane,
Goldstein produced a revised second edition that was published in the year after his death.
IRVING GOLDSTEIN & FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1969) (3 volumes,
looseleaf). The third edition is still in print. See FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE
(3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997) (3 volumes, looseleaf).
35. See supra note 22.
36. See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text for a definition of Complexity Theory
and a rudimentary explanation of its relevant teachings.
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nate our understanding of the mechanisms by which legal change
occurs.
Scholars frequently write about the "evolution" of legal rules or
systems, 37 but they most commonly use the term as a synonym for
"change" without having an evolutionary theory about the mecha-
nisms of legal change.3 8 "Evolutionary theories typically have three
basic components: a theory of variation, a theory of selection, and a
theory of transmission or retention. ' 39 The neo-Darwinian theory of
biological evolution, for example, posits transmission of genetic infor-
mation encoded in DNA, variation by genetic mutation and sexual
recombination, and natural selection through differential rates of re-
production and survival ("survival of the fittest") in the interaction of
organisms with their environment.4"
Law, like other cultural institutions, arises from conscious human
activity, raising fundamental questions about the applicability of the
neo-Darwinian evolutionary metaphor to legal change. Human insti-
tutions are inherently non-Darwinian insofar as they evolve through
cultural transmission, a Lamarckian process involving the "inheritance
of acquired characters."41 The retention and transmission of Ameri-
37. Variants of the words "evolution" or "evolve" appear in the titles of nearly 400 arti-
cles published since 1980. Search of WESTLAW, JIr Database (Oct. 26, 1997) (da(bef 10/
23/1997) & ti(evolution! evolve!)). Two excellent works examining the use of evolution-
ary models in American legal theory are E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985) and Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in
Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985). Other works examine the application of the
evolutionary model to legal development. See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996) (refining "the classical evolutionary
model from law and economics by modifying it to accommodate three related concepts-
one from chaos theory, another of path dependence, and a final one from modem evolu-
tionary theory"); M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 31, 31 (1993) [hereinafter Sinclair, Second Thoughts] (explaining "the attraction of the
theory of evolution" and the "difficulties in applying the theory to law"); M.B.W. Sinclair,
The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 451 (1987) [hereinafter Sinclair,
Evolution Theory] (discussing evolutionary theory and its application to the law, and criticiz-
ing other authors' analyses of the subject). For a survey of pre-Darwinian European works
on legal evolution, see PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION (1980). For a cogent summary of
the prior literature on evolutionary theory and its relationship to Complexity Theory, see
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society
and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
38. Elliott, supra note 37, at 90-91; Sinclair, Second Thoughts, supra note 37, at 32.
39. Sinclair, Second Thoughts, supra note 37, at 36.
40. See Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1423. Ruhl notes that Darwin contributed only a theory
of selection. Subsequent discoveries in genetics and population biology established the
mechanisms of transmission and variation and refined our understanding of the selective
advantage conferred by genetic mutation. Id. at 1434-35.
41. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISToRy
63-65, 165 (1991); accord Gould, supra note 26, at 49-50; Sinclair, Second Thoughts, supra
note 37, at 32-33.
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can law result from its embodiment in written form (judicial opinions,
constitutions, statutes, and regulations) in conjunction with the doc-
trine of stare decisis and related institutional and constitutional con-
straints.42 While some of the factors promoting retention of existing
legal forms may operate subconsciously, the generation of new legal
forms (i.e., variation) and the determination of which among various
alternative forms will survive (i.e., selection) both involve conscious
decisions by human actors. When ajudge, legislator, or administrator
is "making" law, any contemplated change necessarily must be the
product of human design, and it is not obvious how the deci-
sionmaker benefits from perceiving the change in evolutionary
terms.43
The insights offered by Complexity Theory,44 the science of non-
linear dynamical systems, 45 provide a plausible justification for persist-
ing in efforts to view the legal system from an evolutionary
perspective. Complexity Theory has been used to model collective in-
teractions of physical and biological systems such as weather and eco-
systems.46  Complexity Theory also purports to encompass
42. See Sinclair, Evolution Theory, supra note 37, at 456-59 (discussing factors promoting
inertial retention of common law rules).
43. See Sinclair, Second Thoughts, supra note 37, at 39 ("That the variation or selection
mechanisms in a developing system involve rational agency does not preclude an evolu-
tionary explanation; however, it may diminish the value of such explanation . " (foot-
note omitted)).
44. J.B. Ruhl explains:
Complexity Theory has been described as "the study of behavior of macro-
scopic collections of [interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to
evolve over time." Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity: The
Search for Order in a Chaotic World 7 (Faber, 1995). Complexity Theory... is an
overarching field of mathematical analysis of the behavior of nonlinear dynamical
systems.
Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1409-10 n.5. In this and two related works, Ruhl provides a clear
and accessible presentation of Complexity Theory, along with extensive citation to primary
sources. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45
DuKE L.J. 849 (1996);J.B. Ruh] & HaroldJ. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Admin-
istrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the
Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 405 (1997). My rudimentary knowl-
edge (or my misunderstanding) of Complexity Theory derives almost entirely from my
(mis)reading of Ruhl's articles. Interest in the topic was stimulated by an earlier reading of
Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REv. 751 (1992).
45. Ruhl notes:
A system exists whenever two or more phenomena interact. The system is
dynamical if the interactive relationship changes over time, and the system is non-
linear if the relationship of change is not strictly proportionate and thus cannot
be graphed by a straight line.
Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1409 n.4.
46. Id. at 1438.
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evolutionary biology and to reconcile certain anomalies within the
neo-Darwinian evolutionary model.47 More fundamentally, because
Complexity Theory "is about evolution of all dynamical systems, bio-
logical, physical, and social,"4 it should apply, at least by analogy,49 to
the relationship between law and society in a dynamical sociolegal
system.50
This Article suggests that Complexity Theory provides a fruitful
metaphor for understanding the legal system itself, or more precisely,
the relationships among its component parts. Instead of viewing "law'7
and "society" as the interacting entities in a "sociolegal" system,51 this
Article views the law as a nonlinear dynamical system in its own right.
This system consists of lawyers, judges, legislators, bureaucrats, law en-
forcement officers, and law professors, along with their respective in-
stitutional embodiments (the bar, the judiciary, the legislature, the
administration, the police, and the academy). Such a system operates
within and across national, state, and local jurisdictional boundaries.
In order to appreciate the relevance of Complexity Theory as a
metaphor for legal evolution, one need not have a comprehensive or
47. Id. at 1416. In particular, the neo-Darwinian model suggests a pattern of gradual
evolutionary change, whereas the fossil record depicts a pattern of "punctuated equilib-
rium" in which long periods of stability alternate with brief periods of mass extinction and
rapid and dramatic diversification. See STEPHENJAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS
SHALE AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY 227-39 (1989) (discussing Darwinian theory in the
context of ecological change of the Burgess fauna); Gould, supra note 26, at 47 (discussing
Daniel Dennett's attacks on Gould and Eldredge's theory of "punctuated equilibrium").
Punctuated equilibrium remains a contested theory among evolutionary theorists. Roe,
supra note 37, at 663 n.44. Compare DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN's DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 282-99 (1995) (disputing punctuated equilibrium)
with NILES ELDREDGE, REINVENTING DARWIN: THE GREAT DEBATE AT THE HIGH TABLE OF
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 93-124 (1995) (defending punctuated equilibrium), Stephen Jay
Gould, Darwinian Fundamentalism, N.Y. REv. BooKs, June 12, 1997, at 34, 36 (criticizing
Dennett and defending punctuated equilibrium) and Gould, supra note 26, at 47-51
(same).
48. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1417.
49. Because Complexity Theory involves mathematical analysis of dynamical systems
whose components interact according to determinate rules, it cannot strictly apply to a
legal or sociolegal system in which human actors are capable of exercising free will to
violate any algorithms that might, in theory, govern human behavior. Although I remain
an agnostic in the "free will versus determinism" debate, for purposes of engagement in
normative legal scholarship, I presume that legal actors are capable of exercising free will.
Cf. infra note 524 (discussing the controversy concerning the epistemological foundation
of normative legal scholarship).
50. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1417; Ruhl, supra note 44, at 854, 862.
51. In his discussion of the interaction of the "law-and-society" system, Ruh] generally
treats "law" as a monolithic entity, and he implicitly assumes that the law can be shaped by
conscious human manipulation. See Ruhl, supra note 44, at 916-26. He does not address
the extent to which the law, as a nonlinear dynamical system, may prove resistant to such
prescriptions for structural change. See id.
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sophisticated understanding of nonlinear dynamical systems theory.12
With respect to the evolution of "reasonable medical certainty," the
salient teachings of Complexity Theory are, quite simply, that a non-
linear dynamical system has the following three related characteristics:
stability of potentially suboptimal local equilibria, "chaos" or contin-
gency, and "path dependence."53 Complexity Theory depicts evolu-
tionary change occurring on a "fitness landscape," which constitutes a
topographic representation of the relative fitness of each potential
combination of the various qualities of the system components. 54
Evolution involves incremental movement to local "fitness peaks" that
are marginally superior to nearby points on the fitness landscape,
although they may be inferior to more distant points on that land-
scape. A component of a complex system may thus attain equilibrium
in a configuration that is suboptimal with respect to present or future
system conditions. Although not adaptively superior in a global sense,
these local "fitness peaks" may represent stable equilibria and can be
expected to persist until interrupted by some crisis or perturbation of
the system.55 A complex system exhibits "chaos" insofar as future con-
figurations of the system are highly sensitive to contingent variations
in the initial conditions and are thus difficult, if not impossible, to
predict.56 A complex system exhibits "path dependence" insofar as
change in one component affects all other components of the system
in ways that make change irreversible.57
52. At least I hope this is true, because systematic treatment of Complexity Theory is
beyond the scope of this Article, as well as beyond the competence of its author. Indeed,
the discussion in this Article should be comprehensible on its own terms, even without
regard to Complexity Theory.
53. The focus on these three characteristics follows Roe, supra note 37, at 642-43, who
proposed to augment the "evolution-to-efficiency" hypothesis of Law and Economics with
the "paradigms" of chaos, path dependence, and local equilibrium. Although derived
from Complexity Theory, these characteristics of nonlinear dynamic systems can be de-
rived without reference to that theory. For example, although Stephen Jay Gould does not
employ the terminology of Complexity Theory, his theory of punctuated equilibrium in
biological evolution emphasizes the importance of contingency and path dependence in a
manner entirely consistent with these aspects of Complexity Theory. See Gould, supra note
47, at 35.
54. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1448-50.
55. See Roe, supra note 37, at 642-43, 663-65 (noting the stability of local equilibrium
until punctuated by crisis); Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1456-62 (emphasizing the stability of
local equilibrium until "long jumps" occur across the fitness landscape).
56. See Ruhl, supra note 37, at 1438-39 ("[S]nowflakes form according to fixed rules of
physics and chemistry, yet no two look alike .. . because no two undergo the exact same
conditions of formation .... This is the chaos property-sensitive dependence on condi-
tions in a system based on deterministic rules produces what appears to be random
behavior.").
57. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 44, at 434-36 ("[A] system can not turn back along its
trajectory to a point in the past. It may only make forward turns and curves."). Mark Roe
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The history of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" illus-
trates an evolutionary process consistent with these characteristics of
Complexity Theory. The dynamic interplay of legal doctrine, legal
practice, legal theory, and legal publications yielded a stable equilib-
rium of usage among attorneys that was reinforced only occasionally
by legal doctrine.5s The evolutionary process was chaotic insofar as it
was highly contingent on chance events, and it manifested path de-
pendence to the extent that it has irreversibly altered the legal
landscape.
Whereas most articles begin with a survey of the historical back-
ground, this Article starts by surveying the contemporary foreground.
Part I briefly summarizes the current diversity of opinion about the
legal significance and meaning of "reasonable medical certainty," pro-
viding both a justification for the historical inquiry into the creation,
dissemination, and evolution of the phrase and a context for evaluat-
ing the results of this inquiry.
Part II investigates the genesis of "reasonable medical certainty,"
explaining how the phrase arose from the efforts of the Illinois bar to
accommodate two mutually inconsistent evidentiary rules adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court in the early years of the twentieth century:
the "reasonable-certainty rule" and the "ultimate-issue rule." The rea-
sonable-certainty rule initially limited recovery of future damages to
those damages that were "reasonably certain" to be incurred, but it
was transformed from a rule of proof into a rule of admissibility, ex-
cluding testimony about future problems or conditions that were not
illustrates path dependence with the example of a winding road that cannot readily be
straightened because it now is lined with homes and factories that were built along what
originally was a fur trader's path that wound through the woods to avoid a wolves' den and
other then-dangerous sites. Although the original reason for the curves in the road have
long since vanished, intervening historical developments impede, if they do not absolutely
preclude, construction of a better road. Roe, supra note 37, at 643-44.
Roe distinguishes among three degrees of path dependence: weak, semi-strong, and
strong. Id. at 646-53. Weak path dependence attributes the survival of competing forms to
contingent events, but without regard to their past or current efficiency. Id. at 647-48.
Semi-strong path dependence, as in the winding road example, explains the current preva-
lence of suboptimal forms as resulting from their selective advantage in the past, coupled
with subsequent investments that increase the cost of adopting alternative forms that later
may turn out to be superior. Id. at 648-50. Strong path dependence would explain the
current prevalence of suboptimal forms as resulting from changes in the landscape created
by the path itself. " [B] eyond the sunk costs, . . . two path-created features... systematically
impede change": public choice, the political dynamic associated with the advantages of
economic incumbents, and information barriers, whereby "society cannot think effectively
about the alternative path because it lacks the vocabulary, concepts, or even belief that the
other path could exist . . . ." Id. at 651.
58. The sequel to this Article will argue that this equilibrium is suboptimal. See supra
note 22.
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reasonably certain to arise. The ultimate-issue rule precluded expert
witnesses from "invading the province of the jury" by expressing defin-
itive opinions related to such ultimate issues as causation. Thus, medi-
cal experts were required to testify with reasonable certainty
concerning future damages, while at the same time they were forbidden
from expressing definitive opinions concerning causation.
Dean Wigmore fulminated against these absurd rules, both in law
review articles and in his treatise on evidence,59 but to no avail. Mean-
while, the Illinois bar, taking its cue from a 1916 opinion of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, began framing questions that asked whether,
"with reasonable medical certainty," the accident "might or could"
have been the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Between 1916 and
1935, this formula took root and became an established element in
the lexicon of Illinois trial attorneys, including Irving Goldstein.
Part III explores the dissemination of the phrase beyond the bor-
ders of Illinois between 1935 and 1960. It explains how Goldstein's
1935 manual on Trial Technique' and his co-authored 1942 book on
Medical Trial Technique1 served as the vectors that spread this unique
Illinois form of expert interrogation to the remainder of the United
States. The history of attorney usage of the phrase "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" and the judicial response thereto, as reflected in pub-
lished judicial opinions, is consistent with the thesis that the phrase
entered the legal lexicon through the bar's imitation of models in
Goldstein's texts rather than as a result of judicial mandate. The sys-
tematic use of the phrase throughout the American Jurisprudence Proof
of Facts series, which commenced publication in 1959, elevated the
phrase above all competing formulations, assuring its singular role in
the framing of questions to physicians. Thus, through unreflective im-
itations of models provided in practitioner-oriented texts, attorneys
throughout the nation adopted this curious phrase for reasons having
nothing to do with its original function.
Part IV studies the interpretation of the phrase during the 1960s.
In states other than Illinois, the phrase interacted with indigenous
doctrines respecting admissibility and sufficiency of proof, generating
diverse interpretations of the phrase that enabled it to fill different
ecological niches in a variety of dissimilar legal environments. The
most unexpected conclusion from the review of judicial opinions
through 1969 is that while most courts expected to hear medical opin-
59. See infra notes 106-107, 112, 134, 139-141 and accompanying text.
60. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34.
61. IRVING GOLDSTEIN & L. WILLARD SHABAT, MEDICAL TRIAL TECHNIQUE (1942).
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ions expressed with "reasonable medical certainty," courts in surpris-
ingly few jurisdictions required the phrase for purposes of admissibility
or evidentiary sufficiency. In those jurisdictions that attributed legal
significance to the phrase, the incorporation of the phrase into legal
doctrine resulted from the judiciary's uncritical acceptance of attor-
ney usage without conscious consideration of its meaning. Insofar as
courts defined the phrase, most treated it as equivalent to an expres-
sion that a fact was "probably" true, while only a few treated it as re-
quiring a higher degree of certitude. At the beginning of the 1960s,
the Illinois Supreme Court repudiated the ultimate-issue rule that had
contributed to the birth of the phrase, but Illinois attorneys continued
to use the phrase in eliciting expert opinions. At the end of the dec-
ade, an Illinois appellate court supplied a novel interpretation of the
phrase that justified its continued survival in the new legal
environment.
Part V explains the selection of 1970 as a terminal date for the
historical analysis. It briefly surveys the transformations in evidence
and tort law subsequent to 1970, including the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the new probabilistic approach to causation in
toxic tort litigation, the recognition of novel causes of action in toxic
tort and medical malpractice litigation, and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 2 These recent de-
velopments demonstrate that any meaningful evaluation of the
current significance of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" must
occur in the context of a more comprehensive analysis of the role of
expert medical testimony in modern tort litigation. While these cata-
clysmic changes in the legal environment threaten the continued via-
bility of "reasonable medical certainty" as a term of art in litigation,
the phrase has acquired a new role as a legal standard in modern leg-
islation on a diverse array of subjects, assuring that lawyers and judges
will continue to wrestle with the meaning of "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" well into the next century.
The conclusion of this Article assesses the history of the genesis
and dissemination of the phrase from the perspective of Complexity
Theory. The history reflects an evolutionary process involving a dy-
namical interplay among legal doctrine, legal practice, legal theory,
and legal scholarship. Both the genesis and dissemination of the
phrase resulted from practitioners' efforts to conform with legal doc-
trine, and in turn, the resulting legal usage influenced the further
development of legal doctrine. A discussion of the relationship be-
62. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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tween academic and practical legal scholarship culminates in the rec-
ognition that, in addition to its impact on legal usage and legal
doctrine, Goldstein's manual had a profound influence on trial prac-
tice and on the teaching of trial technique. Semantic analysis of the
phrase with respect to jurisprudential issues associated with Legal Re-
alism helps explain the rapidity of the diffusion of the phrase. The
history of the phrase lends support to the claim that law is a complex
adaptive system, characterized by contingency and path dependency,
while it undermines the functionalist notion that law adapts to meet
social needs.
I. FOREGROUND: CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE AND
INTERPRETATIONS
According to conventional wisdom, attorneys were, and perhaps
still are, compelled to use the phrase, because in many jurisdictions,
common law rules of evidence require that medical opinion testimony
be expressed with "reasonable medical certainty."63 Today's leading
trial advocacy texts declare that judges in "some," "many," or "most"
jurisdictions will not admit a medical opinion into evidence unless it is
expressed with "reasonable medical certainty."64  Regardless of
63. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 155 (2d
ed. 1993) ("Some jurisdictions require an expert to express an opinion in terms of reason-
able scientific probability or certainty."); EDWARD J. IMW]NKELRIED, EIDENTARY FOUNDA-
TIONS 255 (3d ed. 1995) ("Some jurisdictions insist that the expert vouch that his or her
opinion is 'reasonably certain.' Other jurisdictions demand a 'reasonably probable' opin-
ion. The witness must be willing to testify that he or she has formed the opinion to a
reasonable medical or scientific certainty or probability."); Stein, supra note 19, at 219
("[The degree of certainty] can relate to the admissibility of the opinion. Some jurisdic-
tions, and some judges, require that all questions calling for an opinion must call for it to a
certain standard, usually 'a reasonable degree of medical certainty.'"). See generally Hullver-
son, supra note 18, at 578 (discussing the "semantic nuisance" of defining the phrase in
various jurisdictions); Martin, supra note 27, at 782 (analyzing "the rule of certainty... in
its various forms"); Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony
as to Future Consequences of Injury as Affected by Expression in Terms of Probability or Possibility, 75
A.LR.3D 9, § 5, at 25-27 (1977) (citing cases requiring reasonable medical certainty in
determining future consequences of injuries).
64. See ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL THEORIES, TACrICS, TECHNIQUES 428
(1991) ("Some judges may require the attorney to use specific traditional words (legal
jargon) as a predicate to the introduction of an opinion. Example: Q Do you have an
opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical (or psychiatric, accounting, or other)
certainty?"); JAMES W. JEANs, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY 394 (2d ed. 1993) ("['Reasonable scien-
tific certainty'] is the verbiage that establishes the threshold of admissibility in most juris-
dictions."); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 276 (4th ed. 1996) ("[T]he expert can
testify to an 'opinion' or, as is required in some jurisdictions, an 'opinion to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty.'"); JAMES W. MCELHANEV, McELHANEVs TRAL NOTEBOOK 472
(3d ed. 1994) ("Some states said it was foundational to any opinion, while others said it was
required only on the issue of causation in personal injury cases.").
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whether this was ever true in any but a handful of jurisdictions,65 the
liberalization of the rules of evidence, especially since the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, has led most courts to reject
any mandatory formulaic expressions of medical certainty or
probability as a prerequisite to admissibility.66 Today, expressions of
reasonable medical certainty are essential to admissibility of opinion
testimony in at most a handful of states.6 7
Beyond serving as a standard of admissibility, in many states the
phrase is associated with legal doctrines establishing the standards for
proof of liability or damages. Physician opinions expressed with "rea-
sonable medical certainty" may thus be necessary to establish one or
more elements of a prima facie case, such as causation' or future
65. For a discussion of pre-1970 decisions bearing on admissibility, see infra notes 386-
413 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., Aspiazu v. Orgera, 535 A.2d 338, 34243 (Conn. 1987); Noblesville Casting Div.
of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ind. 1982); State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166,
1170 (Me. 1979); Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 274 N.W.2d 411, 425 (Mich.
1979); Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 597-98 (Miss. 1996); Dallas v. Burlington N., Inc.,
689 P.2d 273, 277 (Mont. 1984); Matott v. Ward, 399 N.E.2d 532, 536 (N.Y. 1979); Kun-
nanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 173-74 (N.D. 1994); Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 824
(S.D. 1991); Drexler v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 241 N.W.2d 401, 408 (Wis. 1976);
Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 165-66 (Wyo. 1989); see also MAUET,
supra note 64, at 289-90, 303, 308 (illustrating alternative methods of eliciting expert opin-
ions under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in lieu of the traditional request for
opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty); McELHANEv, supra note 64, at 476
("[Since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,] [s]ome of the stultifying formalism
has gradually eroded. The 'magic words' that were always recited before any expert opin-
ion are not heard so often as they once were.").
67. The states that have most consistently conditioned admissibility on expressions of
"reasonable medical certainty" or similar formulas are Illinois (regarding future damages),
see infra notes 193-196, 461-466 and accompanying text, Pennsylvania (regarding causa-
tion), see infra notes 332-342 and accompanying text, and Tennessee (regarding causation
and future damages), see infra notes 399413 and accompanying text. Even in these states,
recent decisions of intermediate appellate courts have questioned the need for expressions
of reasonable medical certainty. See Dominguez v. St. John's Hosp., 632 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) ("[T]here is no magic to the phrase itself."); Hoffman v. Brandywine Hosp.,
661 A.2d 397, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("[T]estimony need not be expressed in precisely
the language used to enunciate the legal standard."); Youngblood v. Solomon, No. 03A10-
9601-CV-00037, 1996 WL 310015, at *4 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App.June 11, 1996) ("[T]he phrase
'reasonable medical certainty' is not a magic phrase which is required in the testimony of a
medical expert.").
68. See, e.g., Aguilera v. Mt. Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 668 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
("Proximate cause in a malpractice case must be established by expert testimony to 'a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty.'" (emphasis added)); Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803,
807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (per curiam) ("But if the doctor who was an expert in the field
and who had treated plaintiff would not say with reasonable medical certainty that the hernia
resulted from the accident, then certainly a jury composed of laymen would not be justi-
fied in making such a finding." (emphasis added)); McCann v. Amy Joy Donut Shops, A
Div. of Am. Snacks, Inc., 472 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("[C]ausation ...
was not in evidence" because "appellants' expert never stated that.he believed 'to a reason-
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damages.69 As embodied in substantive doctrine, the phrase figures
prominently in many controversial decisions in the fields of toxic torts
and medical malpractice.
In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs are denied recovery when their ex-
perts cannot testify with "reasonable medical certainty" that toxic ex-
posures were a cause of their current condition7" or that such
exposures will result in future injury or disease.71 Even the emerging
rules that address the uncertainty of toxic causation by allowing plain-
tiffs a limited measure of recovery for the emotional distress
associated with fear of disease72 or for the cost of medical monitor-
able degree of medical certainty' or that 'in his professional opinion' the pastries appellant ate
caused his gastritis." (emphasis added)); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn.
1993) ("Causation in fact is a matter of probability, not possibility, and in a medical mal-
practice case, such must be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." (emphasis ad-
ded)); Moore v. Walwyn, No. 01A01-9507-CV-00295, 1996 WL 17143, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 19, 1996) ("[T]he report failed to provide the expert testimony needed to contradict
appellee's affidavit because it failed to establish within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that the failure to use the antibiotics probably caused Mr. Moore's injuries." (emphasis
added)). For a discussion of pre-1970 cases addressing sufficiency of proof of causation,
see infra notes 415-436 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., South v. AMTRAK, 290 N.W.2d 819, 842 (N.D. 1980) ("In order to recover
for future medical services there must be substantial evidence to establish with reasonable
medical certainty that such future medical services are necessary." (emphasis added)). For a
discussion of pre-1970 cases addressing sufficiency of proof of future damages, see infra
notes 437-447 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, No. 85-1733, 1996 WL 241549, at *3 (9th Cir. May
9, 1996) (mem.) (stating that under Nevada law, "Roberts had not established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the radiation
caused the leukemias" (emphasis added)); Brown v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (In re
Paoli R.R_ Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d 717, 750-52 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that under Penn-
sylvania law, "We will uphold the district court's grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendants in those instances when the plaintiffs' expert states the [sic] he or she could not
testify that a plaintiff's illness was caused by PCBs with a reasonable degree of medical certainty"
(emphasis added)); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200, 1203-04 (6th
Cir. 1988) (stating that under Tennessee law, "In seeking damages for actual physical inju-
ries, a plaintiff must prove to a reasonable medical certainty that his or her injuries were
caused by a defendant's acts or omissions" (emphasis added)); Johnston v. United States,
597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) (mem.) ("Kansas law requires that causation must be
proven to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." (emphasis added)).
71. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-05 ("Tennessee law requires that the plaintiff
prove there is a reasonable medical certainty that the anticipated harm will result in order to
recover for a future injury." (emphasis added)); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 814-15 n.15 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) ("[C]laims seeking recovery for future injuries
that have less than a reasonable probability or medical certainty of occurring are denied as spec-
ulative." (emphasis added)); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1989)
("[U]nless plaintiff could prove to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that cancer was
more probable than not, his claim for increased risk of cancer could not be sustained."
(emphasis added)).
72. See David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating
Thereto, as Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R4TH 13, § 3, at 49-52 (1986).
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ing7' nevertheless require testimony with "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" as to the existence of a substantial risk of disease to justify the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs fear7 1 or the necessity of medical
monitoring.
75
In actions for medical malpractice, seriously ill patients who en-
tered treatment with less than a fifty-percent chance of recovery tradi-
tionally could not recover because of their inability to prove with
"reasonable medical certainty" that the physician's negligence was the
proximate cause of death, i.e., that "but for" the physician's malprac-
tice, the patient probably would have survived. 7' The phrase "reason-
able medical certainty" plays a role in recent decisions that allow these
plaintiffs to recover complete damages based on a finding that the
defendant's negligence substantially increased the risk of death,7 7 or
partial damages for the "lost chance" represented by the percentage
by which the defendant's negligence reduced the likelihood of
survival.78
The universal use of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty,"
and the importance that some courts attach to this phrase, cannot be
explained by its intrinsic meaning, for the phrase has no readily ap-
parent meaning. 79 The very notion of "reasonable certainty" is almost
73. See Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovey of Damages for Expense of Medical Monitor-
ing to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.5TH 327, § 6, at 346-49 (1994).
74. Cf Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205-06 & n.23 (noting that Tennessee law allows recovery
of emotional distress only if there is reasonable medical certainty that future injury or
disease is probable).
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 916 F.2d 829, 851
(3d Cir. 1990) (stating that under Pennsylvania law, "the appropriate inquiry is... whether
medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in order to
diagnose properly the warning signs of disease"); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984) ("The future expense of medical monitoring, could be
a recoverable consequential damage provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reason-
able degree of medical certainty that such expenditures are 'reasonably anticipated' to be
incurred by reason of their exposure."). But cf. Stead v. F.E. Myers Co., Div. of McNeil
Corp., 785 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D. Vt. 1990) ("[Qluantification of the increased risk to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty is not required." (emphasis added)).
76. SeeJohn D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54
A.L.R.4TH 10, § 10, at 62 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978) ("[A] prima facie case of
liability is established where expert medical testimony is presented to the effect that de-
fendant's conduct did, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, increase the risk that the
harm sustained by plaintiff would occur." (emphasis added)).
78. Cf Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) ("[I]t
is impossible for a medical expert to state with 'reasonable medical certainty' the effect of
the failure to diagnose on a specific patient, other than the fact that the failure to diagnose
eliminated whatever chance the patient would have had.").
79. In this regard, the definition of "reasonable certainty" is just as elusive as that of
"beyond a reasonable doubt." See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (stating that the
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an oxymoron,8 ° because the adjective "reasonable" qualifies and es-
sentially negates the absolute implications of the noun "certainty.""
Insertion of the adjective "medical" does not reduce the tension be-
tween "reasonable" and "certainty," for the concept of certainty is just
as elusive in medicine as in other scientific disciplines, 2 and perhaps
more so.
standard "beyond a reasonable doubt... defies easy explication"); id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) ("[T] he words 'beyond a reasonable doubt' are
not self-defining for jurors.").
80. See Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 165 n.10 (Wyo. 1989) ("In
technical context of the words themselves, it may not be totally facetious to compare 'rea-
sonably certain' with 'somewhat' pregnant or 'half' dead.").
81. One commentator criticizes the phrase "a fair degree of medical certainty":
If you analyze it, it doesn't mean anything. What's a "fair" degree? It's a weasel
word. It can mean almost whatever you want it to mean. And then what's a "fair
degree of certainty"? I thought certainty was 100%. And what's a "medical cer-
tainty" as opposed to some other kind of certainty?
Irving Younger, Expert Witnesses, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 267, 277 (1981). In Wheeler v. Central
Vermont Medical Center, Inc., 582 A.2d 165 (Vt. 1990), the Supreme Court of Vermont like-
wise found confusion in the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." The court explained
that "[w]hile 'reasonable degree of certainty' contains the word 'certainty,' which might
connote some marginally higher standard of proof than a mere preponderance, the modi-
fier 'reasonable' returns the standard to the level of preponderance." Id. at 170. Another
observer concludes that the word "reasonable" has the same effect in this phrase as it does
in the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt":
The source of the perplexity stems from the definitions of the root words
"certain" and "reasonable." "Certain" is defined as "sure; true; undoubted; un-
questionable." In comparison, "reason" is defined as "an explanation orjustifica-
tion of an act." Joined together as "reasonable certainty," the obvious literal
meaning of the phrase is absence of doubt after thoughtful analysis. In that phrase,
"reason" does not diminish the exactitude of "certainty." Instead, "reasonable"
explains how that exactitude is derived. Thus, the literal meaning of "reasonable
certainty" fits nicely with the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," but
clashes with the civil burden of "more likely than not."
Hullverson, supra note 18, at 589 (footnotes omitted).
82. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) ("[A] rguably,
there are no certainties in science."); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAw,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA XV (1995) ("Science.. . emerges from this analysis
not as an independent, self-regulating producer of truths about the natural world, but as a
dynamic social institution, fully engaged with other mechanisms for creating social and
epistemological order in modem societies."); Black, supra note 7, at 613-27 (discussing the
law's traditional "logical positivist" or "mechanistic materialist" "view of the scientific
method [which] implies an exactness and certainty that simply cannot exist"); Margaret G.
Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15
CARDozo L. REv. 2183, 2189-98 (1994) (contrasting the traditional "positivist" view of sci-
ence with the "constructionist" view, according to which "prediction can consist only in
statements about probability"); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995) (noting that under the "revised empiricist" view of
science, "[a] dynamic enterprise like science does not produce fixed, unassailable conclu-
sions.... [but rather] uncertainty among scientists is a natural state of affairs"); Laurence
H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics,
103 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) ("Science is not so much about proving as it is about improv-
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While some judges and attorneys assume that "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" must be a medical term of art,83 the meaning of which is
well known to physicians, nothing could be further from the truth.
Physicians are not accustomed to thinking in terms of certainty.84 Be-
cause physicians do not use the phrase in their daily practice, most
texts and journal articles addressed to medical audiences warn physi-
cians to expect lawyers and judges to insist upon the use of this unfa-
miliar terminology. 85 Physicians differ widely in their interpretation
of the phrase. Works written by physicians with legal training most
frequently advise physicians that the phrase "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" is a legal term of art meaning "more probable than not" or a
51% probability. 86 Nevertheless, physician witnesses frequently as-
sume that the phrase means something more than a probability,87 and
ing. To look to the natural sciences for authority-that is, for certainty-is to look for what
is not there.").
83. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) ("Within the medical disci-
pline, the traditional standard for 'factfinding' is a 'reasonable medical certainty.'").
84. See Earl F. Rose, A Pragmatic Approach to Medical Evidence and the Lawsuit, 5 U. TOL.
L. REv. 237, 252 (1974) ("[R]endering an expert opinion on disease or injury which re-
quires a degree of certainty presents a most vexing situation for a physician.... [P] hysicians
are unaccustomed to thinking in terms of certainty.").
85. See, e.g., HIoLD A. LIEBENSON, YOU, THE MEDICAL WITNESS 129 (1961) ("What is
this thing called 'reasonable degree of medical certainty'? It is a legal fiction."); Rappe-
port, supra note 17, at 8 ("As men of law they are trying to force us aliens to speak their
language.").
86. See, e.g., Douglas Danner & Elliot L. Sagall, Medicolegal Causation: A Source of Profes-
sional Misunderstanding, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 303, 305 (1977) ("The legal requirement for
establishing proximate cause generally is 'probability,' '50.1 percent,' 'more likely than
not,' or 'reasonable medical certainty'-all of which are requirements far less demanding
than the scientific proof sought by physicians."); Cyril H. Wecht, Forensic Use of Medical
Information, in LEGAL MEDICINE 558, 560 (S. Sandy Sanbar et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995) ("Rea-
sonable medical certainty is a catch phrase meaning 'more likely than not' in a medical
sense. In other words, if the likelihood of an event is more probable than not, given the
facts, the physician can testify with a 'reasonable medical certainty.'").
87. See, e.g., Brown v. Baden (In reYagman), 796 F.2d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 1986) (a
forensic pathologist testified, "I do not think there is sufficient evidence to say beyond a
reasonable-to a reasonable medical certainty death is by chokehold. But I think it is
more likely-51 percent versus 49 percent."); People v. Ahmad, 565 N.E.2d 137, 145 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (a forensic psychiatrist testified that "a reasonable degree [of medical cer-
tainty] is approximately 70 percent" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dellenbach v.
Robinson, 642 N.E.2d 638, 648 n.6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he medical expert misun-
derstood the term 'reasonable degree of medical certainty,' as requiring a higher standard
than probability."); Ritzschke v. Department of Labor & Indus., 454 P.2d 850, 851 (Wash.
1969) ("[The doctor] was asked the further question of whether his '.. . diagnosis [was]
based on possibility, probability or reasonable medical certainty?' He answered, 'I think it
would be between probability and reasonable medical certainty."' (ellipsis and second al-
teration in original)); State v. Terry, 520 P.2d 1397, 1403-04 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("Dr.
Lovell stated on three occasions that he could not give his opinion as to the cause of...
death with 'reasonable medical certainty' but that he could indicate a cause of death that
was 'more probable than not.'").
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they often assume it indicates a near absolute certainty, on the order
of 90% or even 99.99% probability,88 corresponding to the standard
of scientific proof that rules out the null hypothesis with 95% confi-
dence.8 9 In contrast to the prevailing view that "reasonable medical
certainty" represents some fixed quantitative standard, one physician
said that the phrase should mean "that level of certainty which a physi-
cian would use in making a similar clinical judgement,"9" implying
that the meaning of the phrase would vary according to the context.
For some physician witnesses, the phrase represents nothing more
than the formal expression of the concept of an "educated guess."91
Other physician witnesses have been completely unable to define the
term.
92
Nor has the legal profession achieved any consensus on the
meaning of the phrase.93 Most courts interpret "reasonable medical
88. See, e.g., Rhoto v. Ribando, 504 So. 2d 1119, 1122 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he
defendants averred the proper standard was a 'reasonable medical certainty,' which Dr.
Singer understood to mean 'almost 100% certain.'"); Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d
803, 805 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (providing testimony of a witness unwilling to equate 90%
likelihood of causation with reasonable medical certainty); State v. Austin, 368 N.E.2d 59,
64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) ("[The doctor testified,] 'when I speak of medical certainties, I
like to be up in the ninety-nine point nine nine percentage range.'").
89. See Hullverson, supra note 18, at 590-91 (explaining the null hypothesis and relat-
ing it to scientists' interpretations of "reasonable certainty"); see also Troyen A. Brennan,
Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance
Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 469, 510-12 (1988) (explaining statistical significance in rela-
tion to the null hypothesis); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv. 643, 682-94 (1992) (same); D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant, 61
WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1337-56 (1986) (same).
90. Rappeport, supra note 17, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See, e.g., Bridges v. Householder, 385 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) ("Dr.
Tauxe explained that by using the term 'educated guess' he meant an opinion 'based on a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, training, etc.'"); cf. Allith-Prouty Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 185 N.E. 267, 268 (Ill. 1933) ("[The witness] stated that by a degree of medical
certainty he meant 'the best we can ascertain-that is, the best we can guess.'").
92. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cervantes, 917 S.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (dis-
cussing a physician who at one point stated that "reasonable medical certainty" meant
"more likely than not" but later found that the two standards were not identical); see also
infra notes 428431, 462-463 (providing additional examples from excerpts of physician
testimony); cf Bondi v. Pole, 587 A.2d 285, 287 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1991) (discussing a
physician who defined "reasonable medical probability" as "[w] ithin the action of a normal
individual with good common sense and proper wits"); Schrantz v. Luancing, 527 A.2d
967, 968-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986) (discussing a physician who equated "reasonable medi-
cal probability" with "accepted standards of medical practice").
93. See JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAw OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 200 (2d
ed. 1986) ("Unfortunately, there has been little concensus [sic] on either the meaning of
this phrase or how strictly such semantic preferences should be enforced."); Black, supra
note 7, at 667-68 ("'Reasonable medical certainty' usually serves as nothing more than an
undefined label .... The wide variation in the way they apply the concept of reasonable
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certainty" as a substantive comment about the likelihood that a propo-
sition is true. While the majority equate "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" with "reasonable medical probability" or a preponderance of
the evidence standard,9 4 courts in a number of jurisdictions view the
"reasonable medical certainty" test as more demanding,9" perhaps
even approaching the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.9 6 More-
over, contrary to the prevailing view of the phrase as a comment on
the substantive likelihood that a proposition is true, a handful of courts
have declared that the phrase does not refer to the underlying statisti-
medical certainty makes it clear that the standard has no analytical value."); Firestone,
supra note 17, at 1 ("[T]he term is rarely given a clear definition in court opinions.");
Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Medical Testimony and the Expert Witness, in LEGAL MEDICINE, supra
note 86, at 141, 151 ("Courts differ, however, as to how much certainty is enough to consti-
tute a reasonable degree of medical certainty.").
94. See, e.g., Dallas v. Burlington N., Inc., 689 P.2d 273, 277 (Mont. 1984) (stating that
the evidentiary standard for "reasonable medical certainty" is satisfied "if medical testi-
mony is based upon an opinion that it is 'more likely than not'"); Lane v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 308 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Neb. 1981) (recognizing that the court has frequently
held that "reasonable certainty" and "reasonable probability" mean the same thing);
Wheeler v. Central Vt. Med. Ctr., Inc., 582 A.2d 165, 170 (Vt. 1990) (concluding that while
the word "certainty" may connote a standard higher than a preponderance, "the modifier
'reasonable' returns the standard to the level of preponderance"); National Indus. Con-
structors, Inc. v. Williams, No. 2009-95-3, 1996 WL 246496, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. May 14,
1996) (mem.) (holding that the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" standard re-
quires a "doctor to conclude that it is more probable than not"); In re Twining, 894 P.2d
1331, 1336-37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a number of Washington cases have
interpreted "reasonable medical certainty" to mean "more likely than not"). For pre-1970
authority, see infra notes 389-393, 416, 418.
95. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) (mem.)
("Kansas law requires that causation must be proven to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. A statistical method which shows a greater than 50% probability does not rise to
the required level of proof." (citations omitted)); Bowman v. Twin Falls Constr. Co., 581
P.2d 770, 775 (Idaho 1978) (holding that proof of causation to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty "is to ask for too much... [as] one cannot expect the claimant to prove
that his occupation necessarily caused his disabling condition"); Parker v. Employers Mut.
LIab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1969) (explaining that "reasonable medical cer-
tainty... is even more stringent than the reasonable medical probability required to sub-
mit a causation issue to the jury"); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483,
271 S.E.2d 335, 340-41 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that the trial court erred in using a "reason-
able medical certainty" standard when instructing the jury on causation, because a testify-
ing physician "need only state the matter in terms of a reasonable probability").
96. Cf Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 165-67 (Wyo. 1989) (re-
jecting the use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" in ajury instruction on future damages
because "'to say that proof of a fact must be made reasonably certain is by the literal im-
port of the words tantamount to saying the proof must be made beyond a reasonable
doubt'" (quoting McElroy v. Luster, 254 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, writ
ref'd))).
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cal probabilities but instead refers to the foundation for the opinion as
resting on established principles of medical science.97
Academic commentators mirror this split of authority. Most writ-
ers interpret the phrase as a substantive evaluation of the probabili-
ties, with many treating it as equivalent to "more probable than not,"98
while others view it as a higher standard.99 A distinguished minority,
however, interpret the phrase as indicating the existence of a scien-
tific foundation for the opinion as opposed to a comment on the un-
derlying probabilities.1 " °
Thus, while courts continue to attribute legal significance to ex-
pressions of "reasonable medical certainty," and attorneys routinely
97. See, e.g., Boose v. Digate, 246 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (reasonable medical
certainty "refers to the general consensus of recognized medical thought and opinion con-
cerning the probabilities of conditions in the future based on present conditions");
Schrantz v. Luancing, 527 A.2d 967, 969-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986) (same) (citing Boose, 246
N.E.2d at 53); cf. Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind.
1982) ("'[R]easonable certainty' is primarily a formulation designed to guarantee the
trustworthiness or reliability of the opinion offered, rather than the fact to be proved."
(citing Boose)). The opinion in Boose is discussed infra notes 461-467 and accompanying
text.
98. See, e.g., Danner & Sagall, supra note 86, at 305, 307 (equating "reasonable medical
certainty" with "probability," "50.1 percent," "more likely than not," or "reasonable medical
certainty"); Stein, supra note 19, at 220 (claiming that in expressing opinions with "'rea-
sonable degree of [whatever] certainty' . . . all we are going is using a fancy phrase for
'probably'" (alteration in original)).
99. Cf Hullverson, supra note 18, at 588-91 (noting that both the literal meaning of the
words and the high levels of certainty associated with scientific verification suggest a mean-
ing that "fits nicely with the criminal standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt,' but clashes
with the civil burden of 'more likely than not'"); Younger, supra note 81, at 277 (asserting
that an expert's opinion should be admissible only if the witness has a 75% conviction as to
its truth).
One commentator states:
Lawyers often elicit opinion testimony from a medical witness by asking if the
witness can offer an opinion "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." That
formulation is appropriate. Although reasonable certainty does not imply any
"special degree of certainty," it certainly means a degree of certainty less than
more probable than not.
Kermit V. Lipez, The Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases in Maine: Presentation, Impeachment,
and Controversy, 42 ME. L. REv. 283, 305 n.103 (1990) (emphasis added). While this ex-
cerpt says that "reasonable medical certainty" involves a lower degree of certitude than
.more probable than not," Judge Lipez or his editors may have inadvertently substituted
"less" for "more" in this passage.
100. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 44 n.5 ("The phrase
,reasonable degree of [scientific, medical, or other technical] certainty' refers to whether
the expert witness, in deriving an opinion, relied on an explanatory theory which experts
in the discipline substantially accept." (alteration in original)); Rose, supra note 84, at 252
("Reasonable medical certainty or reasonable medical probability means to the physician
that the conclusions which can be drawn from the data would have a high degree of ac-
ceptance by other qualified physicians." (footnote omitted)).
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use the phrase in eliciting expert testimony from medical witnesses,
none of the participants seems to know what the phrase means or why
it is being used. An inquiry into the creation and dissemination of the
phrase will explain how it took root and may help determine how best
to prune or eradicate it.
II. GENESIS: 1885-1935
The phrases "medical certainty" and "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" did not appear in any opinions prior to 1930 that are avail-
able on-line,10 1 nor could any reference to these phrases be
found in any legal materials prior to that date. Both "medical cer-
tainty" and "reasonable medical certainty" made their first appearance
during the 1930s in opinions of the Illinois state1"2 and federal
101. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases-old Database (Feb. 18, 1998) ("reasonable medical
certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 25 cases, none of which
was decided before 1930); Search of WESTLAW, Allcases-old Database (Jan. 26, 1998)
("medical certainty") (retrieving 37 cases, none of which was decided before 1930). The
research for this Part of the Article was conducted primarily within the WESTLAW Allcases,
Allcases-old, Allstates, Allstates-old, Allfeds, and Allfeds-old databases. References to "pub-
lished" opinions means opinions available in these databases. In order to track down pre-
cursors and variants of the phrase, the search terms "reasonable certainty," "medical
certainty," and "reasonable /s medical /s certainty" were used to find pre-1960 cases using
those terms.
Systematic research into the genesis and dissemination of the phrase would not have
been possible prior to the advent of on-line databases. Within West Publishing Company's
National Reporter System, the phrase can be found in the headnotes of only about 10% of
the opinions that contain the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." Searches of
WESTLAW, Allcases and Allcases-old Databases (Feb. 18, 1998) ("reasonable medical cer-
tainty" & da(bef 1960)) (retrieving 98 and 20 cases, respectively); Searches of WESTLAW,
Allcases and Allcases-Old Databases (Feb. 18, 1998) (he("reasonable medical certainty") &
da(bef 1960)) (retrieving 10 and 3 cases, respectively). Moreover, even this sample could
not be found through a manual search because of the multiplicity of contexts in which the
phrase may be relevant and the vagaries of the indexing system. The phrase has appeared
within headnotes under the key numbers of such diverse topics as Action kI 3, Appeal and
Error k30, Criminal Law kl0, Damages kl15, Death k117, Evidence k157, Federal Courts
k170B, Homicide k203, Insurance k217, Judgment k228, Physicians and Surgeons k299,
Pretrial Procedure k307A, Seamen k348, Trial k388, and Workers Compensation k413.
102. The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty" appeared in 10 opinions of the Illinois state courts during the 1930s. See Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 10 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. 1937); Ford Motor Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 192 N.E. 345, 346 (Ill. 1934); Burns v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 N.E.
225, 229 (Ill. 1934); Plano Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 190 N.E. 255, 260 (Ill. 1934);
Allith-Prouty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 N.E. 267, 268 (IIl. 1933); Sanitary Dist. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 175 N.E. 372, 373 (Ill. 1931); Gaydos v. Peterson, 20 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1939); Kilroy v. Retirement Bd. of Park Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 17
N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938); Ebbert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 336, 339
(Ill. App. Ct. 1937), aff/d, 16 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. 1938); People ex rel. Oemke v. Schuring, 6
N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937).
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courts.1"3 Only after 1940 did these phrases begin to appear in opin-
ions from other states.1
0 4
The available evidence suggests that the phrase "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" originated in Chicago prior to 1930 as a unique local
usage. Although its precise origins cannot be determined, the phrase
appears to have been generated by the efforts of Illinois attorneys to
accommodate two inconsistent rules of evidence that were adopted
almost simultaneously by the Illinois Supreme Court in the early years
of this century: the "reasonable-certainty rule," which prohibited ex-
perts from expressing speculative opinions about damages, and the
"ultimate-issue rule," which prohibited experts from "invading the
province of the jury" by expressing definitive opinions on disputed
issues. i'0 These rules received intense criticism from Northwestern
University's Dean John Henry Wigmore, both in law review articles 0 6
and in his treatise on evidence,'0 7 but they remained the law of Illinois
for more than half a century.'
0 8
103. The phrase appeared in two cases involving appeals ofjudgments entered following
trials in the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois. See Mangol v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1939); Alexander v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.,
68 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1933).
104. See discussion infra Part III.B.
105. See infra notes 109-120 for a discussion of the reasonable-certainty rule, and infra
notes 121-138 for a discussion of the ultimate-issue rule. Cf Huliverson, supra note 18, at
587 ("In the early part of this century, trial lawyers charted a course of dialogue between
the Scylla of inadmissible speculation, and the Charybdis of invading the province of the
jury."). See generally WILARD L. KING & DOUGLASS PILLINGER, A STUDY OF THE LAW OF OPIN-
ION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 71-88 (1942) (providing a definitive analysis of the impact of
these doctrines in Illinois).
106. SeeJohn H. Wigmore, Evidence: Opinion as to Cause of Injury.-[Illinois], 26 ILL. L.
REv. 431, 432 (1931) [hereinafter Wigmore, Cause of Injury] (complaining that these rules
"have now reached such a climax of nonsense that they are almost symptomatic of some
general failing in the professional intellect");John H. Wigmore, Comment, Evidence: Opin-
ion of a Medical Expert as to Causes of Plaintiffs illness, 2 ILL. L. REV. 467, 467 (1908) [herein-
after Wigmore, Medical Expert] (referring to the ultimate-issue rule as "the quibbling view"
and applauding its apparent demise).
107. See 4 WIGMORE, second edition, supra note 31, § 1920, at 115-16 (criticizing the
ultimate-issue rule in a section entitled "Usurping the Function of the Jury"); id. § 1976, at
198 (criticizing the reasonable-certainty rule in a section entitled "Probability and Possibil-
ity; Capacity and Tendency; Cause and Effect"); see also 3 WIGMORE, first edition, supra note
31, § 1920, at 2555-56 (explaining that allowing an expert witness to express his opinion
risks usurping the function of the jury).
108. See infra notes 141-146, 450-458.
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A. The Reasonable-Certainty Rule
The reasonable-certainty rule, which is still discussed in many ju-
risdictions,1 °9 relates to the standard of proof for establishing dam-
ages, especially with respect to conditions or illnesses that the plaintiff
might suffer in the future. To prevent sympathetic juries from award-
ing substantial damages based on speculation that the plaintiffs con-
dition might not improve or might worsen, in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, courts in many jurisdictions developed a "rule of
certainty" that required plaintiffs to establish proof of future damages
with certainty through expert medical testimony. ° Recognizing that
medical science would not warrant expressions of "absolute certainty,"
these courts declared that the rule could be satisfied by expressions of
"reasonable certainty."1 1 ' Although the reasonable-certainty rule ini-
tially was expressed as a rule relating to sufficiency of proof, courts in
several states extended it to questions of admissibility, ruling that spec-
ulative or conjectural testimony, expressed with insufficient certainty,
was not probative and therefore not admissible.
112
109. Several opinions explicitly refer to a "rule of certainty" or "reasonable-certainty
rule" as a standard of proof in tort law. See, e.g., Allen v. Devereaux, 426 P.2d 659, 661
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (following the rule); Largent v. Acuff, 317 S.E.2d 111, 114 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984) (same);Johnson v. English, 214 N.E.2d 254, 259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (same);
Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tenn. 1990) (applying the discovery rule to a
statute of limitations for latent diseases, because the "reasonable certainty rule" precluded
recovery at the time of exposure); Robinson v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 953, 958-59
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that while the rule prevails in some jurisdic-
tions, it is not recognized in Texas); Peck v. Bez, 40 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 1946) (following
the rule); Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 163-64 (Wyo. 1989) (re-
jecting the rule). A search of WESTLAW for "rule of certainty" discloses that courts also
use this phrase to describe doctrines relating to civil pleadings, contract damages, and
criminal indictments, as well as in a number of unrelated contexts. Search of WESTLAW,
Allcases Database (Jan. 26, 1998) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & to(110) /p "rule of certainty")
(retrieving 1 case under the topic "Civil Pleadings"); Search of WESTLAW, Allcases
Database (Jan. 26, 1998) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & to(115) /p "rule of certainty") (retrieving 7
cases under the topic "Contract Damages"); Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Jan.
28, 1998) (da(bef 1/1/1997) & to(302) /p "rule of certainty") (retrieving 3 cases under
the topic "Criminal Indictments").
110. See Martin, supra note 27, at 786-97 (providing a discussion on the development of
the rule of certainty in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois).
111. E.g., McClain v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 22 N.E. 1062, 1064 (N.Y. 1889); McCrosson v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 129 A. 568, 568-69 (Pa. 1925). Not all courts required
expressions of reasonable certainty; in fact, many held that expressions of "reasonable
probability" sufficed. E.g., Griswold v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 21 N.E. 726, 726 (N.Y.
1889); Gallamore v. City of Olympia, 75 P. 978, 980 (Wash. 1904).
112. The leading case was Strohm v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co., 96 N.Y.
305 (1884). See 2 WIGMORE, second edition, supra note 31, § 1976, at 200 (noting that
courts "sometimes misapply the Opinion rule," requiring experts to express only those
opinions that are certain or fairly probable, and excluding from evidence an expert's opin-
ion expressed in terms of possibility only); see also Hassman, supra note 63, at 25-27 (citing
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In Illinois, the reasonable-certainty rule was well established by
the end of the nineteenth century.113 The Illinois Supreme Court ini-
tially treated the requirement that damages be proved with reasonable
certainty as a rule of substantive proof, enforceable by appropriate
jury instructions and appellate review.114 In two later opinions, one
from 1909 and one from 1910, however, the court ruled that unduly
speculative medical testimony about the consequences of an injury
was inadmissible ab initio."5 In Amann v. Chicago Consol. Traction
Co.," 6 the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that the trial court
erred in allowing a physician to discuss the "possibility" that the injury
"might aggravate" the plaintiffs existing paralysis." 7  In Lauth v.
Chicago Union Traction Co.,1" 8 the court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff because of an error in allowing a physician to answer a hypo-
cases which held that in order to be admissible, expert medical testimony as to future
consequences of an injury must be expressed with reasonable certainty).
113. See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Conway, 48 N.E. 483, 484 (Ill. 1897) (holding
that in order for an alleged disability to be a ground for damages, it must be "reasonably
certain to result from the injury").
114. E.g., Donnelly v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 85 N.E. 233, 235 (Ill. 1908); Chicago & M.
Elec. Ry. Co. v. Ullrich, 72 N.E. 815, 816 (Ill. 1904). In Donnelly, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that a physician's testimony was "uncertain and conjectural" and
found that it was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff:
Damages can only be recovered for future disability when it is reasonably certain
that it was the result of the alleged injury....
... The question whether this dislocation would have a tendency to predis-
pose the shoulder to a second dislocation was a proper subject for expert testi-
mony. We think it was correct practice for the court to permit appellee to prove
the facts with reference to these subsequent dislocations and submit the question
of their cause, as one of fact, to the jury, under proper instructions, as was done
here.
85 N.E. at 235.
115. See Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434 (Ill. 1910); Amann v.
Chicago Consol. Traction Co., 90 N.E. 673, 674 (Ill. 1909); accord KING & PILLINGER, supra
note 105, at 90 (referring to Amann and Lauth in noting that "the prior rule seems to have
been reversed by two cases decided in 1910 [sic] which now dominate the field").
116. 90 N.E. 673 (Ill. 1909).
117. Id. at 674. The court explained:
The witness was then asked if the abrasion would tend to make the paralysis worse
or aggravate it, and he answered that it might aggravate it. On motion to strike
out the answer the court ruled that it might stand, and, the witness being asked
what would be the probabilities, he said he could not tell. These rulings were
wrong. A mere possibility, or even a reasonable probability, that future pain or
suffering may be caused by an injury, or that some disability may result therefrom,
is not sufficient to warrant an assessment of damages.... To justify a recovery for
future damages the law requires proof of a reasonable certainty that they will be
endured in the future.
Id. The court affirmed the judgment, however, because the damages awarded by the jury
did not exceed the amount warranted by the admissible evidence. Id.
118. 91 N.E. 431 (Ill. 1910).
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thetical question about the possibility that the plaintiff might die if his
hernia strangulated and was not promptly treated." 9 Thereafter, Illi-
nois courts consistently treated the rule of "reasonable certainty" as a
standard governing the admissibility of medical opinion testimony on
the subject of future damages.' 20
B. The Ultimate-Issue Rule
At almost exactly the same time that the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois established a reasonable-certainty rule that mandated expression
of definitive medical opinions on the question of future injuries, the
court also adopted an ultimate-issue rule that prohibited expression of
definitive medical opinions on the question of causation of existing in-
juries.12 1 The rationale for the ultimate-issue rule stemmed from judi-
cial fear that definitive testimony by expert witnesses would so
overwhelm the jurors as to prevent reasoned deliberation and thus
"usurp" the jury's function.122 To prevent experts from "invading the
province of the jury," Illinois and a number of other states required
that expert opinions on the "ultimate issue" of causation be expressed
with qualifications such as "may," "might," or "could" instead of the
more definitive "is," "did," or "will. '"123
119. Id. at 435. The court declared:
To form a proper basis for recovery, however, it is necessary that the conse-
quences relied on must be reasonably certain to result. They cannot be purely
speculative....
.. Before death could result two contingencies must arise: First, the stran-
gulation of the bowel; and, second, the inability to reduce it. The first, consider-
ing the experience of appellee and the liability of all hernias to become
strangulated, is quite probable, while the second is a remote possibility.... There
is not such a degree of probability that death will result from this injury as
amounts to a reasonable certainty, and it was error to admit this testimony.
Id. at 434-35.
120. See, e.g., Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 111 N.E. 499, 502 (111. 1916);
Lyons v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 101 N.E. 211, 214 (Ill. 1913); Gaydos v. Peterson, 20 N.E.2d
837, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939); see also ]KING & PILLINGER, supra note 105, at 92 n.67 (noting
additional early cases).
121. For the definitive account of the development of the ultimate-issue in Illinois
through 1942, see KING & PILLINGER, supra note 105, at 1-20, 73-85. For a more abbreviated
treatment that includes the rule's demise, see Martin, supra note 27, at 793-97.
122. 3 WiGMORE, first edition, supra note 31, § 1920, at 2555; H.D. Warren, Annotation,
Admissibility of Opinion Evidence as to Cause of Death, Disease, or Injury, 66 A.L.R.2D 1082, § 6,
at 1112-18 (1959).
123. See 4 WIGMORE, second edition, supra note 31, § 1920, at 115; 3 WIGMORE, first edi-
tion, supra note 31, § 1920, at 2555; Warren, supra note 122, at 1112; see also Cherry v.
Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 436-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the history of the ultimate-
issue rule in North Carolina); cf. Richard L. Miller, The Rule of Medical Certainty, in Evi-
DENcE: THE RULE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY 4, 4-7 (The Defense Research Inst., Inc. Series,
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Illinois first adopted the ultimate-issue rule in the 1904 case of
Illinois Cent. K Co. v. Smith.12 4 In Smith, the court reversed ajudgment
for the plaintiff, because two medical expert witnesses had testified
that the injury to the plaintiff's foot had been caused by contact with
an uneven surface (testimony consistent with the plaintiff's allegation
that his foot went through a hole in the platform and into machinery
below) and not by a flat or even surface. 125 The court said that wit-
nesses are permitted to testify about what "might have caused" the
injury but not what "did cause" the injury.126 Analyzing the trial testi-
mony, the court noted that "the opinions of the physicians took the
form, not of opinions as to how the injury might have been produced,
but of direct testimony as to how it occurred and what caused it, which
was the very question which the jury were called upon to decide." 127
Hence, the court concluded that the trial court erred in permitting
the physicians to "usurp the province of the jury."128
The incongruity of the ultimate-issue rule with the reasonable-
certainty rule manifested itself in the Illinois Supreme Court's 1907
opinion in Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Ertrachter.129 In Ertrachter, the
1967) (criticizing courts that allowed testimony in the "might or could" form, without ac-
knowledging that many courts at one time required testimony in that form).
124. 70 N.E. 628 (Ill. 1904).
125. Id. at 631-32.
126. After reviewing at great length the prior authorities from Illinois and otherjurisdic-
tions, the court concluded:
An examination of those cases discloses the fact that they, generally, are cases
where physicians have been allowed to express an opinion as to what might have
caused the injury, the cause of which was then being investigated; but none of
them, so far as we have been able to discover, sustain a course of examination
which calls for an opinion from the expert as to what caused the injury, and they
all recognize the fact that the question of what did cause the injury is a question of
fact for the jury, and not for the witness.
Id. at 631 (emphasis added). King and Pillinger commented that "[t]his is hardly a fair
statement of the prior cases." KING & PILLINGER, supra note 105, at 73 n.5.
127. Smith, 70 N.E. at 631.
128. Id. at 629. The court explained:
[T]o permit the witnesses to testify the injury was caused from the foot being
caught between two uneven, and not two even, surfaces, was to permit them to
usurp the province of the jury, and to testify to the facts which were to be deter-
mined by the jury, which all the authorities agree is not permissible.
Id.
129. 81 N.E. 816 (Ill. 1907). The discussion in this paragraph of the text draws upon the
following excerpt from the court's opinion:
Several physicians testified, for appellee, that the accident set out in the declara-
tion could or might have caused the still-birth of the child in 1903 and the miscar-
riage in 1905. Appellant insists that this evidence is too conjectural to be
admitted; that such evidence must show with reasonable certainty what the conse-
quences are-not what might possibly follow. One of the physicians testified posi-
tively that in his judgment the accident caused the child to be still-born and the
1998]
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defendant's counsel invoked the ultimate-issue rule and objected
when "[o] ne of the physicians testified positively that in his judgment
the accident caused the child to be still-born and the miscarriage. ''13 0
After this objection was sustained, plaintiffs counsel apparently re-
phrased the question to obtain a qualified opinion whether the acci-
dent "could or might have caused" these damages. Defendant's coun-
sel then objected that the question was unduly speculative. This
second objection was overruled, and the defendant contended on ap-
peal that the evidence on this aspect of damages was "conjectural"
because it was not expressed with "reasonable certainty.1 3 1 Affirming
the decision below, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the qualified
opinion testimony was appropriate and not improperly speculative.
The court pointed out the inconsistency in counsel's objection to the
speculativeness of the testimony, inasmuch as the questions were "be-
ing asked in the form that he had apparently contended for when he
had obtained the court's ruling striking out the answer wherein the
physician testified positively."13 9
Subsequent cases substantially limited the Smith rule,13 3 and Dean
Wigmore wrote a case note lauding the Illinois court for its apparent
miscarriage. This answer was stricken out, on motion of appellant, as improperly
invading the province of the jury. In making this motion appellant apparently
cited, and the court in ruling relied on, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Smith, 208 111.
608, 70 N.E. 628. After this motion was allowed, appellant's counsel objected to
questions being asked in the form that he had apparently contended for when he
had obtained the court's ruling striking out the answer wherein the physician
testified positively that in his judgment the accident caused the birth of the child
still-born and the miscarriage.
Id. at 818.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts, 82 N.E. 401, 402 (Ill. 1907) ("It is
entirely immaterial whether the witness testified that the injury was the cause of the condi-
tion, or that the injury was sufficient to cause the condition or might have caused it....
The question may be asked in either form." (emphasis added)); City of Chicago v. Didier,
81 N.E. 698, 700 (Ill. 1907) (holding that the restrictions of the ultimate-issue rule are
inapplicable "where there is no dispute as to the manner of the injury"); City of Chicago v.
McNally, 81 N.E. 23, 25 (Ill. 1907) (determining that a physician could testify that a condi-
tion "must have been caused by some traumatism or injury" (emphasis added)); see also KING &
PILLINGER, supra note 105, at 76 ("In 1907, the Supreme Court made a series of exceptions
to the rule of Illinois C. RR. Co. v. Smith, which considerably weakened the force of that
case as a precedent." (footnote omitted)).
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repudiation of Smith."' Thus, by 1909 it appeared that Smith "was in
the process of being overruled by erosion." ' 5
In the following decade, however, the Illinois Supreme Court re-
interpreted these exceptions and reaffirmed its mandate for qualified
expressions of expert opinion with respect to disputed facts.' 3 6 The
1916 opinion in Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co.137 represented
the court's most definitive statement of the ultimate-issue rule:
One of the objections of the plaintiff in error to the
foregoing questions was that they were improper, as invading
the province of the jury and calling for an opinion on an
ultimate fact. Where there is a conflict in the evidence, as in
this case, as to whether or not the party suing was injured in
the manner charged, it is not competent for witnesses, even
though testifying as experts, to give their opinions on the
very fact the jury is to determine....
.. A physician may be asked whether the facts stated in
a hypothetical question are sufficient, from a medical or sur-
gical point of view, to cause and bring about a certain condi-
tion or malady, or he may be asked whether or not a given
condition or malady of a person may or could result from and be
caused by the facts stated in the hypothetical question; but he
134. See Wigmore, Medical Expert, supra note 106. The Note, reproduced below in its
entirety, demonstrates both the strength of Wigmore's convictions and the fallibility of his
predictions:
In Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts, 229 Ill. 481, 82 N.E. 401 (Oct. 23, 1907),
the Supreme Court plainly decides, per Dunn, J., writing the opinion, that "it is
entirely immaterial whether the witness testified that the injury was the cause of
the condition, or that the injury was sufficient to cause the condition or might
have caused it. * * * The question may be asked in either form." We note with
pleasure this plain declaration of a common-sense rule, because the question
(which is a common one in personal-injury cases) has lately been the subject of
much vain quibbling in some Courts, notably in that of Missouri. Even in our
own State the quibbling view (by which the latter form of the question is alone
allowed) was approved as recently as the opinion in Illinois Central R Co. v. Smith,
208 Ill. 608, 70 N.E. 628 (1904). Three years afterward the sound view was taken
in Chicago v. Didier, 227 Ill. 517, 81 N.E. 698 (1907), followed in Chicago Union
Traction Co. v. Ertrachter, 228 Ill. 114, 81 N.E. 816 (1907). The Roberts case now
clinches this. We may expect to hear no more of the Smith case on this point.
Requiescat in pace; haud nimis infantem sepeliverunt mortuum.
Id. (star ellipsis in original). As recounted infra, reports of Smith's death were premature.
135. KING & PILLINGER, supra note 105, at 80.
136. See id. at 80-83 (discussing cases which held that medical experts may testify that a
subsequent condition was caused by the original injury only when there is no dispute as to
the manner and cause of the injury); see also Schlauder v. Chicago & S. Traction Co., 97
N.E. 233, 236 (Ill. 1911) (holding that it was improper for a medical expert to testify that
the plaintiffs injury had no relation to or connection with the accident).
137. 111 N.E. 499 (Ill. 1916).
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should not be asked whether or not such facts did cause and
bring about such condition or malady.
1 3 8
C. Tension Between the Two Rules
The ultimate-issue rule was directly inconsistent with the reason-
able-certainty rule, both in its underlying premises and in its applica-
tion. Dean Wigmore was an early and vociferous critic of these rules,
especially as applied by the courts of his own state. In the first and
second editions of his treatise, Wigmore had this to say about the ulti-
mate-issue rule's prohibition against "usurping the function of the
jury":
This phrase is made to imply a moral impropriety or a tacti-
cal unfairness in the witness' expression of opinion. In this
aspect the phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that
it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty
rhetoric. There is no such reason for the rule, because the
witness, in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to
"usurp" the jury's function, nor could if he desired.1"9
With respect to the reasonable-certainty rule, Wigmore criticized the
decisions that had transformed the rule from a standard of proof into
a limitation on admissibility. In the second edition of his treatise, he
noted the inconsistency between these decisions and those requiring
qualified expressions of opinion under the ultimate-issue rule:
It should be added that Courts sometimes misapply the
Opinion rule to enforce the doctrine of Torts that a recovery
for future personal injuries must include only the certain or
fairly probable, but not the merely possible consequences; so
that the judge instead of covering the subject by an instruc-
tion to the jury as to the measure of recovery, excludes from
evidence a physician's opinion expressed in terms of possibil-
ity only. This attempt to control the course of expert testi-
mony is of course unreasonable in itself. But its
unsoundness becomes the more notable when the same
Court is found ruling, in another line of precedents, that the
physician may express an opinion as to what might have
caused an injury, but not as to what did cause it. In other
words, possibility, as affecting consequences, is tabooed, and
138. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
139. 3 WIGMORE, first edition, supra note 31, § 1920, at 2556 (footnote omitted). Wig-
more repeated this oft-quoted criticism verbatim in the second edition. See 4 WIGMORE,
second edition, supra note 31, § 1920, at 115-16.
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only actuality is to be accepted; but possibility, as affecting
causes, is sanctioned, while actuality is tabooed.
This is only one of the many instances in which the sub-
tle mental twistings produced by the Opinion rule have re-
duced this part of the law to a congeries of non-sense which
is comparable to the incantations of medieval sorcerers and
sullies the name of Reason.
1 40
Despite the obvious inconsistency between these two rules and
the strong criticism from Dean Wigmore, the Illinois courts persisted
in their adherence to the reasonable-certainty and ultimate-issue
rules.' 41 While there has been "some diversity in the application" of
the reasonable-certainty rule, 142 the Illinois courts have recognized it
even as recently at 1991.143 With respect to the ultimate-issue rule,
Dean Wigmore's view eventually prevailed. 44 Long after the courts of
140. 4 WiGMoRE, second edition, supra note 31, § 1976, at 200-06. The two quoted
paragraphs did not appear in the first edition of the treatise. See 3 WIGMORE, first edition,
supra note 31, § 1976. In the second edition, this section was over eight pages long, more
than double its length in the first edition. The three paragraphs of text (one old, two new)
were supported by a single footnote consisting of roughly seven pages of small print in
which Wigmore summarized all of the pertinent cases from each state. Wigmore devoted
nearly a full page of the footnote to cases from Illinois, most of which post-dated the first
edition of his treatise. About Smith, Wigmore said, "[T]his is a good example of that legal
quibbling which creates for the law of trials a disrespect in the minds of competent physi-
cians... ." 4 WIGMORE, second edition, supra note 31, § 1976, at 200 n.1. About Fellows-
Kimbrough, Wigmore added, "unsound; if there is no dispute as to the cause, why take
testimony on the point; ... the error arises from a misquotation of Chicago v. Didier...."
Id.
141. With respect to the ultimate-issue rule, the Illinois courts were not alone in ignor-
ing Wigmore's advice:
The father of the idea of repealing the ultimate-issue rule is Dean Wigmore,
who, as early as 1899, in his edition of Greenleaf on Evidence dropped out en-
tirely the sections of the prior editions relating to the ultimate-issue rule and in-
serted a condemnation of that rule. He has maintained the same position
throughout the subsequent editions of his work on Evidence. Despite the great
deference universally paid Wigmore, both in England and America, as the lead-
ing authority on evidence, the courts have not followed his ideas on this subject.
Instead, by a great flood of decisions, they have adopted and strengthened the
ultimate-issue rule ....
KING & PILUNGER, supra note 105, at 19 (footnotes omitted).
142. Id. at 92 & n.67.
143. See, e.g., Rainey v. City of Salem, 568 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting
an objection to testimony about future damages as "based on mere surmise or conjecture,"
because the opinion was expressed with "reasonable medical certainty"); see also Overocker
v. Retoff, 234 N.E.2d 820, 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("[T]he doctor should not have been
allowed to give his opinion as to what 'might' develop in the future."); Gaydos v. Peterson,
20 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939) (noting that testimony that opacities "may be per-
manent" should have been stricken, because the opinion was not held with "reasonable
medical certainty").
144. See infra notes 450-455 and accompanying text.
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other jurisdictions had begun to heed Wigmore's advice, 145 however,
he remained a prophet without honor in his own land.' 46
D. The Genesis of "Reasonable Medical Certainty" in Illinois
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" quite obviously derives
from the phrase "reasonable certainty." Given the relationship be-
tween the latter phrase and the rule of certainty applicable to medical
testimony about future damages, one might have expected to find the
earliest examples of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in the
examination of doctors on the subject of the permanence or future
consequences of their patients' injuries. Surprisingly, however, none
of the earliest appearances of the phrase involved testimony about fu-
ture damages. 147 Even more surprisingly, nearly all of the earliest ap-
pearances of the phrase occurred in questions about causation, 4 8 a
topic on which definitive expressions of opinion were forbidden by
the ultimate-issue rule.
While it would be understandable if attorneys cognizant of the
reasonable-certainty rule had begun to phrase questions about future
damages with expressions of reasonable certainty, it is not readily ap-
parent why attorneys would use this phrase in asking questions about
causation. It is possible that once attorneys had developed the practice
of using the phrase "reasonable certainty" in hypothetical questions
about damages, they became so habituated to its use that they began
to include the phrase in all hypothetical questions posed to physi-
cians-including those addressing the issue of causation-without any
conscious awareness that the phrase was not appropriate in this partic-
ular context. Another possibility is that attorneys purposely prefaced
their questions about causation with the "reasonable certainty" formu-
lation in an effort to offset or mask the conjectural nature of the quali-
fied opinions they were required to elicit under the ultimate-issue
145. See infra note 449.
146. The Illinois courts adhered to the ultimate-issue rule throughout the 1950s, insist-
ing that medical experts express opinions on causation in the qualified "might or could"
form. E.g., Smith v. Illinois Valley Ice Cream Co., 156 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959);
Santiemmo v. Days Transfer, Inc., 133 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956). In Clifford-
Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Commission, 166 N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ill. 1960), the Illinois
Supreme Court at last rejected the ultimate-issue rule to the extent of allowing experts to
give definitive medical opinions on causation when asked to assume the truth of facts testi-
fied to, even if they were in dispute. See discussion infra notes 450-453 and accompanying
text.
147. The phrase did not appear in conjunction with testimony about future damages
until the 1939 case, Gaydos v. Peterson, 20 N.E.2d 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939), discussed infra
notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
148. See cases cited infra notes 168 and 179.
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rule.149 While we probably will never know why attorneys began to use
the phrase "reasonable certainty" to preface questions about causa-
tion, we do know that by 1913 at least one member of the Illinois bar
had done so.
1 50
A search of all published American cases in which the three
words-"reasonable," "medical," and "certainty"-appear in a single
sentence and are used together to express the concept of "reasonable
medical certainty" identified a singular Illinois opinion from which
the phrase is reasonably certain to have originated.' Although these
three words appear in the same sentence in a number of earlier opin-
ions, the first case in which they are employed in the sense of "reason-
able medical certainty" is Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,
15 2
the 1916 opinion in which the Illinois Supreme Court definitively re-
affirmed the ultimate-issue rule.
15 3
The plaintiff in Fellows-Kimbrough had sought recovery for various
ailments, including breast cancer and a traumatic neurasthenia, alleg-
edly resulting from injuries sustained when she was thrown to the
floor of a railway car when two trains collided.' 54 At the 1913 trial,1
55
149. Courts and commentators in North Carolina noted that the phrase "reasonable
medical certainty" served to mask the speculative character of "might or could" opinion
testimony that was required under the ultimate-issue rule in that state. A leading authority
on the law of evidence in North Carolina observed:
Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964), interpreted literally,
created a dilemma-i.e., "could or might" was not positive enough to justify a
finding, but no more positive opinion was admissible. In practice, the dilemma
was resolved by treating "could or might" as sufficient, though the questions were
frequently embroidered by such phrases as "to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty."
1 HENRY BRAsNis, JR., BP ANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 137, at 549 n.57 (2d rev.
ed. 1982) (quoted in Cherry v. Harrell, 353 S.E.2d 433, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
150. See infra text accompanying note 156.
151. Astute readers will note that this opinion is expressed with a reasonable degree of
legal certainty.
152. 111 N.E. 499, 502 (Ill. 1916).
153. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
154. FeUows-Kimbrough, 111 N.E. at 500-01. As described in the opinion, the plaintiff
emerges as a striking character who led a difficult life. The court noted that she was "a
colored woman and physician in active practice and earning $200 per month by her profes-
sion .... Her evidence also tended to show that she was a strong, robust, lively, energetic
woman of the age of 41 years and weighing 250 pounds when injured." Id. at 501. In
addition to denying liability, the defendant asserted that her traumatic neurasthenia was
"the result of a series of troubles that she experienced as the result of three marriages and
two divorces and two long spells of sickness and confinement in a hospital, during which
time she underwent two severe surgical operations." Id.
155. The accident occurred in 1907. At the first trial, in 1909, the jury rendered a ver-
dict for the plaintiff in the amount of $7000, and the trial court subsequently ordered a
remittitur reducing the award to $4000. The appellate court then reversed this judgment
because of improper conduct by one of the plaintiffs attorneys. At the second trial, in
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plaintiff's counsel posed the following hypothetical question to the
plaintiffs physician:
"Doctor, referring to the supposititous [sic] or hypothetical
patient and taking into account the elements of the hypothe-
sis, have you an opinion as a medical man, and based upon rea-
sonable certainty, as to what was the cause of the neurasthenia
and the tumor in the hypothetical patient?"156
The court held that this question was improper because it called for a
definitive opinion by asking what "was" the cause instead of what "may
or could be" the cause.'57 Although the court held that the question
was improper because it called for a definitive opinion, the court did
not criticize the use of the phrase "reasonable certainty." Moreover,
earlier in the opinion, the court encouraged the expression of medical
opinions with "reasonable certainty" insofar as it found error in the
admission of testimony about future damages that it deemed unduly
speculative under the reasonable-certainty rule. 1 58
Given the court's holding that the error in the above question
stemmed from the use of the word "was" instead of "might or could,"
an attorney seeking to rephrase that question in accordance with the
court's holding could request a medical opinion about causation in
the "might or could" form and yet retain the reference to "reasonable
certainty." Literal compliance with the court's directions would yield
the following rephrasing of the lawyer's question:
March 1913, the jury rendered a verdict for $3750, upon which judgment was entered.
The case reached the Supreme Court of Illinois from the appellate court's affirmance of
the judgment in this second trial. Id. at 500-01.
156. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
157. The court stated:
A physician may be asked whether the facts stated in a hypothetical question are
sufficient, from a medical or surgical point of view, to cause and bring about a
certain condition or malady, or he may be asked whether or not a given condition
or malady of a person may or could result from and be caused by the facts stated
in the hypothetical question; but he should not be asked whether or not such
facts did cause and bring about such condition or malady.
Id.
158. With regard to the testimony about future damages, the court said:
It is clear that the evidence thus elicited and objected to by plaintiff in error is
purely speculative evidence-that is, the conjecture of the witness as to conse-
quences that are mere possibilities-and was therefore incompetent.
... Mere surmise or conjecture cannot be regarded as proof of an existing
fact or of a future condition that will result. Expert witnesses can only testify or give
their opinion as to future consequences that are shown to be reasonably certain to follow.
Id. (emphasis added). The italicized sentence also appeared in the third headnote to the
opinion, indexed under "Evidence k547-Experts-Scope of Opinion." Id. at 500 head-
note 3.
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Doctor, [based on the assumed facts], have you an opinion
as a medical man, and based upon reasonable certainty, as to what
may or could have been the cause of [plaintiff's condition]?
Moreover, the court itself suggested an alternative rephrasing of the
question when it declared:
A physician may be asked whether the facts stated in a hypo-
thetical question are sufficient, from a medical or surgical point
of view, to cause and bring about a certain condition or mal-
ady, or he may be asked whether or not a given condition or
malady of a person may or could result from and be caused
by the facts stated in the hypothetical question .... "'
The West Publishing Company incorporated this passage in one of
the headnotes,16 ° thereby encouraging attorneys to use this phrase in
formulating questions on causation. Replacing "as a medical man"
with "from a medical or surgical point of view" would yield the follow-
ing question:
Doctor, [based on the assumed facts], have you an opinion
from a medical and surgical point of view, and based upon reason-
able certainty, as to what may or could have been the cause of
[plaintiffs condition]?
Questions in almost precisely this form appeared in Goldstein's 1935
manual on Trial Technique
Doctor, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable certainty
and from a medical and surgical viewpoint, if the facts assumed
could cause the condition assumed and existing up to the
present time?1 61
... Doctor, assuming these facts to be true, have you an
opinion based upon reasonable certainty, and from a medical and
surgical standpoint as to whether there might or could be a causal
connection between the accident described and the condition
of ill-being found as set forth in this question?162
159. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
160. The fifth headnote to the opinion, indexed under "Evidence k553-Expert Wit-
ness-Hypothetical Question," reads:
A physician may be asked whether the facts stated in a hypothetical question
are sufficient from a medical or surgical point of view to bring about a certain condi-
tion or malady, or he may be asked whether or not a given condition or malady of
a person may or could result from the facts stated in the hypothetical question.
Id. at 500 headnote 5 (emphasis added).
161. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, § 507, at 455 (emphasis added).
162. Id. § 523, at 465 (emphasis added).
1998]
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Beginning in the 1940s, Illinois attorneys frequently employed these
"medical and surgical" variants of "reasonable medical certainty" in
framing questions for physicians.163
Finally, it is easy to understand how the rephrased question in
Fellows-Kimbrough could be further refined to generate the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty." An attorney seeking to shorten the ques-
ton could condense "as a medical man" or "from a medical and
surgical point of view" into the adjective "medical" and insert it be-
tween "reasonable" and "certainty." The lexical evidence thus sup-
ports the hypothesis that the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
was developed by personal injury attorneys through conscious adapta-
tion of the model provided by the opinion in Fellows-Kimbrough.16
The one weakness in the hypothesis that the phrase originated
through refinement of the model provided in Fellows-Kimbrough is the
absence of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" from subsequent
appellate opinions involving personal injury litigation between 1916
and 1930.65 If the phrase arose in response to that opinion, one
would have expected to find examples of the phrase in personal injury
litigation thereafter. Curiously, the phrase is not found in any pub-
163. The first case reflecting the "medical and surgical" form of question was published
in 1943. Hogmire v. Voita, 49 N.E.2d 811 headnote 6 (I11. App. Ct. 1943) ("from a medical
and surgical point of view, with a reasonable degree of certainty"). Search of WESTLAW,
Allcases-old Database (Feb. 20, 1998) (reasonable /s "medical and surgical" /s certainty)
(retrieving 3 cases, of which only Hogmire used these terms in the sense of a "reasonable
degree of medical and surgical certainty"). Thereafter, the phrase appears in 54 opinions,
of which 45 issued from federal or state courts in Illinois. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases
Database (Feb. 20, 1998) (da(bef 1997) & reasonable /s "medical and surgical" /s cer-
tainty) (retrieving 62 cases, of which 54 used these terms to quote or paraphrase testimony
based on a "reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty"); see also infra notes 233
and 456.
Numerous "medical and surgical" variants appear in a book written for medical wit-
nesses by Chicago attorney Harold Liebenson. See LIEBENSON, supra note 85, at 146-50
(providing 18 sample questions employing this phrase for civil cases and 6 for criminal
cases); see also id. at 129, 141 (explaining that "the law" wants doctors to give opinions
based on "a reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty"). Of the 54 published
opinions that contain these medical and surgical variants of the phrase, 49 post-date Lie-
benson's book, and 42 of these are from courts in Illinois.
164. That Fellows-Kimbrough may have served as a model for development of the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" is especially ironic in light of the dual holdings in that case.
On the one hand, the court found a violation of the ultimate-issue rule in the admission of
a definitive medical opinion on causation that was expressed with reasonable certainty. On
the other hand, the court found a violation of the reasonable-certainty rule in the admis-
sion of medical evidence on future damages that was not expressed with reasonable cer-
tainty. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is possible that the
court's discussion of the reasonable-certainty rule was a critical factor in legitimizing and
reinforcing what may have been an inadvertent use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" to
preface the hypothetical question about causation.
165. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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lished decisions until 1931,166 and the "medical and surgical" variants
do not appear until 1943.167 Moreover, the phrase "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" makes its first appearance not in personal injury litiga-
tion but in proceedings involving claims for workers' compensation.
Indeed, all five Illinois cases in which the phrase "reasonable medical
certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical certainty" appeared prior
to 1935 were workers' compensation proceedings. 16' This suggests
that the phrase may have evolved independently of Fellows-Kimbrough
in the practice of attorneys specializing in workers' compensation
claims. 1 69
A chronological analysis of Illinois cases containing the phrases
"reasonable certainty" and "reasonable (degree of) medical certainty"
is consistent with the hypothesis that the phrase arose in workers'
compensation cases, independently of Fellows-Kimbrough, through the
efforts of attorneys to offset the speculative quality of opinions on cau-
sation that were cast in the qualified "might or could" form as man-
dated by the ultimate-issue rule. Three workers' compensation cases
from the late 1920s reflect testimony by physicians on the issue of cau-
sation that were phrased in the qualified (i.e., "might" or "could")
form but prefaced with expressions of "reasonable certainty. "170 Like-
166. See Sanitary Dist. v. Industrial Comm'n, 175 N.E. 372, 373 (Ill. 1931) (per curiam);
see also infta notes 172-173 (discussing Sanitary Dist.).
167. See Hogmire v. Voita, 49 N.E.2d 811 headnote 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) ("from a medi-
cal and surgical point of view, with a reasonable degree of certainty").
168. See Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 192 N.E. 345, 346 (Ill. 1934); Burns v.
Industrial Comm'n, 191 N.E. 225, 229 (Ill. 1934); Plano Foundry Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 190 N.E. 255, 260 (Ill. 1934); Allith-Prouty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 N.E.
267, 268 (Ill. 1933); Sanitary Dist., 175 N.E. at 373.
169. This supposed distinction between the personal injury and workers' compensation
bar may be untenable insofar as many attorneys probably practiced in both fields. To the
extent that substantial overlap existed, the initial appearance of the phrases "reasonable
medical certainty" and "reasonable degree of medical certainty" in workers' compensation
proceedings would not be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the phrase arose through
conscious adaptation of the hypothetical question in Fellows-Kimbrough.
170. See Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 N.E. 161,
162 (Ill. 1929) (discussing a physician who testified in response to a hypothetical question
"that the necessary result of the work [claimant] was doing 'would be to increase the blood
pressure, and such an increase in the blood pressure, with a diseased heart, might with all
reasonable certainty over tax-over-dilate-the heart and result in his collapse and death'"
(emphasis added)); Armour Grain Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 153 N.E. 699, 701 (Ill. 1926)
(discussing a physician who "gave it as his judgment that that condition might with reasonable
certainty be due to the accident [claimant] sustained" (emphasis added)); Benton Coal
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 N.E. 520, 525 (Ill. 1926) (discussing a physician who
.gave it as his judgment that [claimant's condition] might, and could with reasonable certainty,
have been caused by the contact with the electric wire and his fall on the steel rail" (em-
phasis added)).
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wise, Sanitary Dist. v. Industrial Commission,'7 1 the very first opinion
containing the phrase "reasonable medical certainty," involved testi-
mony in the "might or could" form on the issue of causation in a
workers' compensation case.
Sanitary Dist. arose on the employer's appeal from an award to
the claimant for a nervous condition supposedly caused by a work-
related fall into the Chicago River. The court's summary of the testi-
mony before the Industrial Commission disclosed two expert opinions
expressed with "reasonable medical certainty" and one with "a degree
of medical certainty.' 172 Despite these expressions of medical cer-
tainty, the court concluded that the testimony "that there might or
could be a direct causal connection between the accident and the con-
dition" was unduly speculative and was insufficient to support the
award, which the court found to be "contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence.' 73
171. 175 N.E. 372 (Ill. 1931) (per curiam).
172. Id. at 373-74. The questions in this case had requested definitive opinions, but the
physician qualified his answers with expressions of "might or could":
Doctor Scott, a specialist in treatment of traumatic cases, testified .... A
hypothetical question was put to the doctor .... and he was asked whether he
had an opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to whether there was
a causal relationship between the accident of May 25, 1927, and the ill being as
stated in the hypothetical question. An objection to the question was overruled.
His answer was that there might or could be a direct causal connection between the acci-
dent and the condition described in the hypothetical question....
Dr. Stevens [a treating physician] ... was asked a hypothetical question ...
and his reply was that there could be a causal relation between the facts as outlined in
the hypothetical question and English's [the claimant's] present condition. He
testified that from the fact, as he had been informed, that English's decline began
after the accident, the submerging in the water of the canal could, with reasonable
medical certainty, aggravate a pre-existing nervous tension and increase it to a point
where eventually he became disabled....
Dr. Goodman [a treating physician] testified .... A hypothetical question
was put to the doctor .... and he was asked whether he had an opinion, based on
a degree of medical certainty, as to what was the matter with this man.
Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 375. Two years later, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the "might or
could" form of the hypothetical question was unnecessary in workers' compensation cases.
Porter v. Industrial Comm'n, 186 N.E. 110, 113 (Ill. 1933). In holding that a physician's
definitive testimony was competent evidence to support the award, the court declared:
The physician testified as an expert witness, and it was immaterial whether he
expressed the opinion that the injury was the cause, or was sufficient to cause, or
might have caused, the condition. The answer was merely the opinion of the
witness upon a state of facts assumed to be true. It still remained for the arbitra-
tor, the commission, and the circuit court successively to determine the facts.
Id. The opinion in Porter strongly suggested that the ultimate-issue rule did not apply to
hypothetical questions in workers' compensation proceedings. KING & PILLINGER, supra
note 105, at 86. Read together, Porter and Sanitary Dist. sent the message that in eliciting
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The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared in six more
workers' compensation cases in the ten years following Sanitary Dist.a74
In none of these cases did the court attach any legal significance to
the phrase. 175 Nevertheless, by 1942, the phrase had become a term
of art in practice before the Industrial Commission:
The stock form of hypothetical question in such [workers'
compensation] cases asks the doctor if he has an opinion as
to whether or not there was a "causal relation based upon a
reasonable degree of medical certainty between the accident
and the subsequent condition of ill-being as described in the
hypothetical question."
'1
76
The chronological evidence thus supports the hypothesis that the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" originated in the practice of at-
torneys handling workers' compensation claims. This evidence fails to
explain, however, why Illinois attorneys would insert the adjective
"medical" between "reasonable" and "certainty." The alternative hy-
pothesis, that the opinion in Fellows-Kimbrough served as the model,
provides an explanation for the insertion of the word "medical." Nev-
ertheless, this theory leaves an unexplained gap of fifteen years be-
tween that decision and the first appearance of the phrase in a
published opinion.
This gap may be more apparent than real, however. The absence
of the phrase from published opinions does not mean that attorneys
were not using the phrase. In Pennsylvania, for example, a single fed-
expert testimony with respect to causation in workers' compensation cases, the qualified
might or could" form of question was neither necessary nor sufficient.
174. See Stewart Warner Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill. 1941);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 10 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. 1937); Ford Motor
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 192 N.E. 345, 346 (Ill. 1934); Burns v. Industrial Comm'n, 191
N.E. 225, 229 (Ill. 1934); Plano Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 190 N.E. 255, 260 (Ill.
1934); Allith-Prouty Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 185 N.E. 267, 268 (Ill. 1933).
175. In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an award to the claimant despite
the existence of testimony expressed with "reasonable medical certainty." See Allith-Prouty,
185 N.E. at 269. The Industrial Commission had awarded benefits to the worker's widow
based on testimony from two physicians that, with "reasonable medical certainty," the
working conditions at the factory "necessarily accentuated the natural hazards" and bore a
"causal relation" to his death from pneumonia. Id. at 268. The Supreme Court reversed
the award, however, because neither witness was able to affirm the existence of either an
accident or a preexisting disease that was aggravated by the working conditions. Id. at 268-
69.
In Plano Foundry Co., 190 N.E. at 260-61, the court affirmed an award for the claimant
where all ten medical witnesses-six for the claimant and four for respondent-had ex-
pressed their opinions in response to hypothetical questions phrased "as a matter of rea-
sonable medical certainty."
176. KING & PILUNGER, supra note 105, at 86 (footnote omitted).
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eral opinion disclosed that the phrase was in use in that state by
1955;1 77 yet, the phrase did not appear in an opinion of the state
courts until 1968.178
Moreover, it is clear that by the early 1930s, Illinois attorneys were
using the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in contexts other
than workers' compensation proceedings. The second case in which
the phrase appeared was a 1933 federal appellate decision arising
from an action to recover benefits under a life insurance policy. 179 In
addition, from 1935 through 1940, the phrase appeared in appellate
opinions in two other federal cases 8 ° and five state cases,18 1 only one
177. See Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
178. See DeVirgiliis v. Gordon, 243 A.2d 459, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (Hannum, J.,
dissenting). For further discussion of this gap between the first appearances of the phrase
in federal and state court opinions in Pennsylvania and other states, see infra notes 232,
331-342, 380-381 and accompanying text.
179. See Alexander v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1933) (applying
Illinois law). In this appeal from ajudgment of the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denying plaintiff recovery under the double indemnity provision for accidental
death under a life insurance policy, the phrase appeared in quotations of two hypothetical
questions:
"Q.*** Based upon the above assumption of facts have you an opinion as to
whether or not the hypothetical individual received injuries evidenced by the
abrasions or bruises which with a reasonable degree of medical certainty might or could
have caused the cerebral hemorrhage resulting in the death of the hypothetical
individual?
*** Have you an opinion as to whether or not the accident which was
evidenced by the abrasions or contusions discovered on the forehead and cheek
of the hypothetical individual might or could have had, with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, a causal connection with the death of the hypothetical individual?"
Id. (star ellipses in original) (emphasis added). The trial court had overruled plaintiff's
objection that the doctor's answer to these questions invaded the province of the jury. In
affirming the judgment, the Seventh Circuit did not rely upon the "might or could" phras-
ing but instead distinguished Fellows-Kimbrough on the basis of earlier Illinois cases that
allowed physicians to express definitive opinions on causation whenever the manner of
injury was not disputed. Id. at 3.
180. See Gray v. Pet Milk Co., 108 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1940) (action for personal
injuries); Mangol v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1939) (action
seeking indemnity for an accidental death under an insurance policy). In Gray, the court
provided the following glimpse of the trial testimony:
In response to the question, "In your opinion, as a physician and with reasonable
medical certainty, can you say that these disturbances you have told us about
could, or might, have resulted from drinking milk containing the body of a
mouse?" he replied, over appellant's objection, "I would say that it could, or there
is a possibility of it being something else * *
108 F.2d at 976 (star ellipsis in original).
181. See Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 10 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. 1937)
(cause of death in a workers' compensation claim); Gaydos v. Peterson, 20 N.E.2d 837, 841
(Ill. App. Ct. 1939) (future damages for personal injury); Kilroy v. Retirement Bd. of Park
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 17 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938) (claim for
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of which involved workers' compensation proceedings. This suggests
that the phrase was already in general use by the trial bar as of the
mid-1930s.
Regardless of whether the phrase was first employed in personal
injury or workers' compensation proceedings, it is abundantly clear
that by the mid-1930s the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" was
well established in the lexicon of Chicago lawyers engaged in personal
injury litigation. The most compelling evidence of the pervasiveness
of the phrase among the Chicago trial bar is Irving Goldstein's 1935
manual on Trial Technique.18
2
Goldstein practiced in Chicago,1 13 and he gathered his illustra-
tions in Trial Technique "from more than a thousand records of actual
cases tried by leading and successful trial attorneys,"1"4 culled from
the files of the Illinois appellate court in Chicago.1 1 5 Thus, his man-
ual should be viewed as a reflection of contemporary civil litigation
practice in Chicago. Trial Technique contained numerous examples of
hypothetical questions to experts, virtually all of which employed vari-
ants of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." 186 Most signifi-
cantly, in the section on "Forms of conclusions," all nine of
Goldstein's examples of questions addressed to doctors employed vari-
ants of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" as a preface to re-
quests for qualified expressions of opinion on causation or medical
negligence. 187
death benefits resulting from injuries incurred in the line of duty); Ebbert v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (death from a disease, and not from an
injury, in a claim for double indemnity on a life insurance policy), affd, 16 N.E.2d 749 (Ill.
1938); People ex rel. Oemke v. Schuring, 6 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (sterility of a
putative father in paternity proceedings).
182. GoLnsrn', supra note 34.
183. For a brief presentation of Goldstein's biographical information, see supra note 32.
184. GOLDSrEIN, supra note 34, at vi.
185. Goldstein's preface acknowledged "Judge William H. McSurely of the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court (First District) for his kind permission to refer to all records of cases, and the
kind assistance of Mr. Joseph Morrison, Deputy Appellate Clerk." Id. at viii.
186. See id. at 398, 455-57, 465-67, 473.
187. This section provides:
§ 507.-Forms of conclusions.
Ordinarily, in cases where the facts are in dispute, the conclusion must con-
fine the opinion to be given to the probable result of the combination of facts or
circumstances assumed. It may be in one of the following forms:
(1) Doctor, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty
as to whether or not there might or could be a causal connection between the
accident described and the condition of ill-being found as set forth in this
question?
(2) Have you an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical certainty as to
whether there is or may be a direct causal connection between the particular
1998]
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While Goldstein's manual reflected the pervasiveness of the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in Illinois litigation practice as
of the mid-1930s, neither the book nor the earliest reported opinions
in which the phrase appears suggested that the phrase had any legal
significance. In each of the decisions in which the phrase appeared
prior to 1935, the court focused on the substance of the doctor's opin-
ion, and in none did the court indicate that this particular phrase was
essential or even helpful.18 s Only with respect to future damages did
Illinois law tend to encourage the expression of medical opinions with
reasonable certainty.' 89
traumatism or fall described and the resulting pathology as described to you in
this hypothetical question?
(3) Have you an opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty [as to]
whether or not the given condition or malady of the hypothetical person may or
could result from and be caused by the facts stated in the hypothetical question?
(4) Doctor, assuming those facts to be true, have you an opinion, based
upon a reasonable certainty and from a medical and surgical point of view as to
whether the facts assumed in the question and the injury assumed, namely, the
dislocation of the vertebrae and the fracture of the lamina of the sixth cervical
vertebra, are sufficient to cause the symptoms and the conditions assumed in the
question?
(5) Doctor, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable certainty and from
a medical and surgical viewpoint, if the facts assumed could cause the condition
assumed and existing up to the present time?
(6) Doctor, have you an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical cer-
tainty, as to what might or could have caused the death of the hypothetical man?
(7) (In an occupational disease case) Have you an opinion, doctor, as to
whether there might or could, with reasonable medical certainty, be a causal rela-
tionship between this employment which I have described in this question and
the condition of this young man in June 1931 and down to the present time?
(8) (Aggravation of a pre-existing ailment) Have you an opinion, based
upon reasonable medical certainty as to whether or not there is or may be a direct
causal connection between the accident described, the pre-existing ailment re-
lated herein, and the condition of ill-being found as set forth in this question?
(9) (In malpractice case-Doctor) Doctor, assuming the facts stated in this
question to be true, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable certainty and
from a medical and surgical point of view, as to whether or not the course pur-
sued by the operating surgeon was such a course as could be pursued by a skillful
and careful physician and surgeon engaged in the same line of work in the City of
- and State of- in January, 1932?
(10) (In malpractice case-Lawyer) Mr. Jones, assuming the facts to be as
stated in this hypothetical question, have you an opinion as to whether or not Mr.
Blank in the defense and trial of the case of Henry Thompson, used and exer-
cised the same degree of care and diligence and ability that is usually, ordinarily
and reasonably used by lawyers in good standing in the City of- and State of
- in June, 1933?
Id. at 455-56.
188. The cases are cited supra notes 168 and 179.
189. The Illinois version of the reasonable-certainty rule is discussed supra Part IIA.
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It was not until the 1937 decision in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Indus-
trial Commission19° that a court attached any significance to the failure
of a witness to express an opinion with "reasonable medical certainty."
The court in that case reversed an award for a mental and emotional
condition supposedly caused by a blow on the head suffered during a
robbery at the claimant's place of employment. 91 The court held
that the evidence was insufficient to support the award because of the
absence of testimony as to "any reasonable medical certainty of a
causal relationship between the blow on the head and the employee's
total break down."'9 2 By incorporating the phrase "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" in its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
transformed an established practice into an aspect of legal doctrine,
thereby reinforcing the usage. As was true of Goldstein's manual,
however, the opinion in Shell Petroleum Corp. did not explain the
phrase, implying that its meaning and significance were self-evident.
190. 10 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1937).
191. Id. at 353, 356.
192. Id. at 354. The court's summary of the testimony provides a typical example of a
physician's reluctance to express an opinion on causation with "reasonable medical
certainty":
For the employee, Dr. Walton was asked a hypothetical question containing sub-
stantially all of the facts set forth in the earlier part of this opinion, and was then
asked, "Now, doctor, have you an opinion as a medical man, based upon these
facts, whether there could be any medical certainty that the alleged assault on July 27, 1930,
did or did not cause the present condition?" to which the witness replied, ... "The
injury would produce some trauma of the brain. As to the causative factor of his
condition, whether it was one of the causative factors, there are several others."
This answer was stricken, and the previous question, in substance, was repeated,
to which the witness said, "I don't think I can answer that except as one of the
causative factors." He was then asked if he could answer yes or no and said, "To
the general question, I would say no, it wasn't the cause." He was then asked whether
he had an opinion, as a medical man, whether there could be any medical certainty that the
alleged assault caused the condition and the witness said, "You say 'certainty'?" and the
attorney then asked if there was any medical certainty[.] The witness then said, "I can't
state yes to that question. I don't think there is a medical certainty. There is a very strong
probability. I have an opinion. I have not a certainty, my opinion is that it is a
causative factor; could cause this condition-not alone, I don't think so. I don't
think it could cause it alone, the injury, I mean." The witness' answers to further
questions stated that the blow could produce the condition by inciting the degen-
erative processes in the brain, and, in response to several further questions, gave
it as his opinion that the Parkinson disease could result from the facts stated in
the hypothetical question, but, at no time, stated that the blow on the head could, with
any medical certainty, be stated to have caused the existing disability.... A careful read-
ing of the testimony of this doctor fails to disclose that he, at any time, definitely stated
that there was any reasonable medical certainty of a causal relationship between the blow
on the head and the employee's total break down. The most he said, at any time,
was that there could be such a connection.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The 1939 opinion in Gaydos v. Peterson1 93 represented the first in-
stance in which a doctor's testimony was ruled inadmissible because it
was not expressed with reasonable medical certainty. 194 In holding
that testimony about the possibility of a permanent impairment
should have been excluded as speculative and conjectural, the appel-
late court was applying the well-established reasonable-certainty rule
and did not attribute any special significance to the inclusion of the
word "medical."' 95 Nevertheless, the court's reiteration of the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" and the appearance of this phrase in
one of the headnotes' 96 would have contributed to the ascendance of
this phrase from legal practice to legal doctrine.
193. 20 N.E.2d 837 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939).
194. Id. at 841.
195. The complete quotation makes it clear that the court was simply applying the rea-
sonable-certainty rule to the testimony of the witness as elicited by counsel and that the
inclusion of the word "medical" was not meant to create a new legal standard:
One of the questions is: "In your opinion to a reasonable medical certainty, is that a
permanent condition-first of all, the vitreous, the opacities in the vitreous?" To
which the doctor answered: "Yes, it is awfully hard to say that is permanent, but
on the other hand it has been there a considerable time." This was objected to
and the objection sustained by the court, after which this question was asked by
the plaintiffs attorney: "Have you an opinion, to a reasonable medical certainty
about the opacities in the vitreous of the right eye?" To which the doctor an-
swered: "I would say that they may be permanent, but there is a chance that they
may absorb." To this answer a motion was made by the defendants that it be
stricken, which motion was denied. The defendants contend that their motion to
strike was well founded. When the doctor said the opacities may be permanent or
may absorb, it was clear that he had, on the question of permanence, no opinion to a
reasonable medical certainty, which was what he was asked and the only thing he could
properly be asked. His answer showed that all he had in mind was a possibility, a
conjecture, a mere speculation and the answer, if for no other reason, should
have been stricken as unresponsive. The case of Lauth v. Chicago Union Trac-
tion Co., 244 Ill. 244, 91 N.E. 431, 434, which was cited by the defendants, seems
to be in point upon this immediate question, wherein the Supreme Court said:
"In this class of cases, in estimating the pecuniary loss, all the consequences of the
injury, future as well as past, which are shown by the evidence to be reasonably
certain to result from the injury, are to be taken into consideration. * * * To form
a proper basis for recovery, however, it is necessary that the consequences relied on must
be reasonably certain to result. They cannot be purely speculative." And the court in
that case reached the conclusion that the fact that a remittitur was entered and
agreed to did not cure the error caused by the admission of evidence of the char-
acter before us. So we believe the court should have stricken the answers made by
the doctor.
Id. at 840-41 (star ellipsis in original) (emphasis added).
196. The second headnote, indexed under "Trial k89," reads:
In personal injury action, physician's reply that opacities in vitreous of eye might
be permanent or might absorb should have been stricken out as unresponsive to
question whether physician had opinion to a reasonable certainty about opacities
in vitreous of eye, where physician had no opinions of reasonable medical certainty on
question of permanence.
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The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared in nine
more Illinois cases decided between 1940 and the end of 1944,197 and
in three of these cases, the phrase was included in the headnotes.198
In one of these three cases, the court held that testimony on the sub-
ject of future damages about "the results which might be expected"
was not unduly speculative because it was expressed with "reasonable
medical certainty." '99 In another, the court found no error or preju-
dice in the admission of testimony "based upon reasonable medical
certainty" to the effect that plaintiffs knee had sustained permanent
injury with a 25% impairment. 20 Both of these opinions reinforced
"reasonable medical certainty" as the formula for complying with the
reasonable-certainty rule respecting admissibility of evidence on fu-
ture damages. In the third, the court upheld the propriety of a hypo-
thetical question about causation that was posed in the "might or
could" form, prefaced with the "medical and surgical" variant of the
phrase; the court further reversed a directed verdict for the defend-
ant, which apparently resulted from the exclusion of this testimony. 20 1
This opinion would have reinforced the usage of expressions of "rea-
sonable medical certainty" in conjunction with qualified expressions
of opinions on causation in compliance with the ultimate-issue rule.
The analysis of Illinois decisions thus reveals that the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" had become a well-established usage
among attorneys engaged in personal injury and workers' compensa-
Id. at 837 headnote 2 (emphasis added).
197. See People v. Martin, 34 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ill. 1941); Stewart Warner Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 33 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill. 1941); Goad v. Grissom, 57 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1944); Meltzer v. Shklowsky, 53 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); Traut v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 N.E.2d 262, 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); Hogmire v. Voita, 49
N.E.2d 811, 811 headnote 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (variant form); Welter v. Bowman Dairy
Co., 47 N.E.2d 739, 753, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943); Gray v. Richardson, 40 N.E.2d 598, 600
(Ill. App. Ct. 1942); Powell v. Myers Sherman Co., 32 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941).
198. See Goad 57 N.E.2d at 514 headnote 2; Hogmire, 49 N.E.2d at 811 headnote 6 (vari-
ant form); Powell, 32 N.E.2d at 664 headnote 5.
199. Powe, 32 N.E.2d at 667.
200. Goad, 57 N.E.2d at 516.
201. Hogmire, 49 N.E.2d at 811 headnote 6. Only the headnotes to the opinion were
published. Headnote 6 reads:
Quoted portion of hypothetical question propounded to doctor which question
concluded, "Have you an opinion from a medical and surgical point of view, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, whether the infiltration or injection of this hypoder-
mic needle with novacaine [sic] into the gums, might or could have brought
about the condition of ill being as stated in the hypothetical question to this hy-
pothetical person?", was proper.
Id. (emphasis added). This is the first published opinion to employ the "medical and
surgical" variant of the phrase as suggested by the headnote in Fellows-Kimbrough and as
reflected in Goldstein's manual.
1998]
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tion practice by 1935, long before the Illinois courts attributed any
special significance to the phrase. Moreover, when the Illinois courts
began to mention the phrase in their opinions, they treated the
phrase as a prerequisite to admissibility only with respect to future
damages under the long-established reasonable-certainty rule. In its
principal usage, as a preface to expressions of opinion about causa-
tion, the phrase contributed to the sufficiency of proof but was not
essential to admissibility.
III. DISSEMINATION: 1935-1960
Although the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" was already
in use in Illinois by 1931, there is no evidence that the phrase was
employed in any other jurisdiction prior to 1940. By 1960, however,
the phrase was in use in at least twenty-two states2 "2 and had become
deeply ingrained in the legal lexicon, as reflected in numerous secon-
dary authorities.20 3 Analysis of published opinions containing the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" suggests that the diffusion of
this phrase between 1940 and 1960 was attributable to the bar rather
than the bench. As the discussion below will demonstrate, in virtually
every state, the phrase was used by an attorney at trial prior to any
judicial commentary attributing legal significance to the phrase.
While direct empirical evidence is lacking, the most plausible explana-
tion for the rapid diffusion of the phrase between 1940 and 1960 was
that attorneys throughout the United States were employing the mod-
els provided in Goldstein's 1935 manual on Trial Technique °4 and his
1942 book on Medical Trial Technique.2°5
A. Goldstein's Trial Technique
Goldstein wrote Trial Technique as a manual for trial attorneys.
The preface suggests that the book be carried to court as a reference
guide.2 6 The book was filled with illustrations, and Goldstein en-
202. See infra notes 231-259 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 353-365 and accompanying text.
204. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34.
205. GOLDSTEIN & SHABAT, supra note 61.
206. In his preface, Goldstein declared:
A practical book on trial procedure from the viewpoint of the attorney who
must try cases should have: (1) Question and answer illustrations covering the
technique involved in making proof of all facts in all types of cases, (2) It should
cover all phases of trial tactics and the psychology of the court-room, (3) Citations
of authorities to sustain all illustrations and points of law set out, (4) Illustrations
and points of law simply indexed for ready and quick reference, (5) It should be
in one compact volume so as to be available for use in the court-room during the
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couraged attorneys to use them as models: "With every phase of proof
illustrated, it will be found that trial practice has almost been reduced
to a formula, and that most of the formulas are contained herein."2 °7
In the chapter on expert witnesses, Goldstein advised that hypo-
thetical questions be prepared in advance of trial,20 8 especially their
"troublesome" conclusions. 20 9 The section on conclusions to hypo-
thetical questions provided nine examples, all of which were prefaced
with expressions of "reasonable medical certainty" or variants
thereof.210 Goldstein explained that qualified expressions of opinion
on causation were necessary in order to avoid "invading the province
of the jury."21 1 He offered no explanation, however, for the inclusion
of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in these examples, imply-
ing that its meaning and significance were self-evident.
Moreover, Goldstein did not confine "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" to use with qualified expressions of opinion on the issue of
causation. In another section of his manual, he used the phrase with
requests for definitive opinions about permanence and future medi-
cal treatment.212 Nowhere in the book, however, did Goldstein define
"reasonable medical certainty" or explain what purpose it served. The
pervasive use of the phrase implied that it was essential and gave no
progress of the trial and (6) It should be plainly and simply written so as to be
easily understandable.
It has been my endeavor to cover all of the above requirements in this
book ....
It has been prepared with a view to meeting the requirements for a practical
trial manual available for instant use during the stress and excitement of a highly
contested trial. The simplicity of its literary structure must become apparent at
once. It has been written in the plainest and most simple language so as to be
easily understandable.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at vi-vii.
207. Id at vii.
208. See id. at 452 ("The hypothetical question to be most effective should almost always
be prepared in advance.").
209. Specifically, Goldstein cautioned:
The conclusion is usually the most troublesome part of the hypothetical ques-
tion. To keep from "invading the province of the jury" and to determine just how
far a conclusion may go frequently causes great concern. An improper conclu-
sion invalidates the entire question.
Id. at 455; see also id. at 453 ("Usually, the more troublesome features, in the preparation of
a hypothetical question, are the commencement and the conclusion of the question.").
210. The complete text of these illustrations appears supra note 187.
211. GoLDsrEIN, supra note 34, at 455.
212. Goldstein explained:
Several conclusions or opinions may be requested of the witness, based upon
the same hypothesis, for example, as to whether the condition is temporary or
permanent.
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hint that it reflected a unique local usage. Thus, any attorney turning
to Goldstein's text for model hypothetical questions naturally would
have tended to adopt this formulation when interrogating medical
experts.
Trial Technique was extremely influential. It received five
favorable reviews,"' two of which emphasized the usefulness of
the chapter on hypothetical questions.214 The work was a "best
Illustrations
(1) Now, doctor, assuming the facts set forth in the same hypothetical ques-
tion, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty, as to
whether or not the conditions described are temporary or permanent?
(2) Doctor, assuming the same hypothesis, have you an opinion, based upon
reasonable certainty and from a medical and surgical viewpoint, as to whether or
not the conditions set forth in the hypothetical question are temporary or
permanent?
Some lawyers also follow up with a question in reference to future medical care
and attention.
Illustration
Doctor, assuming the facts set forth in the same hypothetical question, have
you an opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty, as to whether or not it
will be necessary for the hypothetical person to continue under medical treatment?
Id. at 456-57.
213. See LouisJ. Freehof, Book Review, 1J. MARSHALL L.Q. 446, 448 (1936) ("a distinct
aid and valuable contribution"); FrankJ. Lanigan, Book Review, 14 NoTRE DAME LAw. 142,
143 (1938-1939) ("indispensable to every trial lawyer however long experienced"); Harold
R. Medina, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 1188, 1188-89 (1936) ("innumerable practical
hints of real value" and "a valuable addition to the literature"); Book Note, 4 KAN. CITv L.
REv. 14, 14 (1935) ("possible that this book is the best book of its type ever presented the
American Bar" and "loaded with practical tips"); Book Note, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 336, 336
(1937) ("competently covered the subject").
The book received a mixed review, though, from Professor Edmund Morgan. See E.M.
Morgan, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. Rxv. 1387 (1936). As "a lawyer's guide book for the
trial of law suits as they are actually conducted," Morgan described the work as "first rank."
Id. at 1387. Morgan issued a warning, however, to any "reader who may be inclined to rely
upon Mr. Goldstein's general statements as to particular rules of law." Id. at 1388 n.6.
Morgan cited numerous examples of statements that failed to note a conflict among au-
thorities. Id. More importantly, Morgan decried the work's unabashed portrayal of the
trial as a "battle of wits" rather than "a proceeding for the discovery of truth by rational
processes." Id. at 1389. Morgan further noted:
If only some lawyer could rise up and honestly denounce Mr. Goldstein as a de-
famer of his profession! If only Mr. Goldstein himself had written his book as an
exposition of the evils inherent in our adversary system of litigation! . . . But a
decent respect for the truth compels the admission that Mr. Goldstein has told his
story truly. He has told it calmly, without pretense of shame, and (God save us!)
without the slightest suspicion of its shamefulness.... In all innocence, he has
produced a document which is a devastating commentary upon an important as-
pect of our administration of justice.
Id.
214. Harold R. Medina, who later served as a federal trial judge, evaluated the chapter
on "The Expert Witness" as "good" and the chapter on "Hypothetical Questions" as "excel-
lent." Medina, supra note 213, at 1188. FrankJ. Lanigan declared:
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seller,"2 '5 went through more than a dozen printings between 1935
and 1950,216 and presumably more thereafter.2 17
In 1942, working with physician L. Willard Shabat, M.D., Gold-
stein published a specialized book on Medical Trial Technique,218 which
was intended to enable trial attorneys to understand the medical is-
sues in their cases and to interrogate medical experts at trial.2 19 The
first chapter of Medical Trial Technique provided an introduction to the
law and a summary of techniques applicable to interrogation of medi-
cal experts. The remainder of the book was devoted to detailed expla-
nations of medical terminology, anatomy, and the relevant issues that
may be the subject of testimony in particular medical specialties, with
separate chapters devoted to various organ systems or diseases.
Nearly all of the examples of opinion-questions included in the
introductory chapter requested expressions of opinion with some vari-
ant of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty. ' 220 Most importantly,
the eleven-step model "outline" of a hypothetical question provided
the following guidance for phrasing the conclusion: "11. Conclusion
based on reasonable medical certainty as to whether there might or
could be a causal connection (or relation) between the fall and the
condition of ill-being."221 In addition, the authors interspersed illus-
trations of direct or cross-examination throughout the text. Within
each medical topic, the text was replete with illustrations of questions
that asked the physician to express an opinion with some variant of
"reasonable medical certainty."222 In addition, the text regularly re-
ferred readers back to the introductory chapter for the suggested
Expert witnesses are thoroughly discussed, both as to their qualifications and
cross-examination. The hypothetical questions so necessary in examining an ex-
pert are treated in a special section. It is in the handling of just such intricate
problems as these that this book makes itself indispensable to every trial lawyer
however long experienced.
Lanigan, supra note 213, at 143.
215. In the preface to the second edition, Fred Lane wrote, "[t]his all time 'best seller'
has guided more trial lawyers safely and successfully through the stormy seas of litigation
than any other single book in the history of law." GOLDSTEIN & LANE, supra note 34, at iii.
216. Charles Komaiko, He Heckles the Lawyers, COLLER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 21, 1950, at 35,
36.
217. Records of sales of the first edition were not available from the publisher, Calla-
ghan and Company, which now is part of Clark Boardman Callaghan.
218. GOLDSTEIN & SHABAT, supra note 61.
219. In their preface, the authors stated, "this manuscript has been prepared with the
hope that it may help the attorney in some small measure to better understand, prepare,
and prove (or disprove where necessary) the medical phases of his cases." Id. at v.
220. See, e.g., id. at 15, 16, 18, 19.
221. Id. at 18.
222. See, e.g., id. at 102, 134, 154, 161, 169 (providing questions requesting opinions with
.reasonable medical certainty" in the chapter on "The Head").
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phrasing of conclusions to hypothetical questions relating to
causation.223
As was true of Goldstein's earlier work, Medical Trial Technique did
not define the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" or provide any
explanation of its purpose. This book did, however, include a caveat
warning that the "might or could" form of question was not univer-
sally accepted.224
Medical Trial Technique received a favorable review in the Illinois
Law Review, 225 and medico legal authority William Curran referred to
it as an "important" work. 26 One measure of the book's impact was
that the authors, in 1954, created the periodical Medical Trial Tech-
nique Quarterly to publish updated articles in essentially the same for-
mat.22 7 Each issue of Medical Trial Technique Quarterly provided
additional illustrations of questions asking for opinions with "reason-
able medical certainty."
Moreover, Goldstein's influence on legal practice was not limited
to his written works. Throughout his career, Goldstein *as active in
legal education. In 1933, Goldstein founded the Trial Technique In-
stitute, which continues to conduct training for members of the Illi-
223. The authors explained:
To conserve as much space as possible, we have had to make numerous cross-
references. For the same reason, it has not been possible to add a hypothetical
question after each illustration. We feel that the attorney will be able to prepare a
legally adequate hypothetical question if he will but follow the suggestions con-
tained on pages 16 to 19.
Id. at v.
224. Immediately following the text of the model outline, the authors added: "(Note: In
some states the conclusion 'might or could' is held not to prove a prima facie case. In such
states the conclusion 'whether or not there is or was a causal connection (or relation) [']
must be used.)" Id. at 18. This cautionary note appeared again after the principal illustra-
tion of a complete hypothetical question. Id. at 19.
225. The reviewer wrote:
In all, this book is a practical course in medicine, medico-legal injuries, and trial
practice.... which will make for a more intelligent legal and medical approach to
a highly complicated field of law.... [The book] is an important sequel to [ Trial
Technique]. Medical experts will be unable to confound a lawyer who has made
careful use of this book.
Daniel D. Carmell, Book Review, 37 ILL. L. REV. 187, 188 (1943).
226. See WILLIAMJ. CuRRAN, TRAcy'S THE DocrOR AS A WITNESS 79 (2d ed. 1965) ("A well
known, rather outdated text for practicing attorneys. Somewhat technical for physicians,
but an important work."); cf. id. at 107 (citing and quoting from the work and referring to
Goldstein as "an attorney of great experience in the trial of cases, particularly personal
injury cases").
227. Goldstein and Shabat initially served as co-editors of this journal. After Dr.
Shabat's death in 1955, Nathan Flaxman, M.D., joined Goldstein as co-editor. Following
Judge Goldstein's death in 1968, Flaxman continued on as sole editor. Fred Lane suc-
ceeded Flaxman as editor in 1972 and continues to serve in that capacity.
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nois Bar.228 He taught trial technique at Northwestern University's
School of Law from 1934 to 1964 and was a lecturer on medical juris-
prudence at Northwestern's School of Medicine from 1944 to 1951.229
In addition, as Dean of the Lawyers' Post-Graduate Clinics, Goldstein
taught seminars on trial technique to thousands of attorneys in Illinois
and many other states.2s
B. Dissemination Beyond Illinois
The dissemination of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
can be traced indirectly by its appearance in "published" cases avail-
able through on-line databases. 231 The empirical shortcomings that
result from using published opinions as evidence of litigation practice
are obvious. Most cases are settled prior to trial, and published opin-
ions shed almost no light on pre-trial practice-this is especially true
for depositions, where the phrase would be used most frequently. Few
jurisdictions publish trial court opinions, and even those that do
would not necessarily refer to the use of the phrase at trial. Nearly all
published cases emanate from appellate courts, representing only a
small subset of cases tried to a verdict. Because appellate opinions
focus on legal issues, particular phrases from the trial record would be
included only by chance, unless they directly related to the matters in
dispute. Restricting research to on-line databases creates even more
empirical shortcomings due to the fact that such databases exclude
opinions from certain intermediate appellate and trial courts. Many
228. Goldstein passed the reins of the Institute to Fred Lane, and the Institute still exists
as the Fred Lane Trial Technique Institute of the Illinois Bar Association. Telephone In-
terview with Fred Lane (Spring 1997).
229. See supra note 33.
230. According to materials in the Northwestern University Archives Series 17/13, in-
cluding a 1950 article in Collier's Magazine, see supra note 216, the "Lawyers' Post-Graduate
Clinics" employed a "learning-by-doing" method, with groups of about 35 lawyers meeting
every week in two-hour sessions over the course of nine months. Goldstein himself con-
ducted the seminars in Chicago, and supervised other attorneys conducting seminars in
Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City, and Philadelphia. The brochures indicated that
seminars qualified for funding under the GI bill, and one listed former Governor of Illi-
nois, Otto Kerner, as a graduate. In addition to these extensive seminars, Goldstein trav-
eled throughout the country teaching day-long seminars on trial technique and medical
trial technique. Komaiko, supra note 216; IRVING GOLDSTEIN, How TO LOSE YOUR COURT-
RooMJITERS... IMPROVE YOUR TRiAL TECHNIQUE... BECOME A SUCCESSFUL TRLAL LAWYER
(n.d.) (on file with Northwestern University Archives, Series 17/13, Box 1, Folder 19).
231. The research was conducted within the WESTLAW Allcases, Allcases-old, Allstates,
Allstates-old, Allfeds, Allfeds-old, and individual state databases, supplemented by cross-
checks using the LEXIS-MEGA database. Herein, "published" opinions refer to opinions
available in these databases. Appendix B lists the date of the first appearance of the phrase
in each state, as well as the number of opinions from the state courts that contain the
precise phrase.
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years may therefore elapse between the use of the phrase in litigation
and the first appearance of the phrase in a published opinion.232
Nevertheless, the published opinions are significant in several re-
spects. First, and most obviously, the appearance of the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" in an opinion demonstrates conclusively
that the phrase was used by at least one attorney or physician within
the jurisdiction by that date. Second, the appearance of the phrase in
a published opinion could be expected to encourage further use of
the phrase in that jurisdiction, especially if the court treated the
phrase as significant. Third, the frequency with which the phrase ap-
pears in opinions of a given jurisdiction may provide some evidence of
its significance to the bench and the bar in that jurisdiction.
In evaluating the extent of usage in other states between 1940
and 1960, the phrase's state of origin may serve as a benchmark. In
Illinois state courts, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" ap-
peared in ten opinions during the 1930s, fifteen during the 1940s,
and twelve during the 1950s.2 33 Within these Illinois opinions, the
phrase appeared in the headnotes of one opinion from the 1930s,
three from the 1940s, and five from the 1950s. 23 14 In other state
232. Thus, for example, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" did not appear in any
opinions of the Pennsylvania state courts until 1968, see DeVirgiliis v. Gordon, 243 A.2d
459, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (Hannum, J., dissenting), even though a federal trial court
opinion reflected that the phrase was in use in that state as early as 1955, see Vaccaro v.
Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1955), and a federal appellate opinion from
1963 referred to the phrase as a legal requirement, see Sleek v. J.C. Penney Co., 324 F.2d
467, 471 (3d Cir. 1963); see also infra notes 331-342, 380-381 and accompanying text. A
thorough review of opinions from the courts of common pleas, including those published
in District & County Reports and those published in several individual county reporters,
probably would have disclosed earlier examples of the phrase in Pennsylvania.
Likewise, in Florida the phrase did not appear in a published opinion until 1958, see
William Penn Hotel, Inc. v. Cohen, 101 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), but an article
written two years earlier noted that the phrase "crops up from time to time" in Florida
personal injury and workers' compensation cases, Smith & Tipton, supra note 28, at 327.
233. Search of WESTLAW, Il-cs Database (Jan. 3, 1998) (da(bef 1960) & "reasonable
medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving a total of 37
cases).
To preserve comparability, these figures reflect only cases containing the precise
phrases "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical certainty." Vari-
ant forms of the phrase appear in several other Illinois decisions from this period. See, e.g.,
Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 94 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Ill. 1950) ("based upon reasonable
certainty and from a medical and surgical standpoint"); Olson v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
104 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) ("reasonable degree of medical and surgical cer-
tainty"), affd, 115 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1953); Hayes v. New York Cent. R_ Co., 67 N.E.2d 215,
219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946) (same); Hogmire v. Voita, 49 N.E.2d 811 headnote 6 (Ill. App. Ct.
1943) ("from a medical and surgical point of view, with a reasonable degree of certainty").
234. Search of WESTLAW, Il-cs Database (Jan. 3, 1998) (da(bef 1960) & he("reasonable
medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty")) (retrieving a total of 9 cases).
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courts, the phrase appeared in fifteen opinions from the 1940s and
eighty-two from the 1950s.2 5 Of these, it appeared in the headnotes
of two from the 1940s and seven from the 1950s. 23 6 In the federal
courts, the phrase appeared in two opinions from the 1930s (both
from Illinois), one opinion in the 1940s (again from Illinois), and
nine opinions from the 1950s (one from Illinois and eight from other
states) .237
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" first appeared outside
of Illinois in a 1941 Michigan opinion.23' The phrase gradually
spread during the 1940s, appearing in another eight states for the
first time during that decade: New York (1944),239 Texas (1944),24 °
235. See Appendix A for year-by-year figures on the total number of state and federal
cases containing the precise phrases. Cases from Illinois, see supra note 233, were sub-
tracted from the totals to yield figures for other states. Again, these figures reflect only the
precise phrases "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical certainty."
Thus, for example, neither the text nor Appendix A reflects the appearance of the "medi-
cal and surgical" variant of the phrase in a 1948 opinion from Idaho. See Warlick v. Dris-
coll, 200 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Idaho 1948) ("an opinion from a medical and surgical point of
view and based upon a reasonable certainty").
236. Search of WESTLAW, Allstates Database (Jan. 3, 1998) (da(bef 1960) &
he("reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty")) (retrieving
15 cases, of which there were 7 non-Illinois cases in the 1950s and 2 in the 1940s); Search
of WESTLAW, Allstates-old Database (an. 3, 1998) (da(bef 1960) & he ("reasonable medi-
cal certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty")) (retrieving 3 cases, all of which
came from Illinois).
237. Search of WESTLAW, Alifeds Database (Jan. 3, 1998) (da(bef 1960) & "reasonable
medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 9 cases, 1 of which
came from Illinois); Search of WESTLAW, AlIfeds-old Database (an. 3, 1998) (da(bef
1960) & "reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retriev-
ing 3 cases, 1 of which is an Illinois case from the 1940s and 2 of which are Illinois cases
from the 1930s).
238. See Cole v. Simpson, 1 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Mich. 1941). Michigan opinions from the
1940s and 1950s are discussed infra notes 261-268 and accompanying text.
239. See Messinger v. State, 51 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (Ct. Cl. 1944); see also Kurtz v. State, 52
N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (Ct. Cl. 1944). New York decisions from the 1940s and 1950s are discussed
infra notes 310-318.
240. Southern States Life Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 180 S.W.2d 977, 978-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944,
no writ), quoted six interrogatory questions that asked for opinions "based upon reason-
able medical certainty." Five opinions of Texas courts during the 1950s referred to testi-
mony expressed with "reasonable medical certainty," but in none of these cases was the
phrase important to the decision. See Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315,
317 (Tex. 1955); Porter v. Puryear, 262 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. 1953), judgment set aside by
264 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1954); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Florez, 327 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959, no writ); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ramirez, 326 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stahl v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 295 S.W.2d 473, 475
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956, no writ). The phrase also appeared in two federal appellate cases
from the 1950s that were tried in the Texas district courts. See Whitten v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 257 F.2d 699, 701 n.2 (5th Cir. 1958); Phillips v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 239
F.2d 79, 80 n.3 (5th Cir. 1956).
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Minnesota (1945),241 Missouri (1945),242 New Jersey (1946),243
Wisconsin (1947),244 Indiana (1948),245 and Ohio (1949).246 The
phrase spread more rapidly during the 1950s, especially in the second
half of the decade, appearing in opinions from twelve more
states between 1950 and 1959: Rhode Island (1953),247 Washington
(1954),248 California (1955),249 Pennsylvania (1955),250 North Caro-
lina (1956),251 Oklahoma (1957),2"2 Florida (1958),"'3 Idaho
241. See Burke v. B.F. Nelson Mfg. Co., 18 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. 1945). Minnesota
decisions from the 1940s and 1950s are discussed infra notes 279-290.
242. See Waterous v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 186 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Mo. 1945).
Missouri decisions from the 1940s and 1950s are discussed infra notes 269-278.
243. SeeJackson v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 A.2d 106, 111 (NJ. Ct. C.P. 1946)
(paraphrasing physician testimony in workers' compensation case). The phrase also ap-
peared in three cases from the 1950s. See Yeomans v. Jersey City, 143 A.2d 174, 179 (N.J.
1958) (quoting a question in a workers' compensation case); Loew v. Borough of Union
Beach, 151 A.2d 568, 571-72 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (same); State v. Colmer, 132
A.2d 325, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (quoting testimony about whether the pa-
tient was pregnant in a prosecution for abortion).
Although the phrase was used by New Jersey attorneys, it was not used by the New
Jersey courts. For example, in the leading cases from the era on the subject of future
damages, the New Jersey courts rejected the rule of "reasonable certainty," opting instead
for a standard of "reasonable probability." See Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. 1959)
(noting that with physician testimony about the probability of future medical treatment,
"the accepted verbal rituals are widely diversified, [but explaining that] . .. we think 'rea-
sonable probability' or its equivalent is sufficient" (quoting Budden v. Goldstein, 128 A.2d
730, 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957), overruled in part by Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1958)); Botta, 138 A.2d at 717 (holding that ajury charge erroneously required proof
of future injuries by clear, convincing evidence and with "reasonable certainty"); Budden,
128 A.2d at 734 (rejecting the standard of "reasonable certainty" for proof of future dam-
ages, and holding that "reasonable probability is the just yardstick to be applied").
244. See Vogelsburg v. Mason & Hanger Co., 26 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1947). Wisconsin
decisions from the 1940s and 1950s are discussed infta notes 291-306.
245. See Cochran v. Wimmer, 81 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1948) (in banc); see also
United States Steel Corp. v. Weatherton, 131 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1956) (en
banc); cf. Slaubaugh v. Vore, 110 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1953) (en banc) ("Even
though not sufficient to diagnose decedent's death with medical certainty, the questions
were sufficient to be of probative value.").
246. See McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 89 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ohio 1949); id. at 146
(Hart, J., dissenting). Ohio decisions from the 1950s are discussed infra notes 307-309.
247. See Priscilla Worsted Mills v. Vizzacco, 96 A.2d 835, 837 (RI. 1953).
248. See Halder v. Department of Labor & Indus., 268 P.2d 1020, 1023, 1024 (Wash.
1954); see also infra notes 319-330 (discussing Halder).
249. See Kalmus v.. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp., 281 P.2d 872, 875 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955); see also Lutz v. Schendel, 345 P.2d 488, 491 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Church v.
Capital Freight Lines, 296 P.2d 563, 565 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
250. See Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
251. See Cudworth v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 91 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. 1956); see also
Hincher v. Hospital Care Ass'n, 103 S.E.2d 457, 460 (N.C. 1958).
252. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kramer, 324 P.2d 270, 272 (Okla. 1957).
253. See William Penn Hotel, Inc. v. Cohen, 101 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958); cf. Martin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 So. 2d 513, 514-15 (Fla. 1955) (basing
[VOL. 57:380
1998] "REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY'
(1958),254 Maine (1958),255 Kansas (1959),256 Louisiana (1959),257
and South Carolina (1959).258 Thus, by the end of 1959, the phrase
was in use in at least twenty-two states, and presumably in many others
as well.
25 9
In most of these cases, the appellate courts simply quoted or para-
phrased the trial testimony, and such cases merely reflected that attor-
the decision in part on the fact that the physician could not "say with medical certainty just
what caused or aggravated [patient's] condition").
254. See In re Estates of Davenport, 323 P.2d 611, 612 (Idaho 1958); see also Moeller v.
Volco Builders' Supply, Inc., 341 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Idaho 1959). The "medical and surgi-
cal" variant of the phrase had appeared in Idaho during the 1940s. See supra note 235.
255. See Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 145 A.2d 362, 363 (Me. 1958).
256. See Kratzer v. Moore (In re Estate of Millar), 345 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Kan. 1959).
257. See Brian v. Employers Cas. Co., 111 So. 2d 161, 165 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
258. See Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 107 S.E.2d 15, 31 (S.C. 1959).
259. As discussed supra notes 231-232, attorneys in any given jurisdiction may have been
using the phrase for many years before it appeared in a published opinion. In at least
three states, a case containing the "medical and surgical" variant predated the first appear-
ance of the precise phrase "reasonable (degree of) medical certainty." See infra notes 377-
378 (Delaware); supra note 235 (Idaho); infra note 368 (Montana).
Evidence that the phrase was being used elsewhere also comes from the appearance in
several states of the phrase "medical certainty," without the "reasonable" qualifier. Because
the phrase "medical certainty" seems to have entered the legal lexicon in conjunction with
.reasonable medical certainty," the appearance of the truncated phrase probably reflects
that the complete phrase was also in use.
For example, several years before the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" first ap-
peared in a New Jersey opinion, a series of decisions in workers' compensation cases re-
jected employer contentions that proof of causation had not been established with
sufficient certainty. These courts declared that the applicable test in such cases was "rea-
sonable probability" and not "absolute medical certainty" or "ultimate medical certainty."
See Simpson v. Seaboard Ice Co., 30 A-2d 512, 515 (N.J. Ct. C.P. 1943); Hyer v. Smith, 27
A.2d 219, 221 (N.J. Ct. C.P. 1942); Yawdoshak v. Somerville Iron Works, 28 A.2d 478, 481
(N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1942); Brown v. Brann & Stuart Co., 28
A.2d 420, 423 (N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1942); Niemi v. Thomas
Iron Co., 26 A.2d 494, 498 (N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1942); D'Amico
v. Middlesex Dress Corp., 26 A.2d 177, 180 (N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau
1942), rev'd, 38 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1944);Jenkins v. A. Abramson & Son, Inc., 23 A.2d 122, 125
(N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1941); Patterson v. Rynar, 13 A.2d 295, 298
(N.J. Dep't of Labor Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1940).
The phrase "medical certainty" appeared in a 1944 Nebraska Supreme Court opinion
that rejected a jury instruction that would have required proof of a relevant fact in a mal-
practice action with "medical certainty." See Douglas v. Johnson (In reJohnson's Estate), 16
N.W.2d 504, 514-15 (Neb. 1944). The complete phrase did not appear in a published
Nebraska opinion until 1961. See Riggs v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 112 N.W.2d 531,
534 (Neb. 1961).
In Arkansas, the phrase "medical certainty" first appeared in a 1958 opinion, see Shipp
v. Tanner Estate, 318 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Ark. 1958), which noted that a doctor was asked,
"[clan you say with medical certainty what caused Mr. Shipp's condition?" The complete
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared in an Arkansas opinion two years later. See
Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. Howard, 338 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ark. 1960).
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neys in the jurisdiction were using the phrase.26 ° Several of these
opinions, however, implicitly or explicitly endorsed the use of this
phrase, thereby further encouraging its use. Moreover, the endorse-
ment would have carried special weight whenever the phrase found its
way into the headnotes and indexes of the West Publishing Company,
a phenomenon that sometimes occurred even when the phrase was
not crucial to the court's decision.
The first published opinion outside of Illinois that reflected testi-
mony with "reasonable medical certainty" was the 1941 Michigan case
of Cole v. Simpson.26 In this case, the plaintiff's attorney appears to
have employed Goldstein's formula:
He [the physician] was asked whether he had any opinion
based upon reasonable medical certainty whether or not the
findings he "had made could have been caused by a fall or
being dragged"; his answer was, "Why it is possible, yes." The
court was asked to strike the answer on the ground that it was
conjecture, whereupon the court stated: "Depends upon
how great the possibility is." Thereupon the doctor stated
that it was "very great," "eighty per cent possible."262
The defendants claimed that the trial court erred "in permitting the
doctor to testify as to a possibility and not to what was reasonably prob-
able."26 In agreeing that "this testimony has very little probative
value,"26 the Supreme Court of Michigan gave no indication that the
expression of "reasonable medical certainty" helped offset the quali-
fied form of the question and answer. The court found "there was no
error in admitting the testimony," however, because "the objection
went to the weight of the question rather than to its admissibility. 265
Two years later, the phrase appeared in the court's quotation of a
hypothetical question and again was not treated as legally signifi-
cant.26 6 The phrase next appeared in the court's quotation of a hypo-
267thetical question in a 1955 opinion. Once again, the phrase itself
260. This was true of all of the pre-1960 opinions from courts in California, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, and Texas. See supra notes 236, 237, 243, 245, 247, 249, 250, 252, 254, 255, 257-259.
261. 1 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1941).
262. Id. at 4.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 4-5.
266. See Mapes v. Berkowitz, 8 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 1943) (en banc) ("[H]ave you an
opinion based on reasonable certainty from a medical point of view, whether or not a
treatment might have alleviated the progressive cause of the case?").
267. See Buehler v. Beadia, 73 N.W.2d 304, 311 (Mich. 1955) (equally divided court)
("' [C]an you say with reasonable medical certainty whether the accidentjust described was
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received no attention from the court. The hypothetical question was
significant only insofar as it had elicited a positive opinion about cau-
sation, prompting an objection from the defendant based on the ulti-
mate-issue rule.268 Thus, in none of the three pre-1960 Michigan
decisions containing the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" did
the Michigan court in any way encourage the use of the phrase.
A 1945 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Waterous v.
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co.269 represented the first judicial endorse-
ment of testimony with "reasonable medical certainty" in a state other
than Illinois. The court in Waterous quoted medical testimony that
included a hypothetical question employing the phrase,27 0 and it
ruled that testimony given with "reasonable medical certainty" was a
positive assertion which constituted "substantial evidence" that the
blow caused plaintiffs paralysis. 27' The phrase "reasonable medical
certainty" appeared in two of the headnotes to the opinion, reinforc-
ing the significance of the phrase in establishing a prima facie case.272
The phrase appeared in two more Missouri cases in the late 1940s,273
and the headnote in one of those cases reflected the court's ruling
that opinion testimony expressed with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty constituted substantial evidence of permanent injuries, war-
the competent, producing cause of an aggravation of the plaintiffs pre-existing
condition?'").
268. See id. Affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the court repudiated the ultimate-
issue rule insofar as it may have existed in Michigan:
If they choose to believe him, testimony that the accident "could" cause the con-
dition does not help them, and an ultimate conclusion on their part that it "did"
is pure speculation. The jury must find that it "did," yet the distinction, if pre-
served, leaves them without any evidence to that effect. There appears to be no
reason to retain and every good reason to abolish the distinction apparently here-
tofore made in this jurisdiction. Accordingly the admission of the testimony com-
plained of was not error.
Id. at 314.
269. 186 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. 1945).
270. See id. at 459.
271. Id. The court explained:
We are of the opinion that this is substantial evidence that the insured's condition
was caused by the blow on his head. This witness said with reasonable medical
certainty that he could say that blow on the head caused the paralysis, and it "is a
perfectly natural result following such injury to the brain * * *."
This opinion is a positive assertion as to what caused the paralysis ....
Id. (star ellipsis in original).
272. See id. at 456 headnotes 3, 4.
273. See Stark v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 211 S.W.2d 500, 502, 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948)
(per curiam); Aut v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 194 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); cf.
Legger v. Great N. Life Ins. Co., 216 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) ("impossible to
know, now, with any medical certainty").
1998]
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ranting submission of this issue to the jury.2 74 Thereafter, "reasonable
medical certainty" seems to have become a regular part of the lexicon
of attorneys and physicians practicing in Missouri, for the phrase ap-
peared in seven more cases from the early 1950s,2 75 twelve cases from
the late 1950s,276 and more than 250 opinions after 1960.277
While the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" quickly attained
widespread acceptance among the Missouri bench and bar, the usage
did not represent a substantial change in any of the state's legal doc-
trines. As in Illinois, the phrase simply represented an appropriate
locution, either for introducing substantial evidence that a plaintiff's
injuries were caused by an accident, or for establishing that the inju-
ries were "reasonably certain" under Missouri's existing reasonable-
certainty rule respecting future damages. 278
In a 1945 decision, the Supreme Court of Minnesota initially re-
jected "reasonable medical certainty" as a standard for proof of causa-
274. See Stark, 211 S.W.2d at 500 headnote 2.
275. Amos v. Southern Ry. Co., 273 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo. 1954) (per curiam); Brown v.
Scullin Steel Co., 260 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1953) (per curiam); Walker v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 243 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. 1951) (per curiam); Brown v. Krey Packing Co., 271
S.W.2d 234, 236, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Sams v. Hays Adhesive Co., 260 S.W.2d 815, 818
(Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Doelling v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 258 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1953); Kasten v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 231 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); cf
Williamson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 252 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo. 1952) ("He was asked
whether or not he could state with any degree of medical certainty .... ").
276. State v. Grapper, 328 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Mo. 1959); Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 327 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Young v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 326
S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1959); Bone v. General Motors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Mo.
1959); Miller v. Multiplex Faucet Co., 315 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Mo. 1958) (per curiam); Kiger
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 311 S.W.2d 5, 14 (Mo. 1958) (per curiam); Bowyer v. Te-Co., Inc.,
310 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Mo. 1958); Roderick v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 299 S.W.2d
422, 426 (Mo. 1957); Bedenk v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609, 617 (Mo. 1955);
Creech v. Riss & Co., 285 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Mo. 1955) (per curiam); Kendall v. Prudential
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 319 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam), affd, 327 S.W.2d
174 (Mo. 1959) (en banc); Karnes v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956) (per curiam); cf Breland v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 325 S.W.2d 9, 14 (Mo.
1959) (per curiam) ("It could not be said with any degree of medical certainty . . .");
Beard v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 S.W.2d 732, 742 (Mo. 1959) (per curiam)
("[H]e could not state to a medical certainty the severity or intensity of future pain. .. ");
Lynde v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (per curiam)
("'I could not give an opinion based on medical certainty as to cause of death in this
instance."').
277. See Appendix B. In terms of frequency of appearance of the phrase, Missouri today
ranks fourth with 277 cases, trailing only Illinois (346), Pennsylvania (414), and Ohio
(459). Missouri decisions from the 1960s are discussed infra notes 427-437.
278. Missouri's leading case on proof of future damages was Plank v. RJ Brown Petroleum
Co., 61 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1933). In that case, the Supreme Court of Missouri commented,
"the injury must be shown with reasonable certainty and while absolute certainty is not
required mere conjecture or likelihood, or even a probability, of such injury will not sus-
tain the allowance of damages therefor." Id. at 334.
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tion in workers' compensation claims.2 79  Nevertheless, the phrase
appeared in the quotation or paraphrase of medical testimony in two
other Minnesota cases from the late 1940s2 80 and eight cases from the
1950s.211 In the 1955 case of Penteluk v. Stark,282 the court affirmed an
award for permanent injuries, based on physician testimony that had
been expressed with "reasonable medical certainty. "128' The court in-
corporated the phrase in its description of the standard of proof, de-
claring, "[t]he rule is that for a person to recover for permanent
injuries it must appear to a reasonable medical certainty that there will be
permanent injury. "284 In Derrick v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 285 the Minne-
sota court reaffirmed the rule, stating that it would be satisfied by testi-
mony expressed in terms of probability:
It is true that, to entitle an injured claimant to damages
for future disability, there must be reasonable medical certainty
with reference thereto. The opinion of a medical expert based
upon his examination of an injured claimant, as well as upon
his knowledge of like injuries generally, to the effect that in
all probability there will be a future recurrence of a present
disability would seem to meet the requirement of reasonable
certainty.286
279. SeeBurke v. B.F. Nelson Mfg. Co., 18 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. 1945). In a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, the employer emphasized the testimony of a physician
who had opined that death could not be attributed to electrocution with "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" in the absence of proof of actual contact with electricity. Id. at 123. Other
physicians had testified, however, that electrocution was the probable cause of death. Id. at
122. In holding that proof of death by accidental electrocution could be established with-
out direct proof of contact with electricity, the court declared, "[i]t is not necessary that
the inference of electrocution should meet Dr. McGandy's test of reasonable medical cer-
tainty." Id. at 124.
280. See Smith v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 36 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1949); Koop v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 28 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Minn. 1947).
281. See Cherry v. Stedman, 259 F.2d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 1958) (quoting Penteluk v.
Stark, 69 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. 1955)); Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 228 F.2d 180,
182 (8th Cir. 1955); Manion v. Tweedy, 100 N.W.2d 124, 131 (Minn. 1959); Seydel v.
Reuber, 94 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1959); Dornberg v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 91 N.W.2d
178, 185 (Minn. 1958); Derrick v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 89 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 1958);
Norby v. Klukow, 81 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. 1957); Penteluk, 69 N.W.2d at 901.
282. 69 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. 1955).
283. Id. at 901.
284. Id. (emphasis added). This statement also appeared in the court's syllabus, see id. at
900 syllabus, and in headnote 3 under the topic "Damages," id. at 899 headnote 3.
285. 89 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 1958).
286. Id. at 633 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A paraphrase of this quotation,
including the phrase "reasonable medical certainty," appeared in headnote 6 under the
topics of "Damages" and "Evidence." See id. at 630 headnote 6.
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In Dornberg v. St. Paul City Railway Co.,28 7 the court reiterated the stan-
dard of "reasonable medical certainty" for proof of future disability,
but it held that the physician's testimony that surgery "might' be neces-
sary was sufficiently definite to meet this standard.2"' The fact that
the opinion was expressed with "less than an absolute conviction" af-
fected the weight of the opinion, but not its admissibility. 28 9 In all
three of these aforementioned opinions, the phrase appeared in the
headnotes, further reinforcing the judicial endorsement. Neverthe-
less, as in Missouri, the inclusion of the phrase "reasonable medical
certainty" did not appear to represent any change in the state's stan-
dard for proof of future damages.29 °
In Wisconsin, the phrase first appeared in the 1947 case of Vogels-
burg v. Mason & Hanger Co.,29 1 in which one of the plaintiffs witnesses
had declared during cross-examination, "'I cannot answer these questions
to a reasonable medical certainty."'29 2 Considering this and other testi-
mony, the court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and re-
manded the case for a new trial on damages because the evidence did
not "establish to a reasonable certainty" that the accident was the
probable cause of a stroke suffered five months later.293 Both the de-
fendant's objections and the court's conclusion had used the phrase
"reasonable certainty,"294 and the court did not attribute any special
significance to the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." The phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" appeared thereafter in numerous Wis-
consin opinions, but primarily in summaries or quotations of trial tes-
timony without comment by the court.295 Kowalke v. Farmers Mutual
287. 91 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. 1958).
288. Id. at 185.
289. Id. The court stated further: "To entitle an injured claimant to damages for future
disability or surgery, there must be reasonable medical certainty with reference thereto."
Id. The statement also appeared in headnote 6 under the topic "Damages." See id. at 179
headnote 6.
290. In 1960, the Minnesota court repudiated the "reasonable medical certainty" stan-
dard for proof of future damages, thereby overruling Penteluk, Derrick, and Dornberg, insofar
as these cases supported the use of the phrase. See Carpenter v. Nelson, 101 N.W.2d 918,
922-23 & n.9 (Minn. 1960); see also infra notes 440-446.
291. 26 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1947).
292. Id. at 686.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 681, 683-86.
295. Of the twelve other cases in Wisconsin in which the phrase appeared prior to 1960,
ten involved the quotation or paraphrase of trial proceedings. See Sauer v. United States,
119 F. Supp. 137, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1954); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 163,
168 (Wis. 1959), overruLed ly Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters (In re
Estate of Stromsted), 299 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1980); Crye v. Mueller, 96 N.W.2d 520, 528
(Wis. 1959); Meyer v. Fronimades, 86 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Wis. 1957); Molinaro v. Industrial
Comm'n, 76 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Wis. 1956); Rick v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 N.W.2d 712, 714
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Automobile Ins. Co.2 9 6 was the next case in which the phrase figured
prominently in a Wisconsin decision. The court in Kowalke quoted a
jury instruction that employed the phrase as the standard for recovery
of damages for future pain, suffering, and disability,29 7 thereby implic-
itly accepting the incorporation of the phrase into the state's rule of
"reasonable certainty." The court also used the phrase three times in
its quotation or paraphrase of trial testimony,29 8 further reinforcing
the use of the phrase in eliciting opinions about permanent or future
injuries.
The related phrase "medical certainty" found its way into Wiscon-
sin's legal jargon in Diemel v. Weirich,29 9 the state's leading case on the
sufficiency of proof of permanent injury. In Dieme, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court declared:
Only a medical expert is qualified to express an opinion to a
medical certainty, or based on medical probabilities (not mere
possibilities), as to whether the pain will continue in the fu-
ture, and, if so, for how long a period it will so continue.3 0°
This sentence appeared in one of the headnotes in Diemel3 1l as well as
in the headnote3 ° 2 and text30 3 of an opinion five years later. The
phrase "medical certainty" also had an impact on Wisconsin practice
in workers' compensation cases. The dissenting opinion in a 1953
case suggested that impartial physicians performing examinations in
workers' compensation proceedings should be informed "that the
written report of such examination containing the doctor's conclu-
sions will constitute evidence in the case, and therefore any such con-
clusions should be stated to be based upon either medical
(Wis. 1954); Doleys v. Arndt, 61 N.W.2d 889, 890 (Wis. 1953); Shewalter v. Shewalter, 49
N.W.2d 727, 729 (Wis. 1951); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & T. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 46
N.W.2d 198, 202 (Wis. 1951); Sharkey v. Michels, 36 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Wis. 1949); cf. Globe
Steel Tubes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Wis. 1947) ("medical cer-
tainty"). The phrase has appeared in 196 Wisconsin state court opinions through 1996. See
Appendix B.
296. 88 N.W.2d 747 (Wis. 1958).
297. See id. at 757 ("'f it appears from the evidence to a reasonable medical certainty
that [the plaintiff] will continue to suffer pain, suffering and disability, including loss of
future earnings, you will ... award such sum as will fairly and reasonably compensation
[sic] her . . ").
298. See id. at 756-57.
299. 58 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Wis. 1953).
300. Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
301. See id. at 651 headnote 2.
302. See Peterson v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 93 N.W.2d 433, 434 headnote 2 (Wis.
1958).
303. See id. at 436.
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probabilities or medical certainty. '3 °4 This suggestion eventually was
adopted by a majority of the court, which, in remanding a later case
for further proceedings, declared, "The conclusions of the doctors
should be required to a medical certainty or at least to reasonable
medical probabilities . "...305 Thus, as of 1960, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had endorsed the phrases "medical certainty" and
"reasonable medical certainty" as the standard of proof and the appro-
priate locution for physician testimony in workers' compensation
cases and about future injuries in personal injury litigation.30 6
In Ohio, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" seems to have
become an established part of practice without the benefit of judicial
encouragement. The phrase first appeared in a 1949 opinion quoting
a hypothetical question in a workers' compensation proceeding.30 7
While the phrase appeared in nine other Ohio opinions during the
1950s,30 8  in only one did it receive even a mild judicial
endorsement. °9
304. Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Wis.
1953) (Currie, J., dissenting).
305. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Wis. 1958) (citing Miller, 57
N.W.2d at 744 (Currie, J., dissenting)). The Johnson court also gave favorable considera-
tion to the opinion of a physician that was expressed with "reasonable medical certainty."
See id. at 441.
306. In 1971, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "[t]he term 'medical
certainty' is misleading." Pucci v. Rausch, 187 N.W.2d 138, 141-42 (Wis. 1971). The court
concluded that "[t]he term 'medical probability' more accurately expresses the standard"
for admissibility of medical opinions, but that no particular form of words is essential so
long as the doctor expresses the opinion with a sufficient "degree of positiveness" or "con-
viction." Id.
307. See McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 89 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ohio 1949).
308. Zelenka v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio 1956) (quoting defense
counsel at trial); Ford v. McCue, 127 N.E.2d 209, 215 (Ohio 1955) (quoting defendant's
overruled objection that a doctor did not testify with reasonable medical certainty); Fox v.
Industrial Comm'n, 125 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ohio 1955) [Fox I] (Taft, J., concurring), afg 132
N.E.2d 475, 478-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) [Fox 1] (phrase appears in both opinions); State
ex rel. M. O'Neil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 N.E.2d 559, 559 (Ohio 1953) (per curiam)
(noting that an employer asked the court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the
Industrial Commission to vacate a decision as it was not based on "reasonable medical
certainty"); Neighbors v. Administrator, Bureau of Workmen's Comp., 166 N.E.2d 403, 406
(Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (quoting a hypothetical question posed to a doctor at trial); Spargur
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 163 N.E.2d 786, 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (quoting a jury
charge relating to future expenses for "such services and care as will with reasonable medical
certainty be required in the future," and holding that future expenses could be awarded, be-
cause a jury could "find, even without professional opinion or a declaration of present
intention to submit to further skin surgery, that plaintiffs unfortunate condition would
with reasonable medical certainty require further services and care."); Luchansky v. J.V.
Parish, Inc., 157 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (quoting a hypothetical question
posed to a doctor at trial); Martin v. Sharon Steel Corp., 121 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1953) (per curiam) (quoting the basis of an objection at trial).
309. See Fox I, 132 N.E.2d at 479. The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated:
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In New York, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" entered
the lexicon of attorneys with only mild endorsement from the courts.
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared in two insignifi-
cant 1944 opinions in the paraphrase of testimony relating to the per-
manence of personal injuries.31 ° After a six-year hiatus, the phrase
appeared in numerous opinions throughout the 1950s. 11 In several
cases, testimony expressed with reasonable medical certainty was
deemed sufficient to sustain a claim,"1 2 and in two of these the phrase
In sustaining such holding of the trial court, we do not mean to hold that, in
all cases where medical testimony is based upon hypothetical questions, the origi-
nal question must include all the elements of a probable proximate causal rela-
tionship to a reasonable medical certainty. There are and may be cases where certain
preliminary questions may be asked as to a causal relationship, followed by other
questions which include the proximate causal connection.
Id. at 478 (emphasis added). The dispute in that case did not involve the physician's de-
gree of certitude, but rather the fact that the question had asked whether there was "a
causal relationship" rather than a "proximate or direct causal relationship." Id. at 477.
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial and appellate courts because the evidence prof-
fered "was insufficient in itself to prove a direct or proximate causal relationship, and, in the
absence of other evidence to cure the insufficiency, its exclusion was harmless error." Fox
II, 125 N.E.2d at 6.
The Ohio Court of Appeals had used the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" a sec-
ond time in its opinion, again suggesting it was part of the legal standard:
It has been argued to this court in this case that the requirement of incorpo-
rating in a question the probable proximate cause to a reasonable medical certainty is
not proper because it usurps the ultimate question and issue which the jury has to
answer. This is true in other cases, but where such questions depend only upon
expert medical testimony the only ultimate question for a jury is to choose be-
tween the credibility of the various medical witnesses for plaintiff and defendant.
Fox I, 132 N.E.2d at 479 (emphasis added). Because the intermediate court's opinion was
affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court, it would have reinforced the usage, which already
appeared to be well established in Ohio.
310. See Kurtz v. State, 52 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (testimony confirmed that claim-
ant had a condition which, "with reasonable medical certainty, appear[ed] to be perma-
nent"); Messinger v. State, 51 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507-08 (Ct. Cl. 1944) (testimony demonstrated
that the claimant had "suffered physical disability which, with reasonable medical certainty,
appear[ed] to be permanent").
311. In addition to the 14 decisions of the New York state courts cited infra notes 312-
316, the phrase appeared in Newton v. County of Erie, 180 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (App. Div.
1958), and in two federal court opinions-Jaffe v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 910, 912
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 255 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1958), and United States v. Peelle Co., 137 F.
Supp. 905, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). The phrase "medical certainty" appeared in four other
New York cases from the 1950s. See Maricle v. Glazier, 121 N.E.2d 549, 550 (N.Y. 1954);
Yance v. Ormsby, 176 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (App. Div. 1958); Dubrow v. 40 W. 33rd St. Realty
Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100 (App. Div. 1957); Sheldon v. Doughty's Laundry Serv., 167
N.Y.S.2d 56, 58 (App. Div. 1957).
312. See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. 1952) (reversing the
appellate division and reinstating the judgment for plaintiff); Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay
& Curr Co., 97 N.E.2d 915, 916 (N.Y. 1951) (reversing the appellate division and reinstat-
ing a workers' compensation award); Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570-71
(App. Div. 1959) (affirming a workers' compensation award); Reich v. Evans 180 N.Y.S.2d
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appeared in the headnotes. 313 In other cases, claimants lost, in part
due to the unwillingness of their doctors to offer positive opinions
with reasonable medical certainty.314 Nevertheless, in one case, the
claimant prevailed despite the unwillingness of a physician to testify
with reasonable medical certainty,3 15 while in another case, testimony
expressed with reasonable medical certainty was deemed improper as
invading the province of the jury.3 16 In sum, the New York courts
commented favorably on testimony expressed with "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" but did not treat the phrase as having any special doctri-
nal significance.31 7 Given the fact that the New York courts had
created the reasonable-certainty rule and had expended substantial
judicial energy clarifying its meaning, 318 it is somewhat surprising that
159, 162 (App. Div. 1958) (reducing a verdict as excessive, but indicating that testimony
expressed with "reasonable medical certainty" was not speculative when qualified by such
terms as "apparently" and "I think"); Zaepfel v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (In re
Zaepfel), 134 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (App. Div. 1954) (affirming a workers' compensation
award), affd, 132 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1956); In re Di Bella's Estate, 100 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766
(Sur. Ct. 1950) (using medical testimony in establishing that a husband predeceased his
wife), affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 929 (App. Div. 1951).
313. See Moore, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 568 headnote 2; Reich, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 160 headnote 6.
314. See Goettel v. United Hosp., 158 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (App. Div. 1956) (mem.) (revers-
ing a workers' compensation award); Heinrich v. Village of Hamburg, 141 N.Y.S.2d 865,
866 (App. Div. 1955) (per curiam) (same); Bethge v. Buffalo E. Motor Lines, 118 N.Y.S.2d
567, 568 (App. Div. 1953) (same); Desmond v. State, 158 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-50 (Ct. Cl.
1956) (affirming a denial of recovery for permanent injury to right arm).
315. See Bellamy v. Carrier Corp., 135 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (App. Div. 1954) (per curiam)
(affirming an award of workers' compensation death benefits based on the testimony of a
family physician, even though another doctor "refused to express an opinion with reason-
able medical certainty as to the cause of the strangulation"); cf Fischetti v. City of New
York, 147 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (renderingjudgment for plaintiff despite testi-
mony that "'there is no medical certainty as to how plaintiff would have fared without the
second accident'").
316. See Aponte v. Garcia, 109 N.Y.S.2d 761, 767 (App. Div. 1952). The Aponte court
reversed a workers' compensation award that had been based on a psychiatrist's testimony
that, "with a 'reasonable degree of medical certainty,'" linked the decedent's suicide to a
workplace accident. Id. The court held that the question was improper because it posed
an "ultimate fact-finding problem" and was speculative insofar as it was based on assump-
tions that lacked a solid factual foundation. Id. at 767-68. The phrase thus appeared in the
text of the opinion and in the paraphrase therefrom in headnote 4, which read in perti-
nent part as follows: "[ Q juestion to psychiatrist-witness [was] whether he could state with
reasonable degree of medical certainty whether accident and circumstances between accident
and suicide were competent producing causes of suicide was improper in that it posed an
ultimate fact-finding problem not within witness' [sic] legal competence." Id. at 762 head-
note 4 (emphasis added).
317. In the 1960s, the New York Court of Appeals stated that no particular verbal
formula was necessary for admissibility or sufficiency of proof. See Ernest v. Boggs Lake
Estates, Inc., 190 N.E.2d 528, 528-29 (N.Y. 1963) (noting that the court "will look for the
thought and meaning of... medical testimony rather than" reject it if it "fail[s] to use the
words preferred by lawyers"); see also infra note 419 and accompanying text.
318. See Martin, supra note 27, at 786-90.
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the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" had so little doctrinal im-
pact in that state.
In Washington, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" re-
ceived a strong endorsement from the state's highest court on the oc-
casion of its first appearance in a published opinion, the 1954 case of
Halder v. Department of Labor & Industries.19 In Halder, the Supreme
Court of Washington reversed ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict
that had been entered against the claimant, and a hypothetical ques-
tion that employed the phrase played a crucial role in the court's deci-
sion. 2' In addition to paraphrasing a question that asked the
physician whether he had an opinion based upon "reasonable medical
certainty" as to the connection between a blow received at work and a
stroke suffered eight days later,3 21 the court itself employed the
phrase in explaining the significance of this testimony: "His answer to
that question was, in effect, that in his opinion, based upon 'reason-
able medical certainty,' it was probable that the blow caused the
stroke."3 22 The court found that this answer "was evidence tending to
establish a causal relationship between the head injury and the stroke
which attained the degree of substantiality necessary to present a jury
question." 23 Rejecting the defendant's contention that Dr. Collins's
testimony was inconsistent and based upon speculation, the court
again emphasized the physician's expression of reasonable medical
certainty:
Dr. Collins' opinion that a causal relationship existed be-
tween the blow on the head and the stroke was certainly not
expressed in terms of speculation or surmise. It was his opin-
ion, based upon "reasonable medical certainty," that the
blow was the probable cause of the stroke.3 24
The Halder opinion established "reasonable medical certainty" as
a legally significant phrase in Washington, for the court recited it
319. 268 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1954).
320. See id. at 1024-25.
321. See id. at 1022. The court elaborated:
[The doctor] was asked specifically whether, assuming those to be the facts, he
had an opinion based upon "reasonable medical certainty" as to whether or not
there could be any connection between the blow received on May 28 and the
stroke suffered on June 5. He was then asked whether it is "probable" that the
blow caused the stroke. Again Dr. Collins answered in the affirmative.
Id.
322. Id. at 1023.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1024.
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three times 25 and it appeared in two of the headnotes3 26 In light of
the court's strong endorsement of this form of testimony, it is surpris-
ing that the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" did not appear
again in a reported Washington decision during the 1950s.3 27 As was
true of the leading cases from Missouri3 2' and Minnesota,3 29 the
Washington court addressed only the sufficiency of an opinion ex-
pressed with reasonable medical certainty and did not rule on the ne-
cessity of this expression, either to establish a prima facie case or for
purposes of admissibility.330
The situation in Pennsylvania is quite surprising. Despite a long-
established state rule requiring opinions on causation to be expressed
with "reasonable certainty" as a precondition for admissibility, the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" is entirely absent from pub-
lished opinions of the state courts prior to 1968.331 The rule requir-
ing definitive expression of medical opinion originated in a 1921
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that proof of
causation could not be established without medical testimony that an
injury "most probably came from the cause alleged. '3 3 2 Four years
later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated this standard and
criticized the continued introduction of testimony expressed in the
qualified "might or could" form.33 3 The court declared, "in order to
avoid further misapprehension, we now announce that hereafter no
consideration will be given to expert testimony on this point, unless it
is as explicit as we have stated."334 The following year, in Vorbnoff v.
Mesta Machine Co.,3 35 the court seemed to transform the requirement
of definitive testimony from a rule of sufficiency of proof into a rule of
admissibility. The court stated:
325. See id. at 1022-24.
326. See id. at 1020-21 headnotes 3, 9.
327. Search of WESTIAW, Wa-cs Database (Feb. 18, 1998) (da(bef 1960) & "reasonable
medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving only Halder).
328. See supra notes 269-278 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 280-290 and accompanying text.
330. See Halder, 268 P.2d at 1024-25. Significantly, many years earlier, the Washington
court had rejected the rule of reasonable certainty, holding that medical opinions on fu-
ture damages were admissible if expressed in terms of "reasonable probability." See Holt v.
School Dist. No. 71, 173 P. 335, 337-38 (Wash. 1918); Gallamore v. City of Olympia, 75 P.
978, 980 (Wash. 1904).
331. See Appendix B; see also supra note 10.
332. Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 113 A. 666, 667 (Pa. 1921).
333. See McCrosson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 129 A. 568, 569 (Pa. 1925).
334. Id.
335. 133 A. 256 (Pa. 1926).
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[T] he witness would have to testify, not that the condition of
claimant might have, or even probably did, come from the
accident, but that "in his professional opinion the result in
question came from the cause alleged"; for, according to our
latest pronouncement on this subject, a less direct expres-
sion of opinion would fall below the required standard of
proof, and therefore would not constitute legally competent
evidence.33 6
Subsequent Pennsylvania cases did not consistently treat the require-
ment of definitive testimony as a rule governing admissibility, 337 how-
ever, and even with regard to evidentiary sufficiency, these cases did
not require use of any particular form of words.33 ' Nevertheless, while
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to the requirement of de-
finitive medical testimony on causation throughout the 1950s,339 the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" did not appear in a single opin-
ion of the Pennsylvania state courts during that decade.34 ° While its
appearance in a federal court opinion demonstrated that the phrase
was being used by Pennsylvania attorneys during the 1950s,34" the
phrase did not appear in a published state court opinion until
1968.42
336. Id. at 258 (quoting McCrosson, 129 A. at 569). As a student commentator pointed
out, "[t] his rule was reached without any separate discussion on the question of admissibil-
ity as distinguished from sufficiency. Yet the case cited in support dealt only with the ques-
tion of sufficiency." John Wilson, Note, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony in
Pennsylvania: The Semantic Trap, 31 U. PiTr. L. REv. 150, 153 (1969).
337. See Robert M. Bernstein, How Certain Must the Expert Be, 18 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 186, 188
(1947).
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 103 A.2d 681, 684 (Pa. 1954) (hold-
ing that testimony that is not a professional opinion directly linking the result in question
to its alleged cause is legally incompetent evidence); Wargo v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 101 A.2d
638, 640 (Pa. 1954) (concluding that medical testimony that creates great doubt as to
whether the injuries complained of were caused or aggravated by the accident in question
was insufficient evidence).
340. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. But cf Pavlik v. Harmar Coal Co., 156
A.2d 565, 567 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959) (using the term "medical certainty").
341. See Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 12, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
342. See DeVirgiliis v. Gordon, 243 A.2d 459, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (Hannum, J.,
dissenting) (paraphrasing an attorney's questions during direct examination). The phrase
appeared in only one other state court opinion from the 1960s and in only sixteen more
cases prior to 1975. See supra note 331 for description of WESTLAW search. It did not
appear, for example, in McMahon v. Young, 276 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1971), the most frequently
cited modern Pennsylvania opinion mandating definitive expert testimony on causation.
In the mid-1970s, however, the Pennsylvania courts began using the phrase "reasonable
medical certainty" in conjunction with the state's requirement of definitive medical opin-
ion testimony. See Hamil v. Bashline, 307 A.2d 57, 61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973), appeal after
remand, 364 A.2d 1366, 1368 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 392 A.2d 1280, 1283-86 (Pa. 1978)
(75% chance that the plaintiff would have survived a heart attack with appropriate treat-
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To summarize the caselaw from this period, as of 1960, attorneys
in at least twenty-two states were using the phrase "reasonable medical
certainty." Furthermore, courts in several states treated the phrase as
an indicator of the sufficiency of medical opinion testimony relating
to causation or future damages. On the other hand, only rarely had
the courts expressly attributed any legal significance to the phrase,
and no court ever said the phrase was mandatory. In Illinois, Mis-
souri, New York, and Washington, the phrase appeared in favorable
comments on the substantiality of evidence of causation, and in Illi-
nois, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin, the phrase was linked with
the rule of "reasonable certainty" respecting future damages. Never-
theless, not a single opinion outside of Illinois held that the phrase
was essential to admissibility or sufficiency of proof.
How can we account for the rapid dissemination of the phrase
between 1940 and 1960? The only reasonable explanation for the
spread of this formulation from Illinois into other jurisdictions is that
attorneys were basing their questions on the models provided in Gold-
stein's texts. Without running afoul of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fal-
lacy, the conclusion follows from application of the factors used to
establish causation in toxic tort litigation: (1) exposure; (2) temporal
sequence between exposure and effect; (3) existence of a plausible
causal mechanism; and (4) absence of plausible alternative
explanations. 43
The exposure of the American bar to Goldstein's texts is undeni-
able. Both works were quite successful. Trial Technique was the lead-
ing trial manual of its era for both lawyers and law students. 3 144 It
ment was evidence of increased risk but would not suffice "to establish that the injury in
question did, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, stem from the negligent act").
A virtual explosion in usage occurred after 1975, with roughly 50 Pennsylvania cases con-
taining the phrase in the next five years and approximately 100 such cases in each suc-
ceeding five-year period. Thus, by the end of 1996, the phrase had appeared in 414
Pennsylvania state court opinions, more than in any other state except Ohio. See Appendix
B; see also supra note 10.
343. See Alan M. Ducatman, Toxic Exposures: The Expert Witness in Environmental Toxic Tort
Litigation, in 1 THE P-iSICiAN'S PERSPECrIVE ON MEDICAL LAW 263, 265-66 (Howard H. Kauf-
man &JeffL. Lewin eds., 1997).
344. Prior to the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) revolution of the 1970s,
trial advocacy was rarely taught in law schools. "[T]here was no nationally recognized,
coherent methodology," and the "teaching ... was often anecdotal." Thomas F. Geraghty,
Teaching Trial Advocacy in the 90s and Beyond, Foreword to Colloquium, Teaching Trial Advo-
cacy in the 90s and Beyond: A Critical Evaluation of Trial Advocacy Teaching Methodologies and
Designs for the Future, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 687, 687 (1991); accord Steven Lubet, What We
Should Teach (but Don't) Wen We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 123, 124 (1987)
(explaining that "trial advocacy teaching... was [o]nce largely the province of part-time
instructors who taught using makeshift materials and war stories drawn from their own
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remained in print as it sold out multiple printings until publication of
the second edition in 1969.345 Medical Trial Technique was so well re-
ceived that its title was incorporated into the periodical, Medical Trial
Technique Quarterly, which commenced publication in 1954 with Gold-
stein as co-editor. 46 A 1956 article by two Florida attorneys percep-
tively identified Medical Tial Technique as a possible source of the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty.
347
The temporal sequence is also clear. The phrase "reasonable
medical certainty" did not appear in a single opinion outside of Illi-
nois prior to the publication of Trial Technique in 1935. Thereafter,
however, the phrase appeared almost simultaneously in roughly half
of all American jurisdictions during the twenty-year period between
1940 and 1960.
experiences"); James W. McElhaney, Toward the Effective Teaching of Trial Advocacy, 29 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 198, 198 (1975) (recognizing that "[flor many years law schools took a
rather indifferent view toward training trial lawyers," and "until recently, many schools did
not offer trial advocacy courses"); G. Joseph Tauro, Graduate Law School Training in Trial
Advocacy: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 56 B.U. L. REv. 635, 63940 (1976) (arguing that
the introduction of Langdell's "case method" of teaching in 1870 shifted the focus of legal
education from training advocates to "developing legal scholars"). For a brief history of
NITA, see Kenneth S. Broun, Teaching Advocacy the NI.T.A. Way, 63 A.B.A.J. 1220, 1220-21
(1977).
Insofar as such courses were taught, Goldstein's manual would have been a readily
available text. My colleague Thomas J. Reed reports that Goldstein's manual was the as-
signed text for his trial methods course at Notre Dame in the 1960s. I am not aware of any
comparable works that would have been appropriate for teaching the nuts-and-bolts of trial
technique prior to the NITA era and the publication of such works as JAMES W. JEANS,
TRiAL ADvOCACy (lawyer's ed. & student ed. 1975), THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1980), and ALAN E. MORRILL, TRiAL DIPLOMACY (1973). Among the
available pre-NITA texts, FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAw AND TACTICS INJURY TRIALS (students' ed.
1950), emphasized law and discussed tactics but provided few models. ROBERT E. KEETON,
TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS (1954), discussed preparation and technique but was less
comprehensive than Goldstein and provided even fewer examples than Busch.
345. See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
347. See Smith & Tipton, supra note 28, at 327. The authors speculated:
The origin in Jurisprudence of the use of the term "reasonable medical cer-
tainty," which crops up from time to time in various ways in both negligence trials
and workmen's compensation hearings, is somewhat of a mystery. "Words and
Phrases" does not even list the term. Perhaps the phrase is borrowed from the
sometimes overly cautious medical profession. Perhaps the source is an unanno-
tated text book on suggested trial methods.' Then again the phrase may have
evolved out of the long standing requirement in negligence cases that future dam-
ages, as an issue of ultimate fact, must be ascertained to a reasonable certainty and
that, therefore, the defendant is entitled to have an instruction to the jury to this
effect.
1. See, for example, Goldstein and Shabat, "Medical Trial Technique," Cal-
laghan and Company, Chicago, 1942, pp. 16, 18.
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With regard to the plausible causal mechanism, both Trial Tech-
nique and Medical Trial Technique were replete with illustrations of hy-
pothetical questions that employed the phrase "reasonable medical
certainty," and Goldstein encouraged attorneys to copy the formulas
provided in his manual.3 4 Because Goldstein gave no hint that his
formula represented a local usage,349 it is not only plausible but pre-
dictable that attorneys throughout the United States would assume
that the phrase was essential and would thus incorporate it into their
hypothetical questions. It is therefore entirely understandable how
the usage could have sprung up simultaneously throughout the
United States as attorneys in each jurisdiction, acting independently,
accepted Goldstein's invitation to imitate his models.
Finally, no other plausible explanation exists for the rapid diffu-
sion of the phrase beyond the borders of Illinois between 1940 and
1960. The usage certainly was not initiated by physicians, for the
phrase had no special meaning within the medical profession.150 Nor
is it conceivable that the usage was spread by the judiciary. Not a sin-
gle opinion outside of Illinois treated the phrase as mandatory, either
for purposes of admissibility or evidentiary sufficiency. In only a few
states did the courts link the phrase with legal doctrine, and in none
did it represent a change in existing standards. In none of these cases
did a court cite an opinion from anotherjurisdiction that encouraged
the use of the phrase. Thus, the only way that appellate judges could
have learned of the phrase was from reading trial transcripts, and in
almost every case that a court commented favorably on the phrase, it
had been used by the attorneys at trial.
If the phrase was not disseminated by the medical profession nor
imposed by the judiciary, it must have been spread by the independ-
ent actions of the practicing bar, and Goldstein's two texts repre-
sented the only universally available source of the phrase for lawyers
engaged in litigation between 1935 and 1960. In sum, one can con-
clude with a reasonable degree of certainty that the diffusion of the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" beyond the borders of Illinois
reflected the influence of Goldstein's Trial Technique and Medical Trial
Technique.
348. See supra notes 187, 206-210 and accompanying text.
349. Indeed, two reviewers faulted Goldstein for treating Illinois legal practice as defini-
tive and for not warning readers of conflicting approaches in other jurisdictions. See Me-
dina, supra note 213, at 1188 (asserting that readers of Goldstein's book who are
"practicing out of the State of Illinois will have to be careful to check up the local prac-
tice"); Morgan, supra note 213, at 1388-89 (warning readers that the rules of law followed
by Illinois are not "universally accepted" throughout the country).
350. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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C. Inclusion of the Phrase in Secondary Literature
By 1960, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" had been
used by attorneys in at least twenty-two jurisdictions, 5 1 and undoubt-
edly in others as well. 5 2 The use of the phrase was sufficiently wide-
spread that it began to find its way into the secondary legal literature.
A 1956 article, entitled A Quest for "Reasonable Medical Certainty" in Flor-
ida,3 53 discussed the occasional appearance of the phrase in Florida
courtrooms. Based on an analysis of Florida law, the authors con-
cluded that "reasonable certainty" was not required except with re-
gard to future damages.3 54 They maintained "that even under this
rule reasonable medical certainty is not required and, moreover, evi-
dence of it may even be improper." 55 A 1957 article on medicolegal
causation referred to a "'reasonable medical certainty' rule" 6 and
concluded with this suggestion: "Be sure to analyze the cases of your
own jurisdiction on the 'reasonable certainty rule,' in order to deter-
mine whether or not your courts require reasonable medical certainty
as to causation."3 57 The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" also
appeared several times in a 1957 article entitled The Medical Expert Wit-
ness-Positive-Negative-Maybe.3 58  The article recommended that
courts should exclude speculative opinions expressed in terms of "pos-
sibility" and should limit admissibility to positive opinions expressed
in terms of "probability." 5 9 In this regard, the author treated "reason-
able medical certainty" as an expression of probability. 6 °
The American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts series, which commenced
publication in 1959, both reflected and reinforced the acceptance of
the phrase into the legal lexicon. The first volume of the series alone
contained eleven articles that used the phrase to illustrate hypotheti-
351. See supra notes 231-258 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
353. Smith & Tipton, supra note 28.
354. See id at 330.
355. Id.
356. Albert Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 CLEv.-MARsHALL L. REV.
209, 226 (1957). The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" also appeared three times at
page 216.
357. Id. at 230.
358. Harley J. McNeal, The Medical Expert Wtness-Positive-Negative-Maybe, 2 J. FOREN-
Sic Sci. 135 (1957).
359. Id. at 141, 148.
360. In one instance, McNeal contrasted the phrase with speculation: "[Hie has failed
to understand the distinction between 'possible' and 'probable,' 'reasonable medical cer-
tainty' and conjecture and speculation." Id. at 140. In another instance, he equated the
phrase with probability: "The strict limitation of medical testimony to 'probabilities' makes
it certain that ajury carefully consider the testimony before reaching the conclusion that a
causal relationship has been established with reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 141.
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cal questions.3 61 In subsequent volumes, the phrase appeared in arti-
cles on cancer3 62 and causation, 363 and an article on hypothetical
questions included the phrase "reasonable certainty" in a question
about medical malpractice.364 The pervasive use of the phrase
throughout the remainder of this series365 established "reasonable
medical certainty" as the definitive preface to requests for opinion tes-
timony from physicians.
IV. PROFUSION: 1960-1970
A. Exponential Growth
Prior to 1960, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" had ap-
peared in opinions from only twenty-one states outside of Illinois.366
Within another ten years, however, the phrase had appeared in pub-
lished opinions from all but two American states,3 67 with appearances
361. See 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Abortion and Miscarriage, 15, 24 (1959); 1 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS Amnesia, 507, 516, 520 (1959); 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Anemia, 559, 564
(1959); 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Aneurism, 569, 575, 579 (1959); 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS Angina Pectoris, 583, 590 (1959); 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Ankle Injuries, 641, 648
(1959); 1 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Ankylosis, 651, 657, 658 (1959); 1 Am. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS Anosmia, 711, 716 (1959); 1 Am.JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Aphasia, 731, 737, 738 (1959); 1
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Apoplexy, 741, 750, 751 (1959); 1 AM.JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Appendi-
citis, 755, 758 (1959).
362. 3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Cancer, 127, 140-41, 154 (1959).
363. 3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Causation: Medical Opinion, 161, 164 (1959).
364. 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Hypothetical Questions, 159, 164 (1960).
365. See Hullverson, supra note 18, at 586 ("Scarcely a volume of the American Jurispru-
dence Proof of Facts series is published without an illustration of dialogue that incorporates a
question of whether the expert has an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of profes-
sional certainty.").
366. See supra notes 231-259 and accompanying text.
367. See Appendix B; see also supra note 10. As of the end of 1969, the phrase had not yet
appeared in opinions from Nevada or New Hampshire. The phrase first appeared in a
decision from New Hampshire in 1970. SeeJackson v. EmileJ. Legere, Inc., 265 A.2d 18, 20
(N.H. 1970). Although the phrase "medical certainty" appeared in a 1972 Nevada opinion,
see Azbill v. State, 495 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Nev. 1972), the complete phrase did not appear in
Nevada until 1988, see Roberts v. United States, No. 85-1733, 1988 WL 57694, at *1 (9th Cir.
1988) (mem.), opinion and order published, 887 F.2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1989). The phrase
first appeared in a decision from a Nevada state court in 1990. See Vance v. Judas Priest,
No. 86-5844, 1990 WL 130920, at *18 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990).
During the 1970s, the phrase also appeared in state or municipal court opinions from
three jurisdictions in which it previously had appeared only in federal court opinions. See
Daugaard v. People ex rel. Daugaard, 488 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1971) (initial federal
opinion, Murphy v. Dyer, 409 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1969)); United States v. Holmes, 343
A.2d 272, 274 n.4 (D.C. 1975) (initial federal opinion, Quick v. Thurston, 290 F.2d 360,
364 (D.C. Cir. 1961)); Womack v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 205 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974) (initial federal opinion, Rewis v. United States, 369 F.2d 595, 598-99 (5th Cir.
1966)).
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in sixteen new jurisdictions from 1960 through 1964,68 and eleven
from 1965 through 1969.369
As the phrase spread to additional jurisdictions, the frequency of
its appearance also increased dramatically. While the phrase ap-
peared in an average of approximately four published cases per year
in the late 1940s and six per year in the first half of the 1950s, it ap-
peared in roughly fifteen per year in the second half of the 1950s,
thirty-five per year in the first half of the 1960s, and sixty per year in
the second half of the 1960s. 7 ° To be sure, the frequency of its ap-
pearance reflected the general increase in personal injury litigation
during this period, and not simply the prevalence of its usage in such
litigation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the phrase had achieved
not just general acceptance, but talismanic significance, as the "magic
words"371 with which attorneys prefaced requests for expert medical
opinions.
368. Quick, 290 F.2d at 364 (District of Columbia); Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 186
F. Supp. 331, 337 (D.N.D. 1960); Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (Ariz.
1960); Wonder State Mfg. Co. v. Howard, 338 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ark. 1960); Condron v.
Harl, 374 P.2d 613, 620 (Haw. 1962); Yeager v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 112 N.W.2d
299, 302 (Iowa 1961); Hazelwood v. Hodge, 357 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Ky. 1961); Baltimore
County v. State ex rel. Keenan, 193 A.2d 30, 33 (Md. 1963); Commonwealth v. Harrison,
173 N.E.2d 87,93-94 (Mass. 1961); Kennedy v. Williams-McWilliams Indus., Inc., 156 So. 2d
806, 807 (Miss. 1963); Newman v. Kamp, 374 P.2d 100, 103 (Mont. 1962); Riggs v. Gooch
Milling & Elevator Co., 112 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Neb. 1961); Batte v. Stanley's, 374 P.2d 124,
126 (N.M. 1962); Vaux v. Hamilton, 103 N.W.2d 291, 295 (N.D. 1960); La Barge v. United
Ins. Co., 349 P.2d 822, 829 (Or. 1960); Williams v. Daniels, 344 S.W.2d 555, 558, 560
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); Pygman v. Helton, 134 S.E.2d 717, 720 (W. Va. 1964). In Montana,
a case containing the "medical and surgical" variant of the phrase was published two years
prior to the first appearance of the precise phrase "reasonable (degree of) medical cer-
tainty" in Newman. See Risken v. Northern Pac. Ry., 350 P.2d 831, 837 (Mont. 1960) ("an
opinion based upon reasonable certainty and from a medical and surgical point of view").
369. Murphy, 409 F.2d at 750 (Colorado); Rewis, 369 F.2d at 598-99 (Georgia); Western
Ry. v. Brown, 196 So. 2d 392, 401 (Ala. 1967); McCracken v. State, 431 P.2d 513, 515
(Alaska 1967); Coffin v. Faggella, 242 A.2d 792, 794 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967); Air Mod Corp.
v. Newton, 215 A-2d 434, 438 (Del. 1965); Howe v. Farmers Coop. Creamery, 132 N.W.2d
844, 846 (S.D. 1965); State v. Lancaster, 433 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah 1967); Valente v. Com-
mercial Ins. Co., 236 A.2d 241, 245 (Vt. 1967); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 146 S.E.2d
220, 229 (Va. 1966); Lujan v. State, 423 P.2d 388, 392 (Wyo. 1967). Although the phrase
had appeared in opinions from Pennsylvania's federal courts as early as 1955, see supra
notes 250 and 341, it finally appeared in an opinion from a Pennsylvania state court in
1968, see DeVirgiliis v. Gordon, 243 A.2d 459, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (Hannum, J.,
dissenting).
370. See Appendix A for year-by-year figures for state and federal courts opinions con-
taining the phrase. See also supra note 10.
371. See Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1969) ("a court should
not disregard the substance of a doctor's testimony merely because he fails to use the
magic words 'reasonable medical certainty'").
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Although the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared in
482 published state and federal opinions between 1960 and the end of
1969,372 in few of these cases did the courts treat the phrase as legally
significant. In roughly one-ninth of these cases, the phrase found its
way into the headnotes prepared by the West Publishing Company,3 73
but the inclusion of the phrase frequently reflected a quotation or
paraphrase of pertinent trial testimony in which the court focused on
the substance of the expert's opinion, rather than the certitude with
which it was expressed. In cases that did not include the words "rea-
sonable medical certainty" in the headnotes, the court was even less
likely to have viewed the phrase as important, for a recitation of testi-
mony containing the phrase often occurred in discussions of the fac-
tual background that was not directly germane to the legal issues
under discussion.
B. Interpretations of the Phrase Outside of Illinois
During the 1960s, attorneys throughout the nation were asking
physicians to express opinions with "reasonable medical certainty,"
but judges rarely were called upon to interpret the phrase. In many
jurisdictions the courts had not attached any special importance to
these words, so they would have had no occasion to define them. But
even courts that viewed the phrase as legally significant rarely both-
ered to say what it meant. Having seen or heard the phrase many
times before using it in their opinions, the judges tended to treat the
meaning of the phrase as self-evident. Like the boy in the story, "The
Emperor's New Clothes," '74 a judge who sensed the universal accept-
ance of the phrase would have been reluctant to declare that these
words were bare, empty, and devoid of meaning.
The diffusion of the phrase had occurred so rapidly and its use
was so ubiquitous that lawyers and judges presumed the words must be
meaningful and legally significant even in the absence of any prior
judicial endorsement. In Arizona, for example, the phrase had never
372. See Appendix A; see also supra note 10.
373. The phrases "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty" appeared in the headnotes of 47 state and 6 federal opinions from 1960 through
1969. Of these 53 opinions, 31 were from just 6 states: Missouri (7), Florida (6), Illinois
(6), Wisconsin (6), Kansas (3), and Michigan (3). The other 22 opinions came from 18
states, while 27jurisdictions issued no opinions during the 1960s in which the phrase ap-
peared in the headnotes. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Jan. 23, 1998)
(he("reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") & da(aft
1959 & bef 1970)) (retrieving 53 cases).
374. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in ANDERSEN'S FAIRY TALES 263
(E.V. Lucas & H.B. Paull trans., 1945).
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previously appeared in a published opinion when the Arizona
Supreme Court used it to describe the legal standard for proof of cau-
sation.375 Just three years later, the Arizona Supreme Court excused
the failure of the claimant's physician to use "the occult words 'rea-
sonable medical certainty"' because "these words are not necessary to
the proof of a prima facie case in all circumstances, "376 implying that
the phrase would be necessary in most circumstances even though no
previous opinion had so stated. Similarly, less than two months after
the Supreme Court of Delaware first used a variant of the phrase in a
quotation from trial testimony, 77 it declared, without citation of au-
thority, that "'the reasonable medical certainty' test, . . . is preferable
when obtainable.,1 7' As in Arizona, the Delaware court implied it was
making an exception to an established legal standard when it excused
the absence of the phrase with the comment, "Semantics must give
way in the search for a fair and just result."3 79
In Pennsylvania, a 1963 decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit referred to "the reasonable medical cer-
tainty required by the law of Pennsylvania,"3 0 but it was not until five
years later that the phrase made its first appearance in a published
opinion of a Pennsylvania appellate court.8 l The most plausible ex-
planation for this dictum is that the court was so habituated to hear-
ing attorneys use the phrase in complying with Pennsylvania's
longstanding evidentiary rule requiring definitive expert opinions on
causation, that the court assumed the phrase itself was required by
that rule.
Another example of attorneys' and judges' presuming the legal
significance of the phrase in the absence of prior authority comes
from the New Mexico Supreme Court's quotation of a colloquy at the
trial of a workers' compensation claim.3 82 During the direct examina-
375. The court explained:
The difference in the medical and legal concept of cause results from the obvious
differences in the basic problems and exigencies of the two professions in relation
to causation. By reason of his training, the doctor is thinking in terms of a single,
precise cause for a particular condition. The law, however, endeavors to reach an
inference of reasonable medical certainty, from a given event or sequence of
events, and recognizes more than one cause for a particular injurious result.
Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (Ariz. 1960).
376. Breidler v. Industrial Comm'n, 383 P.2d 177, 179 (Ariz. 1963).
377. See Weiner v. Wisniewski, 213 A.2d 857, 858 (Del. 1965) ("reasonable degree of
medical and surgical certainty").
378. Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 438 (Del. 1965).
379. Id.
380. Sleek v. J.C. Penney Co., 324 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1963).
381. See supra notes 331-342 and accompanying text.
382. See Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 375 P.2d 327, 330-32 (N.M. 1962).
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tion of the claimant's physician, the employer's attorney objected to
one question because it was not phrased with "reasonable medical cer-
tainty as defined by the Supreme Court."38 3 He objected to another
question "on the ground that the Supreme Court has stated the word
is reasonable medical certainty." '84 The trial court sustained these ob-
jections and directed counsel to re-phrase the questions. 385 At the
time of those proceedings, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court
had never even used the phrase, much less defined or required it!38
6
Thus, by the mid-1960s, lawyers and judges had become so famil-
iar with the phrase that they presumed it was legally required and had
an accepted meaning. The judges heard or read the words, repeated
them in their summaries of the trial testimony, and occasionally incor-
porated them into existing doctrines relating to admissibility or proof;
they rarely paused, however, to define the phrase. Accordingly, the
definitions that may be found in these cases frequently are implicit
rather than explicit.
In jurisdictions other than Illinois, the interpretation of the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" was shaped by its interaction
383. Id. at 331.
384. Id.
385. Id. The record reveals the following:
Q Yes, beyond a-you can't state that by absolute certainty but you have to
deal with the history that you have, is that right?
A That is right, I can only state that they-
MR. McATEE: If the Court please, we object on the ground it is reasonable
medical certainty as defined by the Supreme Court and not absolute certainty.
THE COURT: That is right.
MR. ORTEGA: ... Let me ask it of you this way: Could it very well have been
the triggering factor that aggravated the pre-existent condition, doctor?
MR. McATEE: Just a second, doctor. We object again on the ground that
the Supreme Court has stated the word is reasonable medical certainty.
THE COURT: Add the words in there, with reasonable medical certainty.
MR. ORTEGA: With reasonable medical certainty, not absolute but reason-
able, in view of the history?
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
386. See Appendix B; see also supra note 10. The New Mexico Supreme Court first used
the phrase in a quotation from the trial court's findings of fact in an opinion issued on
August 14, 1962. See Batte v. Stanley's, 374 P.2d 124, 126 (N.M. 1962). The opinion in
Lucero was issued just two months later, on October 16, 1962. Although the date of trial in
Lucero was not specified, the proceedings related to a workplace accident in 1958, see
Lucero, 375 P.2d at 328, and the case undoubtedly was already on appeal when the New
Mexico Supreme Court first used the phrase in Batte.
Moreover, in no opinion did the New Mexico Supreme Court ever define or require
the use of "reasonable medical certainty." An intermediate appellate court later ruled that
the standard of proof for disability in workers' compensation proceedings was "reasonable
medical probability" rather than "reasonable medical certainty." See Archuleta v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 727 P.2d 77, 79 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
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with idiosyncratic local doctrines relating to admissibility and suffi-
ciency of proof. As a result, the meaning and significance of the
phrase depended on the context in which it was employed. An under-
standing of the role of "reasonable medical certainty" in legal doctrine
during the 1960s thus requires separate consideration of the two is-
sues that provided the context for its application and interpretation:
admissibility and sufficiency of proof in civil litigation.
1. "Reasonable Medical Certainty" and Admissibility. -The rules
governing the admissibility of less-than-definitive expert opinions va-
ried considerably among jurisdictions, and even within certain juris-
dictions, depending on the subject matter (e.g., workers'
compensation versus personal injury, causation of present versus fu-
ture damages), or sometimes depending upon which of two compet-
ing lines of authority the court chose to follow. From the welter of
conflicting decisions, three distinct standards of admissibility can be
discerned: (1) opinion testimony is admissible without regard to certi-
tude; (2) opinion testimony must be in terms of probability, not possi-
bility; and (3) opinion testimony must be certain or definitive and
more than a probability.
As of 1970, a small but growing number of courts did not condi-
tion the admissibility of expert opinion evidence on any particular
level of certitude. These courts held that any reservations or lack of
certainty in the expert's opinion went to the credibility or weight of
the opinion, rather than its admissibility.38 7 In jurisdictions employ-
ing this liberal standard of admissibility, expressions of "reasonable
medical certainty" were unnecessary.3 8
387. E.g., Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 47 Cal. Rptr. 173, 182
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Dzurik v. Tamura, 359 P.2d 164, 165-66 (Haw. 1960); Johnson v.
Wilson, 97 So. 2d 674, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1957); M.K. & 0. Airline Transit Co. v. Deckard,
397 P.2d 883, 885 (Okla. 1964) (construing Cohenour v. Smart, 240 P.2d 91 (Okla. 1951)
and Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Kelly, 153 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1944)); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex. 1968).
Several Maryland cases so held. E.g., Baughman Contracting Co. v. Mellott, 139 A.2d
852, 854-55 (Md. 1958); Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Bishop, 55 A-2d 507, 511-12
(Md. 1947); Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v. Garrettson, 51 A.2d 642, 646 (Md. 1947); Bethle-
hem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 50 A.2d 256, 259 (Md. 1946); Langenfelder
v. Thompson, 20 A.2d 491, 493 (Md. 1941). Without expressly overruling these cases, the
Maryland court switched to a rule conditioning admissibility on expressions of "reasonable
probability." E.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 218 A.2d 194, 200 (Md. 1966); Kujawa v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 167 A.2d 96, 99 (Md. 1961); Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 113 A.2d 82, 86
(Md. 1955), overruled in part by Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967).
388. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So. 2d 754, 755-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) ("The admitted inability of the witness to express the opinion with reasonable
certainty did not render his testimony incompetent and require it to be stricken."); Knoper
v. Burton, 163 N.W.2d 453, 456-57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (per curiam) (holding that the
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Most courts still required some level of certitude as a prerequisite
to admissibility. The predominant approach, reflecting the views of at
least a plurality if not a majority of American jurisdictions, drew the
line between the "probable" and the "possible." That is, these courts
distinguished valid expressions of opinion that a fact was "more likely
than not" or "probably" true from invalid speculation or conjecture
based on a mere "possibility" that a fact "might" or "could" be true. 89
In jurisdictions requiring expressions of probability, only a few opin-
ions directly addressed the meaning of the phrase "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" in relation to the admissibility of expert testimony.
Insofar as the courts accepted testimony expressed with "reasonable
medical certainty," they had no reason to consider whether the phrase
was synonymous with "probability" or represented a more demand-
ing standard. The courts in Alaska, 9 ° Nebraska, 91 and Washing-
trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on the issue of damages was harmless error
because the jury found for the defendant and thus never reached this issue), rev'd on other
grounds, 173 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1970); accord id. at 453 headnote 5 ("For testimony of
doctor to be admissible he need not testify in terms of reasonable medical certainty."); cf
Dahlbeck v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 287 P.2d 353, 357 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
("[W]hile the triers of the facts must confine themselves to awards based upon reasonable
certainty, the medical evidence need not reach any such degree of positive assertion.").
389. E.g., Maddocks v. Bennett, 456 P.2d 453, 457-58 (Alaska 1969); Miller v. National
Cabinet Co., 168 N.E.2d 811, 813-15 (N.Y. 1960); Vaux v. Hamilton, 103 N.W.2d 291, 295
(N.D. 1960); O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 440 P.2d 823, 829-30 (Wash. 1968); see also McNeal,
supra note 358, at 148 (concluding that "a better kind of justice" would be achieved if
medical testimony were limited to testimony of a "probably causal relationship" rather than
a "possible" one (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A number of courts employed the locution "reasonable medical probability" to ex-
press their standard of admissibility. E.g., Houser v. Eckhardt, 450 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo.
1969) (en banc); see also infra note 393. This phrase first appeared in 1949, and its develop-
ment lagged behind "reasonable medical certainty," appearing in only a dozen cases prior
to 1960, and 177 prior to 1970. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Oct. 19, 1997)
("reasonable medical probability" "reasonable degree of medical probability" & da(bef
1/1/1970)). The "reasonable medical probability" standard currently governs admissibil-
ity of medical testimony in Maryland. See Myers v. Celotex Corp., 594 A.2d 1248, 1255-57
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); see also infra note 467 (discussing Myers).
390. In Maddocks v. Bennett, 456 P.2d 453, 457-58 (Alaska 1969), the court rejected the
appellant's attack on the admissibility and sufficiency of a physician's deposition testimony
relating to the issue of causation. The appellant contended that "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" was required to establish a causal connection, that this standard was higher than a
mere probability, and that the physician's testimony did not meet this standard. Id. at 456-
57. The court held that the physician's testimony was admissible because the testimony
expressed in terms of "reasonable probability" satisfied the required test of certainty for
proof of causation. Id. at 458. The court treated the applicable evidentiary standard as
'reasonable certainty" rather than "reasonable medical certainty," but it gave no indication
that the latter phrase would impose a different or more demanding standard than "reason-
able probability." See id. at 457-58.
391. In Whittington v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 128 N.W.2d 795, 808 (Neb. 1964), the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the trial court should have sustained objections and
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ton 9 2  described their standards of admissibility in terms of
"reasonable medical certainty," but interpreted the term as meaning
"more probable than not." Courts in several jurisdictions referred to
their standards as rules of "reasonable medical certainty or
probability" without indicating whether the terms were meant to be
synonymous or to represent distinct alternative criteria.398
The Defense Research Institute (DRI) advocated adoption of
"reasonable medical certainty" as a standard of admissibility in its 1967
monograph entitled The Rule of Medical Certainty.94 The Foreword in-
dicated that the purpose of the monograph was to demonstrate that
expert testimony should "be in terms of certainty rather than specula-
tion," and to examine the "philosophical and practical reasons for re-
quiring testimony to a reasonable medical certainty."' 9  In
contrasting "reasonable medical certainty" with "speculation," the
Foreword treated the phrase as an expression of "probability" rather
than "possibility," and it equated the "duty" of the expert to express
opinions in terms of "reasonable medical certainty" with the duty of
jurors to base their verdict on the preponderance of the evidence.39 6
Surprisingly, however, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
excluded a physician's testimony based on "possibilities," rather than on "reasonable medi-
cal certainty," about the cause of plaintiffs condition. Accord id. at 797 headnote 15
("Where medical expert testified he could not speak with reasonable medical certainty as
to cause of plaintiffs dizziness and nausea, objections to his further testimony should have
been sustained and answer excluded."). The Whittington court did not define "reasonable
medical certainty," but in later cases the same court equated "reasonable certainty" with
"reasonable probability." See Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 138 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Neb. 1965)
(noting that a doctor's opinion that a "disability was probably due to a scuffle . . . is as
definite as a doctor can be without giving a positive opinion").
392. In Browning v. Ward, 422 P.2d 12, 16 (Wash. 1966), the court equated its require-
ment of "reasonable medical certainty" with the standard enunciated in an earlier case,
requiring that "'medical testimony must at least be that the injury "probably" or "more
likely than not" caused the subsequent condition, rather than that the accident or injury
"might have," "could have," or "possibly did" cause the subsequent condition'" (quoting
Glazer v. Adams, 391 P.2d 195, 198 (Wash. 1964)). In ODonoghue v. Riggs, 440 P.2d 823,
828-30 (Wash. 1968), the court held that the physician's testimony should have been
stricken because he was unable to express an opinion with "reasonable medical certainty"
as to one "probable" cause among three "possible" causes of the plaintiff's condition.
393. See, e.g., Holecek v. Janke, 171 N.W.2d 94, 101 (N.D. 1969) (for costs of future
surgery to be admissible, plaintiff would first have had "to establish with reasonable medi-
cal certainty or probability that future surgery was necessary"); id. at 94 headnote 8 (same);
Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188, 192 (N.D. 1968) ("A medical witness should be
permitted to testify only to reasonable medical probabilities or reasonable medical certain-
ties."); cf State v. Holt, 246 N.E.2d 365, 365-66 (Ohio 1969) ("the legal requirement of
'reasonable certainty' or 'probability'").
394. Miller, supra note 123, at 4-7.
395. Colleen A. Roach, Foreword to THE RuLE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY, supra note 123, at
3.
396. Id. The Foreword more fully explained:
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never appeared within the monograph's principal article, which fo-
cused on the distinction between expressions of "probability" and
"possibility, '39 7 and the phrase appeared only infrequently within the
Digest of Decisions that made up the bulk of the monograph.3 98 Thus,
in advocating adoption of "reasonable medical certainty" as a standard
of admissibility, DRJ implicitly treated the phrase as equivalent to an
expression of probability and did not suggest any higher threshold.
Only a small number of jurisdictions fell within the third cate-
gory, which conditioned admissibility of expert testimony on defini-
tive expressions of certitude that would not be satisfied by an opinion
that a fact was "more likely than not" or "probably" true. The only two
states that clearly fell within this category in the years between 1960
and 1969 were Pennsylvania and South Carolina, but neither of these
states expressed the standard of admissibility in terms of "reasonable
medical certainty." 99
The duty of the expert to express his opinion in terms of reasonable medical
certainty parallels the duty of the jurors to base their verdict on the side of the
party who has presented the preponderance of reasonable evidence to the degree
required by the law of the jurisdiction....
... The purpose of this monograph is to demonstrate the result of allowing
expert medical testimony of a character which serves to confuse rather than assist
the jurors in its declaration of the facts. The requirement that the expert testi-
mony be in terms of certainty rather than speculation is inherent in the basis for
the allowance of expert medical opinion evidence in the first instance.
Id.
397. See Miller, supra note 123, at 4-7. While the Foreword focused on the admissibility
of less-than-certain expert testimony, Miller's principal article failed clearly to distinguish
between issues of admissibility and sufficiency of proof. Miller suggested that the rules of
evidence should be considered in light of the standard for making out a prima facie case.
See id. at 4-5. Furthermore, Miller emphasized "[t]he vice involved in submitting a causal
relationship question to ajury in the absence of a medical opinion of its probability" which
invites the jury to "speculate with the rights of citizens." Id. at 6-7.
398. See Digest to Decisions, in THE RULE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY, supra note 123, at 8-81.
The phrase appeared in excerpts from opinions at pages 12, 25, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 52, 65,
and it was inadvertently omitted from a quotation at 11. The authors themselves used the
phrase only in describing the rule relating to proof of future damages in Washington. See
id. at 71.
399. Pennsylvania's stringent standard of admissibility requiring definitive expressions
of expert opinions on causation was sometimes referred to as a rule of "reasonable cer-
tainty," but as of 1970, the Pennsylvania courts had not described this requirement in
terms of "reasonable medical certainty." See supra notes 331-342 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina required that expert opinions as to causation
satisfy what it termed the "most probable rule," which required a physician to testify that
the plaintiffs injuries "most probably" resulted from the defendant's conduct. See Cross v.
Concrete Materials, 114 S.E.2d 828, 829, 831 (S.C. 1960). Although the court in one case
approved of testimony on causation elicited by a question requesting an opinion with "rea-
sonable medical certainty," the court attached no particular importance to this phrase and
instead emphasized the definitiveness of the physician's answer. See Martin v. Mobley, 169
S.E.2d 278, 281 (S.C. 1969). The phrases "most probable" and "most probably" dominated
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Tennessee may have been a third state in this category. In Ten-
nessee, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" made its first ap-
pearance in Williams v. Daniels,4"' a decision that linked the phrase
with the state's "reasonable certainty" standard for future damages
and arguably established the phrase as a standard of admissibility.
The defendant had assigned as error "that permanent injuries or disa-
bility evidence by a physician must be to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty, and that 'likelihood, possibility and probability', when
shown by the answers to questions under attack, make the question
and answer thereto inadmissible."" Treating the defendant's con-
tention as entirely consistent with prior authority requiring proof of
permanent injuries with "reasonable certainty," the court implicitly
agreed with the defendant's assertion that statements of "probability"
would be inadmissible under a standard of "reasonable medical cer-
tainty." Lending further support to this implication, the court in dic-
tum quoted a statement from an earlier case that "even a probability"
would not suffice.40 2 The court nevertheless upheld the verdict, be-
cause the physician's testimony, taken as a whole, met the standard of
"reasonable medical certainty.""° In emphasizing the objective find-
ings supporting the physician's testimony, the court apparently at-
tached no importance to the fact that the physician's testimony, which
South Carolina opinions addressing admissibility of expert testimony in this era, and the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" appeared only infrequently.
400. 344 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960); see also Appendix B; supra note 10.
401. Williams, 344 S.W.2d at 558.
402. See id. at 559. The court stated in full, "'"But while absolute certainty should not be
required, a mere conjecture, or even a probability, does not warrant the giving of damages
for future disability which may never exist."'" Id. (quoting Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v.
Reeves, 157 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941) (quoting 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 75, at
488 (1938))). The language in Reeves requiring more than a "probability" was dictum,
however, because the doctor's testimony about future damages in that case did not rise to
the level of "probability." Instead, the doctor had testified only that the plaintiff's back
condition "may clear up and get over it and may never." Reeves, 157 S.W.2d at 855 (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Williams, 344 S.W.2d at 559 (quoting Reeves, 157 S.W.2d at
855); Ronald Lee Gilman, Medical Expert Testimony in Tennessee, 34 TENN. L. REv. 572, 606
(1967) ("[I] n (Reeves], where the doctor based his opinion solely upon plaintiffs subjective
complaints.... the court held that this was not sufficient evidence of permanency.").
403. Williams, 344 S.W.2d at 560. The court explained:
We think that the question and answer was proper, and based upon the objective
fitidings set forth above it is clearly shown that his opinion is based upon a reason-
able certainty from a medical standpoint ....
... [H]is testimony taken as a whole can be and is clearly construed as if he
had said:
"What I have said heretofore makes my answers to these questions show that I
consider the inquiries to be based upon and call for an amount based upon a
reasonable medical certainty."
Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
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stated that the condition "could be permanent,940 4 did not even rise to
the level of probability. Hence, the court's ruling that this testimony
was admissible under a standard of "reasonable medical certainty"
seems inconsistent with its dictum treating "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" as something more than "probability.
40 5
Subsequent decisions of the Tennessee courts during the 1960s
did not seem to require "reasonable medical certainty" as a standard
of admissibility, nor did they interpret the phrase as a higher level of
certitude than probability. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Young,406 the
court repeated the dictum that "even a probability" would not suf-
fice; 4 0 7 yet the testimony that the court ruled insufficient and inadmis-
sible-that future problems "very possibly" or "could or might"
develop 4 S-clearly was conjectural and did not rise to the level of
probability. In Bridges v. Householder,0 9 the court found sufficient evi-
dence to support an award of damages for permanent disability based
on the physician's testimony that the "plaintiff will likely have some
permanent disability" and "my educated guess, my own opinion is that
he will have some mild permanent disability." 410 The court noted that
the physician later "explained that by using the term 'educated guess'
he meant an opinion 'based on a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty, training, etc."'411 In addition to accepting the sufficiency of
testimony that did not rise above the level of "probability," the court
upheld the trial court's refusal to incorporate into the jury instruc-
tions on future damages the "even a probability" dictum from Williams
and Young.412 The court explained that to do so "might well have left
the inference in the minds of jurors that the Court thought his testi-
mony was not to be taken as supporting plaintiffs claim of permanent
disability." '413 Thus, while the Tennessee courts said that testimony
about future damages had to be expressed with "reasonable medical
404. Id.
405. See Gilman, supra note 402, at 607-08 (commenting that the court in Williams had to
"stretch quite far" to find that the testimony met the "standard of reasonable certainty").
406. 362 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1962).
407. Id. at 243.
408. Id.
409. 385 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).
410. Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
411. Id. at 316.
412. See id. at 314-15.
413. Id. at 315. While the court may be correct that the requested instruction "might
well have" had such an impact on the jury, the instruction did not purport to direct a
verdict on the issue and seemed to be consistent with the dictum in previous cases. Even
though the court failed to consider whether the instruction correctly stated the law of
Tennessee, the court's rejection of the instruction could be read as an implicit repudiation
of the dictum requiring more than a "probability."
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certainty" under the rule of "reasonable certainty," and that testimony
in terms of "probability" was not sufficient, the courts nevertheless
regularly upheld the admissibility and sufficiency of far weaker testi-
mony, and in no case during the 1960s did the Tennessee courts ex-
clude testimony for failing to meet this standard.414
2. "Reasonable Medical Certainty" and Sufficiency of Proof.-While
the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" occasionally surfaced in ju-
dicial discussions of admissibility, it more frequently appeared in judi-
cial evaluations of the sufficiency of proof in civil litigation.4
15
Because the rules governing proof of causation sometimes differed
from those governing proof of future damages, these two topics are
discussed separately.
a. Proof of Causation.--Consistent with the preponderance
of the evidence standard, most courts demanded proof of causation in
civil litigation in terms of "probability" or "reasonable probability."
Courts generally treated opinions expressed with "reasonable medical
certainty" as sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs burden to prove that a
fact was "probably" true.4 16 Conversely, courts frequently found a
414. In recent years, the Tennessee courts have continued to insist that testimony be
expressed with "reasonable medical certainty" and have repeated the "even a probability"
dictum. See, e.g., Primm v. Wickes Lumber Co., 845 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(testimony with "reasonable degree of medical certainty" required with respect to causa-
tion). Nevertheless, many cases draw the line between impermissible expressions of possi-
bility and valid expressions of probability. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594,
602 (Tenn. 1993) (plaintiff must show with "a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that
injury was probably caused by defendant); Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856,
862 (Tenn. 1985) ("Regardless of the term employed," an opinion on causation is admissi-
ble if it states the "most likely one among the possible causes," but not if it states that it is
'merely possible." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Youngblood v. Solomon, No.
03A01-9601-CV-00037, 1996 WL 310015, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 1996) ("[T]he
'reasonable degree of medical certainty' test may now have given way to the 'more prob-
able than not' test. ... ."); Moore v. Walwyn, No. O1AO1-9507-CV-00295, 1996 WL 17143, at
*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1996) (report "failed to establish within a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the failure to use the antibiotics probably caused Mr. Moore's inju-
ries"). The "reasonable medical certainty" standard is frequently at issue in Tennessee.
The state ranks fifth after Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Missouri in the number of state
court opinions containing the phrase. See Appendix B.
415. The phrase also appeared in a number of criminal cases. In Maryland, for exam-
ple, a court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction with respect to
the insanity defense unless a psychiatrist could testify with "reasonable medical certainty"
to the existence of a mental disease or defect. See Greenleaf v. State, 256 A.2d 552, 553
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
416. See, e.g, Western Ry. v. Brown, 196 So. 2d 392, 401 (Ala. 1967) (holding that an
expert opinion expressed with "reasonable medical certainty" is equal to an expression
that "plaintiffs condition was probably caused by her injury").
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plaintiff's proof to be deficient if the key witness refused to express an
opinion with "reasonable medical certainty. 4 17
A number of courts purported to require proof of causation with
"reasonable medical certainty," equating the phrase with proof of
"probabilities" as opposed to "possibilities."41 Courts frequently used
"reasonable medical certainty" interchangeably with "probably," and
they often emphasized that the sufficiency of proof should not de-
pend upon subtle semantic distinctions, but should be evaluated with
respect to the totality of the testimony.41 9
417. See, e.g., Bilicki v. W.T. Grant Co., 157 N.W.2d 300, 300 headnote 4 (Mich. Ct. App.
1968) (stating that the doctor's testimony failed to make a submissible case to ajury where
"he could not with reasonable degree of medical certainty form an opinion as to malady
suffered by plaintiffs"), rev'd on other grounds, 170 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1969); id. at 301-02
(concluding that testimony not expressed to a "reasonable degree of medical certainty"
cannot be considered an "expert medial opinion"); Bailey v. Kershner, 444 S.W.2d 10, 10
headnote 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (noting that testimony by a physician as to his "feeling"
about the cause of injury and without "reasonable medical certainty" would not "support
finding that injuries caused or contributed to death"); id. at 15 ("If... plaintiffs only
medical expert... could not say with reasonable medical certainty that the casualty inju-
ries caused or contributed to cause death, then ajury... would not be justified in making
such a finding.").
418. See, e.g., Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 215 A.2d 434, 438 (Del. 1965)
("[U]nquestionably, the 'reasonable medical certainty' test, furnishing probability of cau-
sation rather than mere possibility, is preferable when obtainable."); Stordahl v. Rush Im-
plement Co., 417 P.2d 95, 99 (Mont. 1966) ("The marked propensity of recent years of
resorting to the acceptance in one case of the 'possible' as meaning reasonable medical
certainty cannot be countenanced as treating every 'possibility' as adequate to establish the
fact sought to be proved."); Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 168 N.E.2d 811, 813-14 (N.Y.
1960) ("The probative force of an opinion is not to be defeated by semantics if it is reason-
ably apparent that the doctor intends to signify a probability supported by some rational
basis," as long as "it can be perceived that they are testifying with some reasonable degree
of medical certainty."); State v. Holt, 246 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ohio 1969) ("In workmen's
compensation cases, for example, where the testimony of medical doctors is required to
establish a direct causal relationship between an injury and ensuing disability, the witness
must connect the two with reasonable medical certainty. Probability, and not possibility, is
required."); Browning v. Ward, 422 P.2d 12, 16 (Wash. 1966) ("[M]edical testimony must
at least be that the injury 'probably' or 'more likely than not' caused the subsequent condi-
tion" and testimony can still satisfy the "requirement of reasonable medical certainty"
where "[tihere may be apparent inconsistencies in [the] testimony." (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Although less clear than the foregoing, other cases purported to apply a
standard of "reasonable medical certainty," but seemed to draw the line between possibility
and probability. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 369 F.2d 595, 598-603 (5th Cir. 1966)
(requiring evidence to meet the standard of "reasonable medical probability," and disap-
proving of testimony that merely discusses what "might" have occurred); Watson v. United
States, 346 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1965) (concluding that a physician's expert testimony
proved causation with "reasonable degree of medical certainty" and outweighed the testi-
mony of a "vague and unpersuasive" witness); Breidler v. Industrial Comm'n, 383 P.2d 177,
179 (Ariz. 1963) (concluding that the testimony was sufficient even though the physician
"did not use the occult words 'reasonable medical certainty' nor 'reasonable medical
probability' in expressing his opinion on medical causation").
419. One court noted:
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The Florida courts applied a standard of "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" for proof of causation in workers' compensation cases during
the 1960s,420 but it was not entirely clear what the courts meant by the
phrase. The courts did not seem to connect the phrase with any quan-
titative level of certitude, but instead used the phrase as shorthand for
opinions based on evidence, as opposed to speculation or
conjecture.4 2 1
We will look for the thought and meaning of his medical testimony rather than
penalize the claimant because the doctors did not state their opinions in terms of
infallibility or scientifically determined certainty. Our function is not to reject
opinion evidence because nonlawyer witnesses fail to use the words preferred by
lawyers and Judges but to determine whether the whole records exhibits, as it
does here, substantial evidence of aggravation.
Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc., 190 N.E.2d 528, 529 (N.Y. 1963); accord Breidler, 383 P.2d
at 179 ("[A]lthough Doctor Saylor did not use the occult words 'reasonable medical cer-
tainty' nor 'reasonable medical probability' in expressing his opinion on medical causation
these words are not necessary to the proof of a prima facie case in all circumstances.");
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 689 (Del. 1960) ("We do not believe that
the distinction between the use of the words 'possible' and 'probable', and other words of
a similar import, should be followed too closely."); Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J.
1959) ("[A]lthough the accepted verbal rituals are widely diversified, we think that 'reason-
able probability' or its equivalent is sufficient." (citation omitted)); National Cabinet Co.,
168 N.E.2d at 813 ("The probative force of an opinion is not to be defeated by semantics if
it is reasonably apparent that the doctor intends to signify a probability supported by some
rational basis."); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 47, 49 (Tex. 1969)
("reasonable medical probability" is the standard for proof of causation, but "particular
words from the medical experts are not necessary to create a probability"); Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. 1966) ("Causal connection ... must rest in
reasonable probabilities; .... Reasonable probability, in turn, is determinable by consider-
ation of the substance of the testimony of the expert witness and does not turn on seman-
tics or on the use by the witness of any particular term or phrase.").
420. Between 1960 and 1969, the phrase appeared in 33 Florida opinions, of which 16
involved workers' compensation claims. Search of WESTLAW, Fl-cs Database (Feb. 19,
1998) (da(aft 1959 & bef 1970) & "reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of
medical certainty") (retrieving 33 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Fl-cs Database (Feb. 19,
1998) (da(aft 1959 & bef 1970) & "reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of
medical certainty" & worker /s compensation) (retrieving 16 cases).
421. In a 1960 case, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the denial of a workers' compen-
sation claim on the grounds that the medical opinion testimony was legally insufficient in
the absence of independent evidence of causation. See Harris v. Josephs of Greater Miami,
Inc., 122 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 1960). The court said that proof of causation must be
established based on "evidence rather than speculation or conjecture," and that "[ml edical
opinion should follow this same rule based on reasonable medical certainty." Id. This
language is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the court meant to require that medi-
cal opinion be based on "reasonable medical certainty" or instead meant only to say that
the concept of "reasonable medical certainty" necessarily implied reliance on evidence
rather than conjecture.
The correctness of the latter interpretation was suggested by a lengthy concurring
opinion the following year, which asserted that the compensation commission had been
wrong to impose a test of "reasonable medical certainty" as the standard of proof:
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It seems to me that in requiring proof of the logical cause of the injury to be
tested by "reasonable medical certainty" the full commission has substituted a
different rule of proof from that which this court has determined to be proper in
workmen's compensation cases.
... [A standard of] "reasonable medical certainty" ... would impose an
inordinate burden on many claimants in workmen's compensation cases. It
would require claimants to pinpoint, with precision or certainty, the course or
cause of a serious injury which the law never contemplated. Such a holding
would exclude proof by inferences when extracted from proven facts....
Medical or other relevant testimony may be offered in support of any factor
in a workmen's compensation case but I do not understand that the "logical
cause" or any other factor must be proven by "reasonable medical certainty." ...
[T] he medical profession ... has progressed so rapidly to new and better meth-
ods of treatment, if it knew any such rule as reasonable medical certainty today, it
would be discarded for a different one tomorrow, but in any event the ultimate
question of whether compensation is due is a judicial, not a medical, one.
Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Eng'g, 126 So. 2d 556, 562-64 (Fla. 1961) (Terrell, J.,
concurring).
In three cases from 1962, however, the Florida Supreme Court emphatically reaf-
firmed its commitment to a standard of "reasonable medical certainty" in workers' com-
pensation cases. In one case the court reversed a compensation award because the
evidence failed to establish causation with "reasonable medical certainty." See Montclair
Homes, Inc. v. Thompson, 138 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1962) (quoting Harris and then twice
stating that the evidence failed to establish proof of causation with "reasonable medical
certainty"). In another, it reversed an award with the comment that the evidence "was
speculative and conjectural because it did not deal in that which was within reasonable
medical certainty but only in that which was possible or not impossible." Everhart Ma-
sonry, Inc. v. Crowder, 139 So. 2d 393, 396-97 (Fla. 1962). In the third case, the court
reaffirmed the standard of reasonable medical certainty but indicated that this did not
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Reed v. Whitmore Elec. Co., 141 So.
2d 569, 575 (Fla. 1962). The court declared:
The law does not require a claimant in a workmen's compensation case to
prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Insofar as causal relation-
ship between an accident and a subsequent condition is concerned, this Court
has long since laid down the rule that the medical evidence should establish such
facts with reasonable medical certainty.
Id. (footnote omitted). Although this paragraph is somewhat opaque, the court seemed to
be stating that the medical evidence need not establish causation-in-fact by a preponderance
of the evidence but that there must be some substantial evidence of a causal connection
resting on "reasonable medical certainty" as opposed to mere speculation and conjecture.
This interpretation, which focuses on the distinction between "causation-in-fact" and
"causal connection," rather than on the degree of certitude, is consistent with subsequent
cases that mandated awards of proportional benefits based on testimony apportioning the
cause of an employee's death between a workplace accident and a preexisting disease with
"reasonable medical certainty." See, e.g., Hampton v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Paper Prods.
Div., 140 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1962).
Such an interpretation, focusing on the nature of the causal relation rather than the
degree of proof, also would avoid inconsistency with the decision of an intermediate appel-
late court in a personal injury case, which, in distinguishing testimony with "reasonable
medical certainty" from testimony that an accident "might have or probably did cause the
injury or result," strongly suggested that "reasonable medical certainty" meant something
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Among the courts that required proof of causation with "reason-
able probability," one court expressly distinguished this standard from
that of "reasonable medical certainty." In Parker v. Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co.,4 2 2 the Supreme Court of Texas declared that its
"reasonable medical probability" standard for proof of causation was
less stringent than the "reasonable medical certainty" standard that
governed admissibility of opinions contained in hospital records.4 21
I was unable to find a single opinion from this era in which a
court required proof of causation with "reasonable medical certainty"
and treated the phrase as more demanding than a standard of "rea-
sonable medical probability" or "more likely than not." While Penn-
sylvania courts required definitive testimony that the occurrence "did
cause" the plaintiff's injuries,4 24 and South Carolina courts required
testimony that it "most probably" caused the injuries,4 25 neither re-
quired expressions of "reasonable medical certainty. "426
The decade's most extreme application of a "reasonable medical
certainty" standard for proof of causation can be found in the opinion
of the Missouri appellate court in Bertram v. Wunning (Bertram 1).47
The Bertram I court did not require any particular quantitative level of
certitude but instead focused on the expert's reluctance to attach the
requisite magic words to his opinion. In Bertram I, the court reversed
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, because the physician's testimony con-
cerning a 90% chance that plaintiffs hernia resulted from the acci-
dent did not constitute sufficient proof of causation in the absence of
the crucial phrase.4 2 s Quoting excerpts from the doctor's testimony,
which demonstrated his reluctance to equate a 90% likelihood with
more than "probably." See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 222 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
422. 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
423. Id. at 47. Texas at that time had a special exception to the hearsay rule allowing
the jury to hear opinions contained in hospital records if the opinions rested on "reason-
able medical certainty." See Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966). In Parker,
the court said, "This standard, that entries of medical opinions in hospital records must
rest in reasonable medical certainty to be admissible, is even more stringent than the rea-
sonable medical probability required to submit a causation issue to the jury." Parker, 440
S.W.2d at 47.
424. See supra notes 331-342, 399 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
426. It was not until the mid-1970s that the Pennsylvania courts began using the phrase
reasonable medical certainty" in conjunction with the state's requirement of definitive
medical opinion testimony. See supra note 342.
427. 385 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) [Bertram 1], afterremand, 417 S.W.2d 120 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam) [Bertram II].
428. Id. at 807.
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"reasonable medical certainty,"42 9 the court held that this testimony
was too speculative to constitute substantial evidence of causation.430
The court remanded the case for a trial on the issue of damages.43'
At the second trial, the doctor repeated his testimony as to the
90% likelihood of developing a hernia, but he altered his testimony
insofar as he expressed his opinion with "reasonable medical cer-
429. Id. at 804-05. The following excerpt from the doctor's testimony reflects the confu-
sion engendered by the "reasonable medical certainty" standard:
Q.... I will ask you to state, Doctor, if you have an opinion based upon
reasonable medical certainty as to whether or not the accident I have described in
my previous question, is the competent producing cause of this hernia which you
found present in Mrs. Bertram on July the 19th, 1960?
A. It could be. I couldn't say.
Q. All right. Thank you, Doctor.
BY MR. ROBERTS: Now, if the Court please, at this time I move that all
testimony relative to the hernia be stricken for the reason that he says it could be
and does not testify to it as a medical certainty and that was the question that was
asked him and I move that all the testimony be stricken.
BY MR BYRNE: Q. May I ask you, Doctor, was that your opinion when you
diagnosed the condition, was that your opinion based upon reasonable medical
certainty that the accident caused this hernia?
A. The only way I can answer that is, would be, I don't know if it's accepta-
ble. It would be a percentage.
BY MR ROBERTS: Well, now, if the Court please, -
A. I would say it would be about a 90 per cent chance that it was caused by
that and 10 per cent it wasn't.
BY MR. BYRNE: Q. That's your best opinion based upon reasonable medi-
cal certainty, Doctor?
A. That's the only way I could answer such a question. I don't know if that's
acceptable.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
430. I& at 807. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated:
[W]hen first asked to express an opinion based upon reasonable medical cer-
tainty whether the accident was the competent producing cause of plaintiffs her-
nia Dr. Niesen answered, "It could be. I couldn't say." Pressed further, all he
would say was that, "* * it would be about a 90 per cent chance that it was caused
by (the accident) and 10 per cent it wasn't." However favorable such odds might
seem in some game of chance, a trial is not such a game, and an award of dam-
ages cannot be allowed to rest upon speculation and conjecture of that character.
Were we to accept such an answer as constituting substantial evidence of a causal
connection between an injury and the accident, then what of the odds of 60 to
40? Or 55 to 45? All that such an answer amounted to, at best, was what the
doctor first stated, that "It could be" that the hernia resulted from the accident.
But if the doctor who was an expert in the field and who had treated plaintiff
would not say with reasonable medical certainty that the hernia resulted from the
accident, then certainly ajury composed of laymen would not be justified in mak-
ing such a finding.
Id. (star ellipsis in original).
431. Id. at 808.
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tainty."432 On the defendant's appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff
at this second trial,4"' the court in Bertram II agreed with the plaintiff
that this testimony was admissible, because the physician now was will-
ing to testify with "reasonable medical certainty."434 The only differ-
ence between the doctor's testimony in the two trials was that in the
second trial, he was willing to characterize his opinion in terms of the
magic words "reasonable medical certainty," whereas in the first trial
he had been unwilling to do so.
These opinions are justly criticized on two counts. First, in Ber-
tram I, the court foolishly rejected valid probabilistic evidence because
the witness refused to testify in terms of "reasonable medical cer-
432. Bertram II, 417 S.W.2d at 124. The court in Bertram H quoted portions of the physi-
cian's testimony at the second trial:
BY MR. BYRNE: ... I will ask you to state, Doctor, if you have an opinion, based
upon reasonable medical certainty, as to whether or not the accident I have de-
scribed . . . is a competent producing cause of the femoral hernia which you
found present in Mrs. Bertram on July 19th, 1960? A. Within reasonable medical
certainty, yes.... BY MR ROBERTS: Q. Doctor, did you just testify a few minutes
ago before this Court under oath, without the aid of a Jury, that in your opinion
that you were basing this on a 90-10 percentage the same as you did in the other
trial? A. To me that's reasonable medical certainty. Yes, sir. Q. And you are
basing your answer of reasonable medical certainty on a 90-10 percentage? A.
No. My reasonable medical certainty is a 90-10 percentage. You have it reversed.
Id.
433. The trial judge had sustained the defendant's objection and excluded the forego-
ing testimony about the hernia. Id. at 123. After the jury rendered its verdict, the trial
judge granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. Id. at 124. The trial judge found
that the award was excessive and that the jury had been prejudiced by the doctor's testi-
mony about the hernia prior to defendant's objection as well as by counsel's references to
this excluded testimony in closing arguments. Id. at 124-25. On appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant could not have been prejudiced because the evidence about the
hernia had been improperly excluded. Id. at 124. The appellate court agreed with the
plaintiff that the doctor's testimony in the second trial should have been admitted, but it
nevertheless affirmed the award of a new trial on grounds of excessiveness. Id. at 125-26.
434. Id. at 125. The court explained:
Dr. Niesen's testimony in the instant case materially differs from that he gave at
the first trial. In the instant case his reply to the hypothetical question as to causal
connection was not couched in terms of "could be" or "I couldn't say" but was a
definite affirmance that within "reasonable medical certainty" his opinion was the
accident caused the hernia. What the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
meant to Dr. Niesen is a matter going solely to the weight to be given his testi-
mony and not to whether such testimony constitutes sufficient evidence of a
causal connection between the hernia and the accident.
Id. The court's elaborate effort to justify the admissibility of this testimony based on the
expression of "reasonable medical certainty" is somewhat curious in view of its recognition
in Bertram I of Missouri's longstanding evidentiary rule allowing the admissibility of testi-
mony expressed in terms of "might," "could," or "possibility." See Bertram I, 385 S.W.2d at
806 (citing and discussing the leading case of Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 66 S.W.2d 561
(Mo. 1933) (per curiam) ("An expert's view of possibility or probability is often helpful
and proper.")).
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tainty." Second, in Bertram II, the court elevated form over substance
as it attempted to distinguish the earlier decision on the grounds of
qualitative differences in the ritualistic incantation of the requisite
magic words without regard to the absence of meaningful differences
in the substance of the testimony. 5 Bertram Iwas not the only case in
which the Missouri courts found proof insufficient where the facts
strongly supported causation but the physician refused to express an
opinion with "reasonable medical certainty."436 Consistent with Mis-
souri's reputation as the "Show Me" state, its judiciary's insistence on
proof with "reasonable medical certainty" enabled the state to publish
the most opinions containing this phrase of any American jurisdiction
during this decade. 7
435. Commentators frequently cite Bertram as a prime example of blind insistence on
verbal formulas and of judicial hostility to statistical evidence. See, e.g., Black, supra note 7,
at 667-69 ("elevates form over substance"); Martin, supra note 27, at 805-06 n.123 (judicial
discomfort with statistical evidence); Rappeport, supra note 17, at 8 ("court apparently wed-
ded to reasonable medical certainty and not percentages").
436. In Bailey v. Kershner, 444 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969), the plaintiffs decedent was
thrown from defendant's car, was hospitalized with high blood pressure and bruises and
abrasions of the back, hip, and forehead, and died in the hospital eleven days later of a
"cerebral vascular accident." Id. at 11-13. The treating physician testified that in his opin-
ion the injuries directly contributed to the "cerebral vascular accident" and that he had a
"feeling" that the accident was the cause of death, but he was unwilling to express this
opinion with "reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 14. Although the jury found for the
plaintiff, the appellate court reversed because the evidence was not sufficient to support
the verdict in the absence of testimony with "reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 15-16; see
alsoJohn S. Sandberg, Note, Expert Testimony on Causation in a Wrongful Death Case: Should
"Reasonable Medical Certainty" Be Necessary to Make a Submissible Case?, 36 Mo. L. R.Ev. 127,
129-30 (1971) (criticizing the decision in Bailey).
Also, the Missouri courts did not consistently mandate use of particular verbal formu-
las. See Sandberg, supra (citing Missouri cases that upheld verdicts based on expert testi-
mony that causation was "probable" or even "possible" when corroborated by "other facts"
tending to establish causation). In one leading case, the Missouri Supreme Court de-
clared, "Where, as here, it may be determined from the testimony that the doctor was
expressing his expert opinion as to the cause of a condition, the form of language used will
not deprive the statement of its evidentiary value." Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 243
S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. 1951) (per curiam).
437. From 1960 through 1969, the phrase appeared in 49 Missouri opinions-compared
with 39 from Wisconsin and 29 from Illinois-representing more than 11% of the 421
American state court opinions in which the phrase appeared during this decade. Search of
WESTLAW, Mo-cs Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(aft 1/1/1960 & bef 1/1/1970) & "reason-
able medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 49 cases);
Search of WESTLAW, Wi-cs Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(aft 1/1/1960 & bef 1/1/1970) &
"reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (retrieving 39
cases); Search of WESTLAW, II-cs Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(aft 1/1/1960 & bef
1/1/1970) & "reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medical certainty") (re-
trieving 29 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Allstates Database (Oct. 20, 1997) (da(aft
1/1/1960 & bef 1/1/1970) & "reasonable medical certainty" "reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty") (retrieving 421 cases).
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b. Proof of Future Damages. -The phrase "reasonable medical
certainty" appeared quite frequently in testimony concerning dam-
ages, especially in states that applied a rule of "reasonable certainty" to
proof of future damages. In many cases, the courts held that the "rule
of certainty" was satisfied by proof that future injuries were "prob-
able."4 3 In a few cases, however, courts applying the "reasonable-cer-
tainty" rule respecting future damages required a degree of certitude
in excess of the traditional "more likely than not" preponderance of
the evidence standard.43 9
In the frequently cited 1960 decision of Carpenter v. Nelson,44 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota considered the relationship between the
preponderance of the evidence standard and the state's "rule of cer-
tainty" respecting future damages. The plaintiff in Carpenter chal-
lenged the appropriateness of the trial court's jury instruction that the
plaintiff's claim for current injuries was governed by the requirement
of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but that his claim
for future damages was governed by "a different standard of evi-
dence," requiring proof "by a reasonable medical certainty that such
future or permanent injuries will be sustained." 4 1  The Supreme
438. See Leonard Grumbach, Note, Awarding Damages for Permanent Injuries: A Proposal to
Eliminate the Unreasonableness of "Reasonable Certainty" in Jordan v. Bero, 4 HoFsTRA L. REv.
101, 102 n.7 (1975) ("Some jurisdictions favor 'reasonably certain,' while others favor 'rea-
sonably probable.' 'Reasonably certain' is generally considered the stricter standard, but
from many of the cases it appears that the phrases are actually meant to convey the same
standard of proof-a preponderance of the evidence rather than a mere likelihood or
possibility."); cf. Casimere v. Herman, 137 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Wis. 1965) (holding that "no
particular words of art are necessary" to meet the standard of "reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty or probability" respecting future damages, but testimony must "show more
than a mere possibility or conjecture").
439. See Grumbach, supra note 438, at 102 n.7 (listing cases in which courts have favored
the "reasonably certain" standard over the "reasonably probable" standard when awarding
prospective damages). In Belford v. Humphrey, 424 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1968), the dissent
offered the following analysis, indicating that a higher threshold than "probability" is nec-
essary to prove future damages:
Where an injury per se does not show permanency to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, and where there is absent a medical opinion reasonably indi-
cating permanency, the question of permanency should not be submitted to the
jury.... [T]hat is not to say that the certainty must be absolute, but it must
preclude mere conjecture or even probability.
Id. at 529-30 (Brown, J., dissenting).
440. 101 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1960).
441. Id. at 920-21. The disputed instruction provided:
"If you come to consider the claim of the plaintiff for future or permanent inju-
ries a different standard of evidence is required.
"It is the law that one who asserts a claim for future or permanent injuries
must prove by a reasonable medical certainty that such future or permanent inju-
ries will be sustained."
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Court of Minnesota held that this instruction misstated the law and
that the plaintiff had the burden of proving future damages by the
usual preponderance of the evidence standard.4 4 2 The court ex-
plained that the rule limiting recovery of future damages to those that
are "reasonably certain" precluded the jury from basing an award on
damages that were "remote, conjectural, or speculative" but that it did
not alter the standard of proof." Distinguishing the "degree of
proof' from the "fact to be proved," the court said that the "reason-
able certainty" of future damages was the fact to be proved and that
the plaintiff must prove this fact by a fair "preponderance of the evi-
dence." 4" The court held that in addition to misstating the standard
of proof, the disputed instruction incorrectly described the fact to be
proved as "reasonable medical certainty" instead of "reasonable cer-
tainty" of future damages.4 4 The court said that the phrase "reason-
442. The court said:
In the case of future damages-it being impossible to establish absolute cer-
tainty-most courts, including this one, have long followed the rule that recovery
may be had if they are "reasonably certain" to occur. This rule, however, has
nothing to do with the degree of proof in the sense of the required quality or
quantum of evidence necessary to establish the fact. It simply means that the
ultimate fact which the plaintiff has the burden of proving is future damages rea-
sonably certain to occur as a result of the original injury. It is still sufficient if the
existence of this fact is proved by only a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Confusion understandably arises because the fact to be proved is, in itself, a mat-
ter of probability, although different and of a higher degree than the probability
of evidence required to prove the fact.
... The distinction is not an illusory one. When the term "reasonable cer-
tainty" is used to describe the degree of proof rather than the fact to be proved it
places upon the plaintiff a higher degree of proof than is required in the ordinary
civil case. Such an imposition is clearly prejudicial.
In the instant case the trial court, in its instructions, not only failed to make
the distinction but specifically charged the jury that the plaintiff had a higher
degree of proof in so far as future or permanent injuries were concerned.
Id. at 921-22 (footnotes omitted).
443. Id. at 921.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 922-23. The court explained:
Plaintiff also attacks the instruction on the ground that it required the plain-
tiff to show the occurrence of future damages to a "reasonable medical certainty"
rather than to a "reasonable certainty." While expert medical evidence is often
essential, it is well established that the existence of future damages or permanent
injuries may sometimes be inferred from other evidence .... The use of the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in three recent Minnesota cases was not
intended to alter this rule nor preclude the jury from considering evidence other
than that of expert medical witnesses. Since the word "medical" is susceptible of
being construed as referring only to expert medical testimony, it should be omit-
ted in instructing the jury, and it is withdrawn from the prior decisions in which it
was inadvertently used.
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able medical certainty" improperly implied that the jury should limit
its consideration to medical evidence, whereas non-medical evidence,
including the testimony of the plaintiff, is often relevant to prove that
an injury is permanent.4 4 6
The Supreme Court of Hawaii later cited Carpenter for the propo-
sition that future damages should be discussed in terms of "reasonable
certainty" rather than "reasonable medical certainty."4 4 7 Similarly, in
Michigan, which had a long-established rule requiring proof of future
damages with "reasonable certainty," an appellate court nevertheless
ruled that the defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed
that permanent injury must be proved with "reasonable medical
certainty."" 8
In sum, in the context of the "reasonable certainty" rule with re-
spect to future damages, the courts employed quite divergent inter-
pretations of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." Some courts
equated "reasonable certainty" with "reasonable medical certainty,"
while others viewed the phrases as distinct. Some courts held that the
standard was satisfied by testimony about probable future conse-
quences, while others interpreted the "rule of certainty" as requiring
more than a probability of future injury. Some courts approved of
jury instructions employing the phrase "reasonable medical certainty,"
while others did not.
3. Summary of Interpretations Outside of Illinois.-Because the
phrase had no fixed meaning and could not be defined with respect
to a singular body of common law precedent, its meaning necessarily
was influenced by the context in which it was employed, including
Id. (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the court cited three of its own decisions
and one from the federal courts: Dornberg v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 91 N.W.2d 178, 185
(Minn. 1958), Derrick v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 89 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 1958), Penteluk
v. Stark, 69 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. 1955), and Cherry v. Stedman, 259 F.2d 774, 779 (8th
Cir. 1958). Carpenter, 101 N.W.2d at 922 n.9. These cases are discussed supra notes 279-290
and accompanying text.
446. Carpenter, 101 N.W.2d at 922-23.
447. See Kometani v. Heath, 431 P.2d 931,936 n.1 (Haw. 1967) ("Defendant [in address-
ing future damages] unfortunately uses the term 'reasonable medical certainty' rather
than 'reasonable certainty.'" (citing Carpenter)).
448. See Agee v. Williams, 169 N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). The court
noted, "An examination of the cases cited by defendant reveals that the rule does not
require a reasonable medical certainty either as to the causal relationship between the
accident and the injuries or on the question as to whether or not the injuries will exist on a
permanent basis." Id. at 680. It is unclear, however, whether the court was holding that
such an instruction would have been incorrect, or only that the actual instruction on fu-
ture damages was sufficient and was consistent with the state's rule requiring proof of fu-
ture damages with "reasonable certainty." See id. at 680-81.
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each jurisdiction's existing rules concerning admissibility of evidence
and sufficiency of proof. Lacking any intrinsic meaning or identity,
like Woody Allen's Zelig,449 the phrase adapted to and mirrored its
environment.
C. Transformation in Illinois
Illinois attorneys created the phrase "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" in response to the ultimate-issue rule, and the phrase was
spread throughout the nation by Goldstein's manuals in conjunction
with the "might or could" form of hypothetical question mandated by
that rule. By a curious coincidence, however, just as the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" was achieving universal acceptance in
other jurisdictions, the Illinois Supreme Court repudiated the ulti-
mate-issue rule that had been crucial to the genesis and dissemination
of the phrase.
In response to intense criticism from Dean Wigmore and others,
American courts gradually abandoned the ultimate-issue rule insofar
as it precluded expert witnesses from expressing definitive opinions
on such crucial factual issues as the causal relationship between an
accident and the plaintiffs injuries.45 ° Illinois was among the last
states to reject the ultimate-issue rule in the 1960 case of Clifford-Jacobs
Forging Co. v. Industrial Commission.45'
Clifford-Jacobs arose on an appeal from a workers' compensation
award after the employer objected unsuccessfully to questions con-
cerning causation that apparently were asked in the "might or could"
form.4 5 2 The employer asserted error in that "certain of the hypothet-
ical questions failed to call for a positive answer" from the claimant's
medical witness.4 5 3 In rejecting this contention, the court held that
the "might or could" form of question was proper, but it also repudi-
ated the ultimate-issue rule, declaring that "[t]he form of the ques-
tion, or the form of the answer, when in terms of 'what did' or 'what
449. ZELIG (Orion Pictures Co. & Warner Brothers, Inc. 1983).
450. Leading cases that cited and followed Wigmore include Grismore v. Consolidated
Products Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 656 (Iowa 1942), Buehlerv. Beadia, 73 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Mich.
1955) (equally divided court), which cited "Widmore [sic]," O'Leary v. Scullin Steel Co., 260
S.W. 55, 59 (Mo. 1924) (en banc), and Goldfoot v. Lofgren, 296 P. 843, 847 (Or. 1931). The
demise of the rule is discussed in William B. Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status,
Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41 DENV. L. CENTERJ. 226, 236 (1964).
451. 166 N.E.2d 582 (111. 1960); see also supra note 146.
452. See Clifford-Jacobs, 166 N.E.2d at 585.
453. Id.
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might' have caused the injury and death, is immaterial." '454 Moreover,
the court expressly overruled Fellows-Kimbrough and several other cases
that had established or reaffirmed the ultimate-issue rule.455 Thereaf-
ter, Illinois attorneys had the option of asking medical experts for
either definitive or qualified opinions.
Because the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" initially was
employed to counteract the speculative quality of the "might or could"
form of question, the phrase arguably was superfluous whenever a
physician was able to express a definitive conclusion. Nevertheless,
subsequent to the decision in Clifford-Jacobs, attorneys used the phrase
both in conjunction with qualified "might or could" questions456 and
when asking physicians to give positive and unequivocal opinions.45 7
The phrase had become so firmly entrenched in the practices of the
Illinois bar that no one seemed to question the need for an expression
of "reasonable medical certainty" in the context of unequivocal medi-
cal testimony.
In the second edition of Trial Technique, published in 1969, the
authors noted that Clifford-Jacobs permitted definitive expressions of
opinion "on a direct 'was or is' basis as well as on 'might or could'
basis."4 58 Nevertheless, the authors retained all of the hypothetical
questions from the first edition that used variants of "reasonable medi-
cal certainty" in conjunction with the "might or could" form of ques-
tion.45 9 In a new chapter, entitled "The Medical Witness," the authors
454. Id. at 587. The court also quoted with approval the passage to the same effect from
Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts, 82 N.E. 401, 402 (Ill. 1907). See Clifford-Jacobs, 166
N.E.2d at 586; see also supra note 133.
455. Clifford-Jacobs, 166 N.W.2d at 585-87, overruling People v. Rongetti, 170 N.E. 14 (Ill.
1929), Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 111 N.E. 499 (Il. 1916), City of Chicago
v. Didier, 81 N.E. 698 (Ill. 1907), and Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Smith, 70 N.E. 628 (Ill. 1904).
456. Of the 32 Illinois cases from the 1960s in which the phrase or a variant appeared,
see infra note 468, about half used the phrase in conjunction with a qualified expression of
opinion, including nine that involved some version of a "might or could" form of question.
See, e.g., Boose v. Digate, 246 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) ("medical and surgical"
variant); Piacentini v. Bonnefil, 217 N.E.2d 507, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) ("medical and
surgical" variant); Pertolanitz v. Chicago Transit Auth., 194 N.E.2d 501, 503 (I1. App. Ct.
1963); Healy v. Nordhous, 188 N.E.2d 227, 229 (111. App. Ct. 1963); Rysdon v. Wice, 180
N.E.2d 754, 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
457. About a dozen Illinois cases from the 1960s used the phrase in conjunction with a
definitive expression of opinion. E.g., Siete v. Industrial Comm'n, 181 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ill.
1962); Neubauer v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 238 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Ma-
nion v. Brant Oil Co., 229 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Ill. App Ct. 1967) (Craven, P.J., dissenting);
O'Keefe v. Lithocolor Press, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Pertolanitz, 194
N.E.2d at 503; McNealy v. Illinois Cent. R.R Co., 193 N.E.2d 879, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
458. 3 GoLDsrEIN & LANE, supra note 34, § 18.17, at 7.
459. See id. § 18.18, at 7-9. The second edition included one new hypothetical question
in the same form: "(1) Doctor, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable medical cer-
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provided six examples of questions seeking definitive opinions on cau-
sation, all prefaced with variants of "reasonable medical certainty.
'
"460
Thus, consistent with the practice of the Illinois bar, the second edi-
tion of Trial Technique used the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
in conjunction with both qualified and definitive opinions on
causation.
It was not until 1969 that an Illinois court actually defined the
phrase "reasonable medical certainty." In Boose v. Digate,461 the de-
fendant objected to testimony by an ophthalmologist named Dr. Ey4 62
about the likelihood of future medical complications.46" The court
quoted at length from the direct examination by plaintiffs counsel in
which Dr. Ey, who did not understand the term "reasonable medical
certainty," opined that the injured eye had "a 50 percent chance of
being removed in the next ten years." 4" On cross-examination, Dr.
tainty as to whether or not there might or could be, a causal connection or relation be-
tween the fall described and the condition of ill-being found as set forth in this question?"
Id. § 18.18, at 7. The remaining ten questions, set forth supra note 127, were renumbered
as (2) through (11), with only minor editorial changes. See id. § 18.18, at 7-9.
460. See2 id. § 15.25, at 26, 28, 29; id. § 15.32, at 91, 92; id. § 15.36, at 126. This chapter
included numerous examples of questions on other topics prefaced with expressions of
"reasonable medical certainty." See id. § 15.25, at 30; id. § 15.26, at 34; id. § 15.29, at 54-55,
57, 59-60; id. § 15.31, at 85; id. § 15.32, at 94; id. § 15.36, at 126-27.
461. 246 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
462. I'm not making this up!
463. Boose, 246 N.E.2d at 51.
464. Id. at 51-52. The appellate court provided a synopsis of the direct examination
(I'm not making this up either!):
Dr. Ey, an ophthalmologist, treated plaintiff on and after the date of the
injury and testified in plaintiffs behalf. During his direct testimony concerning
the nature of the injury, the following ensued. "Q. Doctor, I will ask you if you
have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical and surgical cer-
tainty, as to whether there might or could be any further complications with re-
spect to either eye, by reason of the injury which you have described herein in the
plaintiff, Mr. Boose? A. Yes. Q. And would you give us your answer? A. This
particular eye has been severely damaged in the back. There is a possibility that
* * *" Whereupon the counsel for the defendant, Digate, made the following
objection: "Your Honor, I object to the word 'possibility'. This is entirely specula-
tive and conjectural. We are talking about what this is, a reasonable degree."
Whereupon the Court sustained the objection. Plaintiffs counsel then argued
that the question was based on a reasonable degree of medical and scientific and
surgical certainty, and that the witness was honest enough to follow the instruc-
tions of the Court. Whereupon the Court stated: "I have heard the word 'possi-
bility', and I am not satisfied in my mind that a mere possibility is a medical or
scientific certainty." The Court then addressed the witness as follows: "Don't you
understand the question?" Whereupon the witness answered: "I don't under-
stand the question. I don't understand what reasonable degree, what reasonable
certainty, exactly, means. 50 percent, 25 percent, 75 percent, or what is reason-
able." The Court then responded as follows: "We can't improve the question any
more than we have. If you are unable to understand the question, you may say so.
480
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Ey conceded that he was "guessing to some extent" and that there was
"an element of speculation and conjecture" to his opinion about the
possible removal of the eye, but the trial court allowed the testimony
to stand.4 65 In holding that the trial court properly admitted this testi-
mony, the appellate court declared that an expression of "reasonable
medical certainty" does not relate to substantive certainty about the
likelihood of the future condition, but rather to "the general consen-
sus of recognized medical thought and opinion concerning the
probabilities" in question:
In the instant case it appears that the Doctor was unfa-
miliar with the legal phraseology which gives a medical opin-
ion its legal perspective. The testimony objected to relates to
the nature and extent of plaintiff's injury and in particular to
future conditions. What such future conditions will be or
will not be is a matter of foresight and necessarily a some-
what cloudy vision of the future. When a Doctor is asked to base
his opinion on a reasonable degree of medical certainty the certainty
referred to is not that some condition in the future is certain to exist
or not to exist. Rather the reasonable certainty refers to the general
consensus of recognized medical thought and opinion concerning the
You must base your answer upon reasonable, what is a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty in your field. I might say to you, Doctor, if you understand this, not one
chance in a thousand, not one chance in a thousand of speculation or guess or
conjecture or some hope or guess, but what in the field, what you understand
would be a reasonable degree of assurance. Now, I can't improve any more on
that. If you can answer the question, please do so. If you can't answer the ques-
tion, say so." Whereupon the Doctor answered the question as follows: "A. This
particular eye, the right one that was injured, has a 50 percent chance of being
removed in the next ten years." Upon being asked the reason for his opinion the
Doctor explained that a secondary glaucoma (pressure in the eyeball) could re-
sult, requiring removal of the eye.
Id. (star ellipses in original).
465. Id. at 52. The appellate court summarized the cross-examination:
On cross examination Dr. Ey was questioned by counsel for the defendant as
follows: "Q. Doctor, Mr. Ferracuti asked you on direct examination about the
matter, the future problems of the eye, and you made an answer to that question.
You understand what the word 'speculation' means? A. Yes. Q. Is there an ele-
ment of speculation in your answer which you gave here? Is there an element of
speculation, Doctor? A. Yes, there is an element. Q. Doctor, you are guessing to
some extent with respect to Mr. Boose's case, is that correct? A. With respect to
Mr. Boose's case, yes. Q. So that there is an element of speculation and conjec-
ture with respect to Mr. Boose? A. Yes." Counsel for defendant, Digate, moved to
strike Dr. Ey's answer concerning the possible eventual removal of the eye, for the
reason the answer contained an element of speculation and that the witness was
guessing with respect to the plaintiffs case, and that therefore the Doctor's an-
swer did not conform to the requirements of the law. The Court denied the
motion and allowed the testimony to stand.
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probabilities of conditions in the future based on present
conditions.466
Boose was the first opinion in any jurisdiction to articulate the distinc-
tion between the substance of the expert's opinion about the probabili-
ties at issue and the foundation for the opinion in light of existing
medical knowledge.467
466. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). The court continued:
In this context we do not believe the cross examination of the Doctor reveals that
in a legal sense the Doctor's opinion was based on guess or surmise. The specula-
tion referred to by the Doctor was, we believe, a recognition that there was noth-
ing in the plaintiff's present existing physical condition from which it could be
concluded that plaintiff would or would not be one of those patients requiring
eye removal at some time in the future. In his direct testimony the Doctor de-
scribed the medical basis, i.e. development of a secondary glaucoma, which might
affect plaintiffs condition in the future. Therefore his conclusions concerning
future probabilities were not based on guess or surmise and in our opinion his
testimony was admissible and properly considered by the jury.
Id.
467. In recent years, courts in Indiana and New Jersey have adopted this interpretation
of the phrase. See supra note 61. Professor Michael Graham has cited Boose as the definitive
interpretation of the phrase without acknowledging that it represents a distinct minority
viewpoint. See supra note 100; infra note 497.
In Maryland, a trial judge recently expressed a similar understanding of the phrase,
but the appellate court rejected this interpretation as a standard of admissibility in Myers v.
Celotex Corp., 594 A.2d 1248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991):
Appellants contend that the court erred in striking out certain opinion testi-
mony of their medical expert on the ground that it was not shown to be accepted
by the medical community....
... Appellants asserted that the appropriate standard for the admissibility of
the doctor's opinions was "reasonable medical probability" regardless of whether
the opinions were generally accepted by the medical community. The court,
however, accepted defense counsel's argument, as is apparent from the following
discussion between the court and counsel:
THE COURT: Mr. Lilly [Counsel for appellants], how can [Dr.
Schepers] testify with reasonable medical certainty as to A, B, C, or D, unless
he knows what is generally accepted within the medical community?
THE COURT: Mr. Lilly, he has to be able to say within a reasonable
medical certainty. That's the definition of reasonable medical certainty. It's
what is accepted within the medical community. He didn'tjust read. Other-
wise, you would never have to qualify his opinions with that phrase....
The standard for the admissibility of medical expert opinion testimony is
reasonable medical probability. Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 152, 218 A.2d
194 (1966). The "generally accepted in the medical community" standard that
was erroneously employed by the court in the case subjudice was adopted in Mary-
land in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), and generally applies to
the admissibility of evidence based upon novel scientific techniques or
methodologies. ...
"REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY"4
Although lawyers, doctors, and judges in Illinois repeated the
words "reasonable medical certainty" as a ritual incantation, the
phrase seemed to have very little impact on the outcome of litigation.
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty," or a close relative, ap-
peared in thirty-two Illinois state court opinions during the 1960s, and
in seven of these it appeared in the headnotes.46 s Nevertheless, not a
single appellate case during this period ruled medical opinion testi-
mony inadmissible for failure to use these magic words. In one case,
the appellate court held that an objection to a hypothetical question
that failed to include this phrase had been waived because it was not
made at trial.46 9 In another case, testimony was stricken despite the
attorney's use of the phrase in eliciting an opinion, because the sub-
stance of the testimony included equivocations that rendered the
opinion unduly speculative.4"' Likewise, in evaluating the sufficiency
of proof, courts noted the presence or absence of opinions expressed
with "reasonable medical certainty, " "' but in no case was the proof
deemed insufficient because of the absence of these magic words.
Thus, not a single Illinois opinion during this era unequivocally held
that the admissibility or sufficiency of evidence depended on expres-
sions of "reasonable medical certainty."
During this ten-year period, it appears that Illinois attorneys and
physicians had become so habituated to use of the phrase that it had
receded into the background of general legal jargon and was no
That exposure to asbestos may cause cancer, however, is not a novel or con-
troversial assertion, nor is it a conclusion personal to Dr. Schepers. The testi-
mony that appellants sought to introduce . . . was based upon Dr. Schepers's
personal observations and professional experience, and thus required only a rea-
sonable degree of medical probability....
... We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in striking out the doctor's
testimony as to how asbestos directly causes cancer and that appellants were
thereby prejudiced.
Id. at 1255-57 (selected citations omitted).
468. Search of WESTLAW, Il-cs Database (Oct. 11, 1997) (reasonable /s medical /s cer-
tainty & da(aft 1959 & bef 1970)) (retrieving 32 cases); Search of WESTLAW, Il-cs Database
(Oct. 11, 1997) (he(reasonable /s medical /s certainty) & da(aft 1959 & bef 1970)) (re-
trieving 7 cases).
469. See O'Keefe v. Lithocolor Press, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Il. App. Ct. 1964).
470. See Lange v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 245 N.E.2d 35, 38-39 (Ill. App. Ct.) (reversing
a damage award because testimony, even though properly stricken at trial, was unduly prej-
udicial), rev'd on other grounds, 254 N.E.2d 467 (Ill. 1969).
471. Cases in which the headnotes comment favorably on the existence of testimony
with "reasonable medical certainty" include Field Enterprises v. Industrial Commission, 226
N.E.2d 867, 867 headnote 1 (Ill. 1967), Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Fisher, 225 N.E.2d
377, 377 headnote 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967), and Rysdon v. Wice, 180 N.E.2d 754, 755 headnote
6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
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longer a source of contention. Only in Boose did the phrase figure
prominently in the court's discussion, and in no case did the outcome
hinge on its presence or absence.472
V. 1970 TO DATE: DENOUEMENT OR PROLOGUE?
This Article's historical analysis of the genesis and dissemination
of the phrase terminates at the end of 1969. Four factors justify the
selection of this termination date.
First, the date marks a logical termination point for the historical
analysis insofar as courts in all but two American jurisdictions had
used the phrase by the end of 1969.4 7 3 Moreover, the proliferation of
the phrase subsequent to 1970 precludes systematic review of cases in
which the term appears. Whereas the phrase appeared in only 146
cases prior to 1960 and in 482 cases during the 1960s, it appeared in
729 cases during the 1970s and in a total of 4281 cases from 1970 to
the end of 1996, with the number increasing by more than 275 cases
per year in the 1990S.4 7
4
Second, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
profoundly changed the judiciary's approach to expert testimony in
the federal courts4 7 5 and eventually in the courts of those states that
adopted new evidence codes based on the Federal Rules.47 6 With re-
gard to expert witnesses, Rules 701 through 706 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence adopted a "liberal" approach to many of the most contro-
versial common law doctrines restricting expert testimony,4 7 7 but
472. See supra notes 461-467 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 367-369.
474. See Appendix A. A search, conducted late in the final editing process for opinions
from 1997, found over 300 cases containing the phrase. Searches of WESTLAW, Allcases,
Allstates, and Allfeds Databases (Feb. 20, 1998) ("reasonable medical certainty" "reason-
able degree of medical certainty" & da(1997)) (retrieving 307, 243, and 64 cases, respec-
tively). In addition, a growing number of cases employ such variants as reasonable
'professional," "scientific," or "psychological" certainty.
475. Graham, supra note 100, at 43.
476. With the recent adoption of evidence codes in Indiana, Maryland, and NewJersey,
at least 38 states now have evidence codes patterned after the Federal Rules. Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to
Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CuRDozo L. Rv. 2271, 2273 n.17
(1994).
477. FED. R. Evin. 701-706. Rule 702 defined an expert broadly, as anyone possessed of
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." The rule eliminated rules in many
states that restricted expert testimony to subjects not within ordinary lay comprehension,
allowing experts to testify whenever their testimony would "assist the trier of fact." It also
eliminated the requirement of using hypothetical questions to elicit expert opinions, indi-
cating that an expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 703 de-
parted from the common law in permitting experts to base their opinions on inadmissible
facts and data "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
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neither the text of the Rules nor the comments thereto discussed
their relationship to rules that conditioned admissibility of opinion
testimony on the expert's level of certitude.4 78 More than twenty years
after the Rules' enactment, the role of the phrase "reasonable medical
certainty" in the federal courts remains unsettled.479
Third, the rules of tort law have undergone important transfor-
mations since 1970. These transformations have been associated with
the shift from a mechanistic to a probabilistic conception of causa-
tion,48 ° a shift that significantly affected the interpretation and signifi-
cance of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty." In toxic tort
litigation, as the prevailing paradigm shifted to a probabilistic view of
causation, trial courts became more skeptical of conclusory opinion
testimony from treating physicians and began to demand statistically
forming opinions." Rule 704 put the final nail in the coffin of the ultimate-issue rule,
declaring that expert testimony "otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
478. Sensing that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not eliminate questions about
the degree of certitude necessary for an opinion to be admissible, on the eve of the Rules'
adoption, Professor Michael Martin advocated abolition of the "rule of certainty" as a bar-
rier to admissibility. See Martin, supra note 27, at 797-808. Martin's recommendation had
no discernible impact, however, on the text of the Rules or the comments thereto.
479. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Whether such lan-
guage is required under the federal rules is not clear."). A number of federal courts have
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require particular expressions of certitude
as a condition for admissibility. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 785
(3d Cir. 1996) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, do not require a particular
phrase regarding the degree of certainty with which experts must form their opinions
.... "); United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that "an
expert's lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its admissibil-
ity"); Bean v. United States (In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.), 533 F. Supp.
567, 578-79 (D. Colo. 1980) (mem.) ("The fact that Dr. Lewis could not state to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty that the swine flu vaccine caused Mrs. Bean's illness goes
to the weight we give his testimony, not to its admissibility."). On the other hand, one
federal court described the standard for admissibility as testimony reflecting "a conclusion
based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty.... express[ed] ... in terms of reason-
able probabilities...." DaSilva v. American Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 361 (1st Cir. 1988).
And when experts conceded they could not express an opinion with a "reasonable degree
of medical certainty," federal courts have excluded their testimony on the grounds that it
would "confuse or mislead" the jury. Pinkham v. Burgess, 933 F.2d 1066, 1071 (1st Cir.
1991); accord Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
trial court properly excluded testimony not stated with "a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty.... because it was not well-grounded in the scientific method"); Grant v. Farns-
worth, 869 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming the trial court's decision to exclude a
chiropractor's testimony not stated "with a reasonable degree of certainty" as it "would not
have assisted the jury").
480. Brennan, supra note 89, at 493; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and
Scientific Evidence After Daubert, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 889, 895-909 (1994).
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based testimony from epidemiologists and other scientific experts.4 81
The focus on probabilistic evidence also fostered the development of
new causes of action in toxic tort and medical-malpractice litigation
that provided complete or partial compensation to plaintiffs who
would not have prevailed under traditional tort principles.482 In toxic
tort litigation, most jurisdictions continued to demand proof that
toxic exposures were the proximate cause of plaintiffs' existing inju-
ries48 a or were reasonably certain to result in future problems.484
Some courts, however, recognized the right of plaintiffs to recover for
increased susceptibility or risk of disease,485 emotional distress associ-
ated with the fear of future disease,486 and costs of medical monitor-
481. See Black, supra note 7, at 674-77 (applauding judges for rejecting conclusory testi-
mony that purported to link illness to toxic exposure without adequate scientific basis);
Green, supra note 89, at 671-74 (concluding that courts in Agent Orange and Bendectin
litigation had adopted an epidemiological threshold for plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation);
cf Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 732, 736 (1984) (arguing for the use of an epidemiologic standard to evaluate
"evidence of a causal relationship between exposure to a particular factor and the inci-
dence of a disease").
482. See Levit, supra note 16, at 154-58 (discussing "probabilistic injuries").
483. E.g., Brown v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig.), 35
F.3d 717, 750-52 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1203 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Tennessee law).
484. E.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-07 (applying Tennessee law); Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 810-11 (Cal. 1993) (in bank); see also Minneman, supra note
72, § 43, at 102-08 (listing state court cases that require future consequences of exposure to
be reasonably certain to result before allowing recovery of damages).
485. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984)
(mem.) (under Colorado law, recognizing a cause of action for increased risk of cancer
associated with actual damage to cellular and subcellular structures caused by exposure to
radiation); Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984) (allowing recovery for risk of
complications associated with a skull fracture); Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47
(Minn. 1977) (en banc) (stating that testimony about the risk of a stroke was admissible
with respect to damages for scar formation in an artery); Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 517
P.2d 675, 679-80 (Or. 1973) (ruling that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury
that it could consider increased susceptibility to meningitis in awarding damages for a skull
fracture); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 408-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (finding no
error in the admission of a physician's testimony that the plaintiff had a 1-in-20 chance of
seizures as a result of a traumatic injury to the brain); see also Eggen, supra note 480, at 905-
09 ("Courts are beginning to see cases based solely upon claims for increased or enhanced
future risk of disease."); Minneman, supra note 72, § 49, at 124-27 (discussing cases al-
lowing recovery for increased risk of susceptibility to future disease).
486. See, e.g., Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1970) (under
North Dakota law, stating that testimony regarding the future risk of injury or surgery
based upon a present injury may be relevant to establish a basis for compensable anxiety);
Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 263 (NJ. 1989) (allowing recovery for emotional
distress based on a reasonable fear of future disease where plaintiffs exposure to asbestos
resulted in physical injury); Gerardi v. Nuclear Util. Servs., Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004-05
(Sup. Ct. 1991) (recognizing a cause of action for mental anguish for breaching duty to
avoid and warn of asbestos dangers); see also Minneman, supra note 72, § 3, at 49-52 (listing
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ing to diagnose future disease.48 7 In medical-malpractice litigation,
the fact that plaintiffs often have a less than fifty-percent chance of
recovery, even in the absence of malpractice, has precluded experts
from testifying that it was more probable than not that the defend-
ants' negligence was the cause of death or serious injury. In such
cases, courts in a substantial number of jurisdictions adopted the "in-
creased risk" '4 88 or "lost chance" '4 89 theories, or hybrids thereof,490 to
and discussing cases that allow recovery for anxiety concerning future diseases or
conditions).
487. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Techs., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia and
West Virginia law); Brown v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli RR_ Yard PCB Litig.), 916 F.2d 829,
849-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law); Potter, 863 P.2d at 824-25; Ayers v. Town-
ship of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312-13 (NJ. 1987); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App. Div. 1984). See generally Schwartz, supra note 73 (defining medical
monitoring claims and requirements and discussing cases that allow or deny recovery for
medical monitoring costs).
488. Whether based on section 323 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs (1965) or
on the leading case of Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632-33 (4th Cir. 1966), the
increased risk theory relaxes the standard for proof of causation insofar as the jury is not
required to find that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's miscon-
duct. Under the increased risk theory, the jury is instructed that it can find proximate
causation based on testimony that the misconduct substantially increased the likelihood of
injury or reduced the likelihood of recovery and that the increased risk was a substantial
factor in bringing about the loss. E.g., Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 159 (Kan.
1984); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Group Health
Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316,
324-25 (W. Va. 1983); see also Robert S. Bruer, Note, Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 59 Mo. L. REv. 969, 975-79 (1994) (reviewing cases adopting the
"increased risk" theory); Hodson, supra note 76, § 5, at 34-41 (listing cases that "support
the view that a finding of proximate causation in a medical malpractice case can be sup-
ported by testimony that the alleged malpractice increased the risk for, or diminished the
opportunities of the patient").
489. The "lost chance" theory draws upon Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE
L.J. 1353 (1981). In contrast to the "increased risk" theory, which relaxes the standard of
proof, the "lost chance" theory reconceptualizes the plaintiffs damages and allows propor-
tional recovery for the deprivation of whatever chance the plaintiff otherwise would have
had to escape injury or death. Thus, a defendant who deprived the plaintiff of a 30%
chance of recovering from an injury or disease could be held liable for 30% of the value of
the plaintiff's damages. E.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56-57 (Mich. 1990)
(plurality opinion), rev'd in part, 467 N.W.2d 25 (Mich. 1991); Wollen v. DePaul Health
Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) ; Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d
589, 592 (Nev. 1991); accordJordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 640-41 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely,J.,
concurring); Bruer, supra note 488, at 980. See generally Hodson, supra note 76 (collecting
and analyzing cases applying the "loss of chance" theory).
490. Under the "hybrid" theory, courts allow plaintiffs to establish causation under the
"increased risk" theory but then limit plaintiffs to proportional recovery as under the "lost
chance" theory. E.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990); Roberts v. Ohio
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996); McKellips v. St. Fran-
cis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476-77 (Okla. 1987); accord Bruer, supra note 488, at 982-84.
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permit plaintiffs to receive compensation for all or a portion of their
damages.
The modem rules of tort law and evidence intersected in the con-
troversy about 'junk science,"49' culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.49 2 Daubert held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the "general accept-
ance" test of Frye v. United States,49 leaving federal courts with the task
of determining the admissibility of scientific evidence based on an
evaluation of its reliability and relevance.494 While some authorities
have interpreted Daubert as applying only to novel scientific evi-
dence, 495 others have suggested it applies more broadly.496 Even if
the holding is read narrowly, however, the Court's dictum can be ex-
pected to influence judicial evaluation of traditional medical testi-
491. Compare PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3
(1991) (decrying the problem of junk science) with Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637, 1643 (1993) (criticizing Huber's reli-
ance on anecdotal information, inflated rhetoric, and lack of empirical foundation, and
explaining the work's prominence as "largely the product of an expensive, sustained, and
well-coordinated public relations effort by the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research")
andJeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 183, 186-87 (1992) (reviewing HUBER, supra) (concluding that Huber's blend of anec-
dotal evidence and flawed logic constituted "junk litigation science" employed to stir up
fear of the tort system).
492. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
493. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
494. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. "[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at
589. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion indicated that determinations of relevance and
reliability involved a flexible inquiry into scientific validity, identifying four important fac-
tors: "whether it can be (and has been) tested"; "whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication"; "the known or potential rate of error"; and
"'explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of
a particular degree of acceptance within that community.'" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
495. See, e.g., Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y.
1994) (mem.) ("Daubert's narrow focus is on the admissibility of 'novel scientific evidence
.... '"), affd, 101 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
496. See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence,
15 CARDozo L. REV. 1799, 1832 (1994) (arguing that although applicable to all scientific
evidence, Daubert may not apply to clinical judgment, which is not strictly scientific); G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29
CREIGHTON L. REv. 939, 972 (1996) ("Daubert does apply to non-novel scientific evidence
and, in fact, to all expert evidence."); Imwinkelried, supra note 476, at 2289-94 (advocating
an extension of Daubert's principles to nonscientific testimony).
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mony.49 7 Also, it is not yet clear to what extent the state courts will
follow Daubert in abandoning Frye.4 98
In sum, since 1970, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" has
been subsumed within epochal transformations in evidence and tort
law, rendering it impossible to understand the meaning or legal signif-
icance of the phrase without undertaking an extensive analysis of
these developments. 4" Prior to 1970, by contrast, the genesis and dis-
semination of the phrase occurred in a more stable period of evi-
dence and tort law.500
Finally, any analysis of the legal significance of the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" subsequent to 1970 would have to take into
497. In particular, if one accepts the foundational interpretation of the phrase as a state-
ment about the "general consensus of recognized medical thought," then the relationship
of "reasonable medical certainty" to traditional medical evidence would exactly parallel the
relationship of Frye's "general acceptance" test to novel scientific evidence. See MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE RuLEs 608-1103,
at 249-50 n.16 (interim ed. 1992) ("'[R]easonable degree' imposing a consensus require-
ment before an expert may give an explanative opinion is roughly similar to the Frye test of
general acceptance with respect to the results of scientific tests."). Accordingly, Graham
predicts, "With the demise of Frye, it is highly unlikely that courts will employ the concept
of 'reasonable degree of *** certainty' to assure reliability." Id. at 19 (Supp. 1996) (star
ellipsis in original).
Graham may be underestimating, however, the extent of inertial attachment to the
phrase among the bench and bar as an indicia of reliability. Also, the parallel between
novel scientific evidence and traditional medical evidence suggests a continuing role for
"reasonable medical certainty" under Daubert: Just as Fye's "general acceptance" test has
become one of several factors for evaluating the reliability of novel scientific evidence, so
too the "reasonable medical certainty" or "consensus-of-recognized-medical-thought" test
could become one of several factors for evaluating the reliability of traditional medical evi-
dence. The author of this Article plans to explore this topic further in a sequel work. See
supra note 22.
498. See Imwinkelried, supra note 476, at 2273 n.17 ("It remains to be seen how many of
these states will follow the lead of the Daubert Court."); see also Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319,
328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (abandoning Frye in light of Dauber, but reviewing decisions
elsewhere taking various positions). Recent cases adhering to Frye include People v. Dalcolo,
669 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996), Lasky v. Union Electric Co., No. 68102, 1996 WL
330879, at *6-7 (Mo. Ct. App. June 18, 1996), adopted as modified on transfer to 936 S.W.2d
797 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam), Sheridan v. Catering Management, Inc., 558 N.W.2d
319, 326 (Neb. Ct. App.), affid, 566 N.W.2d 110 (Neb. 1997), State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221,
224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). See also 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(F), at 5-6 (2d ed. Supp. 1996) (reviewing Daubert's
effect on state courts); Thomas Lyons, Frye, Daubert and Where Do We Go from Here?, R.I.
B.J., Jan. 1997, at 27 (same).
499. The author of this Article plans to address these issues in a sequel work. See supra
note 23.
500. The foregoing post-1970 changes in evidence and tort law occurred within the con-
text of the so-called "litigation explosion" of the 1970s. Although the seeds of all these
changes had been sown and had begun to germinate prior to 1970, the major transforma-
tions generally are associated with the 1970s. See supra notes 475-499 and accompanying
text.
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account its new prominence in federal and, especially, state legisla-
tion. The phrase has become so firmly entrenched in the legal lexi-
con that the legislatures in thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia, as well as the United States Federal Court of Claims, have
established it as a standard for decisionmaking within dozens of stat-
utes on a wide variety of subjects."0 1 Only a small number of these
statutes relate to actions for personal injury0 2 or claims for worker
compensation, 0 3 the contexts in which the phrase originated. A ma-
501. My research assistant Melanie Susan Williams-Lewonski searched WESTLAW's USC
database and the 51 state statutory databases (xx-ST) during the Fall of 1996 and again on
September 9, 1997 for the terms "reasonable /s medical /s certainty." After eliminating
documents that did not use these words in the sense of "reasonable medical certainty," the
author's 1997 search found 102 relevant documents, discussed infra notes 502-517. In
comparison with the author's 1996 search, this search found several new statutes, but it
also disclosed the omission of two statutes that had been found in the 1996 search. See
infra notes 503 and 508. The Maryland Law Review staff conducted the most recent search
on October 18, 1997. Search of WESTLAW, State Statutory and USC Databases (Oct. 18,
1997) (reasonable /s medical /s certainty) (retrieving 104 documents, including 2 that did
not use these words in the sense of "reasonable medical certainty"). The most recent
search found 102 relevant documents, one from the Rules of the United States Court of
Claims, see infra note 502, and the other 101 from 69 statutes in 37 states and the District of
Columbia. In comparison with the author's search in September 1997, the 102 relevant
documents found by the Maryland Law Review staff in October 1997 included a new statute
from Oklahoma but omitted one of the statutes found by the author. The 8 states with
four or more documents accounted for 54 of the 102 relevant documents: Delaware (5
documents, 4 statutes), Florida (9 documents, 8 statutes), Illinois (4 documents, 3 stat-
utes), Maryland (5 documents, 3 statutes), Montana (6 documents, 3 statutes), New York
(7 documents, 2 statutes), Ohio (14 documents, 2 statutes), and Wisconsin (4 documents,
3 statutes). Thirteen states had no relevant statutes incorporating the phrase: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
502. In medical-malpractice litigation, Idaho requires that expert opinions on a defend-
ant's failure to meet the applicable standard of practice "be testified to with reasonable
medical certainty." IDAHO CODE § 6-1013 (1990). In proceedings for compensation under
the federal Vaccine Act, the Vaccine Rules of the Office of Special Masters of the United
States Court of Federal Claims requires that certain petitions include an affidavit "attesting,
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that a specific Table injury occurred within the
time frames of the Table or that the vaccine in-fact caused the injury alleged." CT. FED. CL.
R. App. J. 2.
503. Workers' compensation legislation in six states requires proof with a "reasonable
degree of medical certainty" of injuries, their occupational origin, or their extent and per-
manence. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(16) (Michie 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(1)
(West Supp. 1997); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 1lA (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-119(5)(b) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11) (Supp. 1997); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-14-605(c) (ii) (Michie 1997).
The Arkansas statute requiring opinions in workers' compensation proceedings with
"reasonable medical certainty" was enacted in 1993, presumably at the behest of employers
who had failed in their repeated attempts to persuade the state judiciary to adopt such a
standard. Compare Pittman v. Wygal Trucking Plant, 700 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ark. Ct. App.
1985) ("Our decisions simply have not required physicians to express opinions in terms of
either a 'most likely possibility' or 'a reasonable degree of medical certainty."') and Hope
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jority of these statutes establish standards for decisionmaking by
health care professionals in their institutional settings. The phrase
appears most often in legislation involving decisions at the end of life,
including advance medical directives and termination of life sup-
port.5 °4 Other statutes establish standards for patients in special cir-
cumstances, including treatment of minors,5 °5 emergency treatment
Brick Works v. Welch, 802 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc) ("[I]n workers'
compensation cases medical opinions need not be expressed in terms of reasonable medi-
cal certainty.. . .") with Hubley v. Best Western-Governor's Inn, 916 S.W.2d 143, 146 n.1
(Ark. Ct. App. 1996) ("This proposition was legislatively changed for all injuries that occur
after July 1, 1993, by virtue of Act 796 of 1993, Section 2 .... ").
In Virginia, by contrast, a 1997 amendment eliminated the phrase from the workers'
compensation law, changing the standard of proof with respect to "[o]rdinary disease of
life' coverage" from "clear and convincing evidence, to a reasonable medical certainty" to
'clear and convincing evidence, (not a mere probability)." VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-401
(Michie Supp. 1997).
504. The phrase appears in 44 documents within 24 statutes from 19 states: COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501, 2505 (Supp. 1996);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-39-2 (1996); Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act,
755 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 43/55 (West Supp. 1997); Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 II..
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 40/20 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-5 (Michie 1993); IowA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.2, 144A.3 (West Supp. 1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (Banks-
Baldwin 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-804 (West Supp. 1996); Health Care Deci-
sion Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 5-601, 5-603 (1994 & Supp. 1996); Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-403 (Supp. 1996); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3402
(1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-55 (West 1996);
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. 24-7A-4 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PuB.
HEaTH LAw §§ 2963-2967, 2983 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997); Uniform Rights of Ter-
minally Ill Act, N.D. CENr. CODE § 23-06.4-07 (Supp. 1997); Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11, .13, .15, .16, .17 (Anderson 1993 &
Supp. 1996); Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Oto REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2133.01, .02, .03, .05, .06, .08, .09, .11, .15 (Anderson 1994 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § 17 (West Supp. 1997); Advance Directive for Health Care Act, 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5403, 5414 (West 1975 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 34-12D-10
(Michie 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.8 (Michie 1993); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-101
(Michie 1997).
505. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (Supp. 1997) (definition of "[n]ecessary medical treat-
ment" to prevent the deterioration of child's condition or to alleviate immediate pain);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-906 (Supp. 1996) (determination of lack of capacity of
infant's parent, for purpose of empowering standby guardian); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-69
(West Supp. 1997) (same); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. AcT LAw § 1726 (McKinney 1996) (same);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-A1370, 1375, 1376 (1995) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.34 (West
1989) (that risks to donor or recipient of bone marrow outweigh benefits); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 253.12 (West Supp. 1996) (that infant or child has condition resulting from adverse neo-
natal outcome, birth defect, or other developmental disability regarding possible
monitoring).
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without consent,5 °6 mental illness,50 7 and abortion.5"' In ten jurisdic-
tions, medical examiners are required to determine the cause of
death with "reasonable medical certainty" under particular circum-
stances.50 9 The phrase is used in criminal proceedings to describe the
status of victims, 510 the capacity of defendants to assist in their own
defense, 51' and the eligibility of inmates for release.5" 2 The phrase
also appears in statutes governing such diverse topics as unprofes-
sional medical conduct,51 3 gestational surrogacy contracts,51 4 disability
506. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.13 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (developmentally disabled);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.064 (West 1997) (minors); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-607
(1994) (general rule); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 433.484 (Michie 1996) (facilities providing
care for mental health, mental retardation); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-26-3 (Supp. 1996) (de-
velopmentally disabled); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-222 (1990) (minors).
507. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102 (1995) (definition); id. § 53-21-126 (effectiveJuly
1, 1997) (standard of proof as to mental disorders); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 1987)
(persons who are mentally ill and who are dangers to themselves and others); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 51.45 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (relationship between alcoholism and dangerous
conduct).
508. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (continuation of preg-
nancy would threaten life of pregnant woman); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6 (West
1993) (that method of abortion will cause organic pain to the fetus and that anesthetic or
analgesic would abolish or alleviate this pain). The historical and statutory notes to 720
ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 510/5 (West 1993) refer to a repealed statute that required a physi-
cian performing an abortion to certify with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus was
not viable. A Missouri statute pertaining to abortion that had been repealed in 1979 was
found in the 1996 search but not in the 1997 search. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.030 (West
1983) (that fetus is not viable).
509. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-406 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4707
(1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2306 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 406.13 (West 1993); GA. CODE
ANN. § 45-16-27.1 (1990); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 5-310 (1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 44-3-213 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1822 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-4-14
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-283.1 (Michie Supp. 1996).
510. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.061 (Supp. 1997) (determination of "serious emotional
injury"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-1.2 (1994) (determination that person depicted in film or
photo is a minor).
511. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1997) (lack of capacity to understand pro-
ceedings or assist in defense).
512. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.149 (West 1996) (inmate terminally ill or incapacitated);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.200 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (inmate terminally ill); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-28-116, 40-35-503 (Supp. 1996) (sex offender not likely to commit sexual as-
saults upon release); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A4 (Supp. 1997) (mentally ill or addicted defend-
ant not a threat to others even if therapy discontinued).
513. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1731 (1987) ("Solicitation or acceptance of a fee from
a patient or other person by fraudulent representation that a manifestly incurable condi-
tion, as determined with reasonable medical certainty, can be permanently cured.").
514. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1997) (commissioning couple is eligible to enter
into enforceable contract for gestational surrogacy only if physician determines with rea-
sonable medical certainty that the woman cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term).
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insurance,5 ' and "supplemental needs trust" provisions linked to
public assistance eligibility.
516
The legislators who enacted these statutes, or at least the persons
who drafted them, must have assumed that the phrase "reasonable
medical certainty" had some ascertainable meaning, either within the
field of medicine or as a matter of law, for they made no effort to
define the term within the statutes. Although dozens of statutes now
include the phrase "reasonable medical certainty," only one purports
to define the term, and that definition is not especially helpful.517 Re-
gardless of whether the drafters understood the phrase, however, its
inclusion in these statutes will force physicians, attorneys, and judges
to interpret the words "reasonable medical certainty" in various con-
texts well into the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" evolved in the Chi-
cago courtrooms through the cross-pollination of two unwholesome
weeds, 518 the reasonable-certainty rule and the ultimate-issue rule.
Goldstein's Trial Technique then provided the vector that enabled the
phrase to escape its midwestern origins and disseminate throughout
the United States. Once it had taken root in the American Jurisprudence
Proof of Facts series, the phrase soon spread into the courtrooms of
every American jurisdiction. The phrase had no intrinsic limitations
and readily adapted to a variety of legal environments. Through sym-
biosis with indigenous legal doctrines respecting admissibility and
proof, the phrase found one or more niches in every American juris-
diction and attained dominance in the legal lexicon of several
515. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.10-211.5 (Michie 1994) (certificate from physician
attesting to insured's condition).
516. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.89 (West Supp. 1997).
517. See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-102(12) (1995). When used as the standard of proof
for mental disorders under § 53-21-126 of the Montana Code, § 53-21-102(12) provides
that "'reasonable medical certainty' means reasonable certainty asjudged by the standards
of a professional person."
518. The "weed" metaphor is consistent with the following comment by Stephen Jay
Gould: "If we want a biological metaphor for cultural change, we should probably invoke
infection rather than evolution." Gould, supra note 26, at 52. Although viral infection
might have been an especially appropriate (or ironic) metaphor for describing the spread
of "reasonable medical certainty," it seemed an unduly morbid and overly dramatic re-
sponse to the "threat" posed by this phrase in comparison with the truly tragic impact of
AIDS. The weed metaphor better captures the role of this phrase in the legal ecosystem.
I thank my father-in-law, historian of science L. Pearce Williams, for his nomination of
kudzu as the archetype of an opportunistic weed that proliferated after being intentionally
introduced into areas outside its native habitat. Informal Conversation with L. Pearce Wil-
liams, in Ithaca, N.Y. (July 1997).
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states.5 1 9 When the demise of the ultimate-issue rule eliminated its
role in the legal ecology of Illinois, the phrase obtained a new mean-
ing to assure its continued presence in that state. The phrase even
propagated beyond the domain of the common law into the realm of
statutes.
The curious history of the genesis and dissemination of "reason-
able medical certainty" cannot by itself give rise to a comprehensive
theory of legal evolution. 20 This example suggests, however, that any
theory of legal evolution should move beyond the view of "law" as a
unitary entity interacting with society and should consider the legal
system itself as a nonlinear dynamical system that evolves through the
complex interplay of its components. 521
This Article's search for the origins of "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" focused primarily on the legal context in which the phrase was
employed, i.e., expert witness examination. Within this context, the
inquiry demonstrated the dynamic interaction of legal practice and
legal doctrine. The usage arose in Illinois from practitioners' efforts
to comply with two arbitrary local rules. It then spread throughout
the United States as a result of practitioners' decisions to use a phrase
that bore the imprimatur of legal approval by copying the models pro-
vided in Goldstein's manual. Finally, judges incorporated the phrase
into legal doctrine by employing this familiar usage to describe ex-
isting rules relating to admissibility and proof.
In addition to demonstrating the dynamic interaction of legal
practice and legal doctrine, this study illustrates the influence of prac-
tical as opposed to scholarly legal publications. When not writing
solely for other academics, 52 legal scholars often seek to shape the
519. The phrase thus exhibited what evolutionary biologists refer to as "adaptive radia-
tion," the differentiation of a species to fill multiple niches in an ecosystem. See Ruhl, supra
note 37, at 1435.
520. It took Charles Darwin five years of empirical study plus additional years of thought
to generate his theory of natural selection through differential survival, which constitutes
the first leg of biological evolutionary theory. To paraphrase Lloyd Bentsen, "I'm no
Charles Darwin," so I'll leave the task of formulating a general theory of legal evolution to
others more capable than myself.
521. The components of the legal system may be characterized according to various
schemas, depending on the topic under study. The components that influence the evolu-
tion of common law doctrine may not be relevant to the evolution of constitutional or
statutory rules.
522. One strand of criticism leveled against American legal scholarship has complained
that too many law review articles are written for an academic audience and ignore issues of
interest to the profession. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Edu-
cation and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. Rv. 34, 42 (1992) ("The growing disjunction
between legal education and legal practice is most salient with respect to scholarship.
There has been a clear decline in the volume of 'practical' scholarship published by law
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law by influencing decisions of courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies.5 23 In the academy, doctrinal articles are supposed to be pre-
scriptive. 524 Academics denigrate descriptive doctrinal works that are
professors."); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 313, 320 (1989) ("[A]cademic writing is now distinctly directed toward the theoreti-
cian/scholar and not the problem-solver/practitioner and judge. The concern that aca-
demics are writing for each other is indeed well founded." (footnote omitted)). For
responses to Judge Edwards's polemic, see Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv.
1921, 1921-2219 (1993). For another perspective, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eaves-
droppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 569, 589-91 (1992),
which analogizes scholarly discourse to dialogue in a play and asserts that although the
discourse ultimately is directed to an audience of practitioners and judges, the scholarly
mission is best served when academics ignore the audience and concentrate on the integ-
rity of the dialogue with other academics.
523. SeeJustice Dennis Archer, The Importance of Law Reviews to the Judiciary and the Bar,
1991 DET. C.L. REV. 229, 229 (focusing on the use of academic writing by appellate courts
as an influence in deciding cases where traditional legal authority fails); Edwards, supra
note 522, at 42-43 (pointing out the decline in "practical" scholarship published by law
professors); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground, "91 MICH. L. REv.
2075, 2102-03, 2111-12 (1993) ("Most scholars continue to assume that the managers of
the legal system want the system to work justly and efficiently and to serve its best purposes;
and that when deficiencies are pointed out, and rational arguments made for amendment,
concerned lawyers will respond with dialogue and collaborate in the reform effort. .. ");
Bernard S. Meyer, Is There CauseforJubilee?, 50 MD. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1991) (advocating
for law review articles that discuss "what the law is and what it should be"); Roger C. Park,
Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MIN. L. REv. 849, 866-67 (1991) ("Doctrinal scholars
write for an intended audience of lawmakers, not primarily for other scholars."); William L.
Reynolds, A Half Century of the Maryland Law Review, 50 MD. L. REV. 239, 250-52 (1991)
(discussing the local influence of law review survey issues on state law); Edward L. Rubin,
What Does Prescriptive Legal Scholarship Say and Who Is Listening to It: A Response to Professor
Dan-Cohen, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 731, 732-36 (1992) [hereinafter Rubin, Prescriptive Legal
Scholarship] ("Standard legal scholarship defines its approach as a set of prescriptions ad-
dressed to public decisionmakers."); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1850-51, 1900-05 (1988) [hereinafter Rubin, Practice and
Discourse] ("Standard legal scholarship is typically directed toward ajudge, and occasionally
to a legislator, administrator, or equivalent public decision-maker."); A Symposium on Law
Reviews in a Neighboring Journal, 1 MD. L. REv. 59, 61-62 (1936) (reviewing a law review
article on law reviews).
524. See Archer, supra note 523, at 236 ("After all, what is the sense of spending hun-
dreds of hours, and an equal number of footnotes for authority, preparing an article for
publication if there is not at least some degree of hope that it will have an impact on the
development of the law."); Edwards, supra note 522, at 42-43 (emphasizing the prescriptive
feature of practical legal scholarship); Gordon, supra note 523, at 2102-03, 2111-12 ("It
makes no sense to write prescriptively unless one has some audience of practical actors in
mind."); Park, supra note 523, at 865-66 ("Doctrinal scholarship is usually prescriptive, that
is, doctrinal scholarship advocates law reform."); Rubin, Prescriptive Legal Scholarship, supra
note 523, at 732-36 (advocating for continuing the prescriptive nature of legal scholar-
ship); Rubin, Practice and Discourse, supra note 523, at 1850-53, 1879-81, 1900-05 (discussing
the prescriptive nature of legal scholarship). Other scholars critique normative legal schol-
arship. See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053, 2073 (1993) ("[D]eficits
in ontological condition will prompt epistemological and normative endeavors as compen-
sation for those ontological deficits, and simultaneously render these normative and episte-
mological endeavors entirely ineffectual in correcting those ontological deficits."
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directed toward practitioners, 2 5 while practice manuals do not even
qualify as legal scholarship.526 The instant study, by contrast, provides
an example of a practitioner-oriented manual that had a significant
impact on American legal doctrine.
Dean John Henry Wigmore was among America's most influen-
tial academic legal scholars. He stood head and shoulders above the
other luminaries whose efforts to modernize American evidence law
bore fruit in the Federal Rules of Evidence.527 In the shorter run of
his own lifetime, however, Wigmore could not convince the Illinois
courts to abandon their incoherent adherence to the reasonable-cer-
tainty and ultimate-issue rules.
(emphasis omitted)); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 187
(1990) ("[Niormative legal thought" reflects "metaphysical confusion" insofar as "[i]t
keeps thinking that it is addressing some morally competent, well-intentioned individual
who has his hands on the levers of power."); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of
Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 931 (1991) ("Normative legal thought is that inseparable
aspect of bureaucratic practice that persists in mistakenly thinking that it is separate and
distinct and then compounds this error by thinking that it rules over bureaucratic prac-
tice."); Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1216
(1981) ("[T]he marginality of contemporary legal scholarship results from the combined
pressures of professionalism, the desire to support the rule of law, and the attempt to
escape the implications of Realism"). But see Frank I. Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On
Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1224, 1228 (1981) ("[1]ntellectual cowardice-
including not least the refusal to face honestly the problem of subjectivity in law-is a vice;
but the name of the vice is 'cowardice,' not 'liberalism.'"); Margaret Jane Radin & Frank
Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019,
1057 (1991) ("[Tlhe conceptual truth that each and every normative project is liable to
deconstruction no longer works as a foundational objection against engagement in such
projects; it becomes just one more problem to be understood and negotiated.").
525. See Park, supra note 523, at 865-66 ("[T]o be recognized as a creative doctrinal
scholar and to avoid being stigmatized as a mere drudge, one must not only describe the
law, but offer an affirmative thesis, an idea for reform or reconceptualization."); Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Self-Understanding and the Internalization of Constitutional Rules, 61 U. COLO.
L. REv. 749, 753 (1990) ("[T]he term 'descriptive' has taken on such a pejorative connota-
tion for anyone who has ever attended a law school faculty meeting in which faculty ap-
pointments were the issue."). Another commentator notes:
[P]ure description rarely counts as an academic contribution these days, because
scholars do not believe that they are describing a process that runs parallel to
scholarly analysis. As a result, essentially descriptive treatises are no longer re-
garded as leading academic contributions, and they are certainly not regarded as
the apogee of scholarly achievement.
Rubin, Practice and Discourse, supra note 523, at 1864.
526. See Kenneth Lasson, Commentary, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth
and Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REv. 926, 936, 941-42 (1990) ("Often neither briefs nor practice
manuals-no matter how learned or useful-are considered 'scholarship.'").
527. See Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1465, 1490 (1993) ("If any evidence scholar from the past still influences evidence
scholarship and the law of evidence today, it is Wigmore.").
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Laboring in the shadow of Dean Wigmore, Irving Goldstein held
more modest ambitions. Having learned the incantation that would
propitiate the savage gods of the Illinois judiciary, Goldstein sought to
share this practical skill with his colleagues in the bar. Where the
Dean had failed, the adjunct instructor in trial advocacy triumphed.
Goldstein had not sought to influence legal doctrine, yet his manual
had the unintended consequence of adding a new phrase to the
American legal lexicon, one that acquired doctrinal significance in a
number of jurisdictions.528
To be sure, Goldstein's impact on this small corner of the law
cannot compare with Wigmore's profound influence on both the the-
oretical structure and the particular doctrinal forms of modern evi-
dence law. Nevertheless, the ubiquity of the phrase "reasonable
medical certainty" constitutes concrete evidence of Goldstein's perva-
sive influence on American trial practice. Goldstein's influence can-
not be evaluated in terms of the number of citations to his work in
legal periodicals or judicial opinions, a commonly employed measure
of scholarly impact,5 29 because he wrote his manual for litigators, not
professors orjudges. Goldstein's influence was complex and indirect,
operating on litigators' cognitive background as well as their concrete
practices. 3 ° In the absence of more direct indicators, the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" functions like a radioactive isotope, en-
abling us to trace the influence of Goldstein's manual on the conduct
of trials and on the teaching of trial technique.
528. This singular example of a practitioner-oriented work affecting both legal practice
and legal doctrine suggests a potentially fruitful line of research for legal historians. A
study assessing the influence of practitioner-oriented legal materials might determine
whether this example provides a meaningful insight into the impact of such works or in-
stead represents an isolated occurrence.
529. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study, 36J.L. & ECON. 385, 389 (1993);John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory
of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950,
1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 382 (1977); John Scurlock, Scholarship and the
Courts, 32 UMKC L. REv. 228, 228-29 (1964); Fred RI Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles, 73 CAL. L. Rev. 1540, 1549-54 (1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 751, 751 (1996); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew,
The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U.
MiAMi L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1991); LouisJ. Sirico,Jr. &Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law
Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 131, 131-32 (1986). Even
as a measure of the direct impact of legal scholarship, the reliability of citation counting
remains controversial. See generally Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judg-
ments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 829 (1993).
530. Cf Rubin, Prescriptive Legal Scholarship, supra note 523, at 750 ("Because influence is
complex and indirect, and operates upon the decisionmaker's cognitive background, it is
rarely acknowledged by direct citation.").
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The fact that attorneys throughout the United States were slav-
ishly imitating Goldstein's examples of hypothetical questions demon-
strates that his book was not languishing unread on their shelves. It
further suggests that attorneys accepted his premise that trial tech-
nique was a practical skill that could be developed through study and
preparation,3 1 in contrast to the prevailing view of trial advocacy as
an innate aptitude or an arcane art that could be acquired only
through experience.532 Coupled with his "learning-by-doing" semi-
nars, 33 Goldstein's Trial Technique had a substantial impact on litiga-
tion practice in the middle years of the twentieth century and
established the foundation for the NITA revolution of the 1970s.534 A
token of Goldstein's legacy, the phrase "reasonable medical certainty"
continues to influence the outcome of litigation, and its incorporation
into dozens of statutes will assure its importance to American law into
the next century.
The foregoing account explains the creation and dissemination
of the phrase as the result of a sequence of historical accidents involv-
ing the interplay of legal practice, legal doctrine, and practical legal
publications, in which the actual language of the phrase played only a
secondary role. Indeed, the history suggests that the principal signifi-
cance of the particular verbal formula was its adaptability insofar as
the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" lacked any definitive intrin-
sic meaning.
This doctrinal history may be enriched, however, by a semantic
analysis of the phrase with respect to contemporaneous jurispruden-
531. In Goldstein's words, "[w]ith every phase of proof illustrated, it will be found that
trial practice has almost been reduced to a formula, and that most of the formulas are
contained herein." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at vii.
532. See, e.g., McElhaney, supra note 344, at 198 ("The popular concept is that trial advo-
cacy is an art form, not thoroughly founded in learning or reason, in which the gift of
persuasion is of paramount importance . . . ."). According to a 1950 article in Collier's
Magazine, Goldstein himself confronted this attitude prior to the creation of his Lawyers'
Post-Graduate Clinics:
In need of employment [following a prolonged illness, during which TIUAL
TECHNIQUE was written and published], and with a family to support, he ap-
proached the dean of [a law school] .. .and asked for a job as an instructor.
"What do you want to teach?" the dean asked.
"I have a new angle on how to teach trial technique."
"Nonsense," said the dean. "No one can teach that. . . it has to be learned!"
Komaiko, supra note 216, at 35.
533. See supra note 230.
534. See supra note 344. Thomas Mauet attended one of the seminars conducted by
Goldstein's prothg6, Fred Lane, and Mauet acknowledged Lane's influence in the preface
to his first edition of Fundamentals of Trial Technique. MAUET, supra note 344, at xii. With-
out in any way disparaging the originality of Mauet's contribution, the organization and
style of his book, as well as its tile, bear witness to the influence of Goldstein's manual.
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tial issues, 53 5  especially the critique offered by Legal Real-
ism.5 36 Consideration of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" in
light of the Realist challenge to legal orthodoxy suggests that the rhe-
torical effect of this particular verbal formulation probably contrib-
uted to the rapidity of its acceptance by the bar and by the judiciary.
The Realists challenged the "basic myth" of legal certainty, the
popular perception that law consists of rules that could, if properly
understood, be applied with certainty and predictability. 537 Any
phrase containing the word "certainty" would have been congenial to
attorneys and judges who accepted the myth of legal certainty,5"8 espe-
cially those who were discomforted by the Realist challenge. In addi-
tion, the reference to "medical certainty" implicitly embraced the
prevailing view of medical science as an exogenous source of objective
and fixed truths in a rapidly modernizing and increasingly uncertain
world.5 39 Finally, the qualifier "reasonable" featured prominently in
American legal language of the era and would have been acceptable
535. From a broader perspective, legal doctrine and legal practice interact not only with
each other and with jurisprudential theory, but also with the rest of society. Law is not an
autonomous institution but rather remains enmeshed in the web of human institutions-
social, cultural, political, and economic-from which it emerges. A comprehensive intel-
lectual history of the period is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the inter-
action among components of the legal system. (It would also exceed the scope of this
author's competence. My wife is the intellectual and political historian in the family. See
generally Alison Williams Lewin, The Great Triangle: Florence, Naples, and the Roman Papacy in
the Late Fourteenth Century, 77 NuovA RrWSTA STORICA 257 (1993) (obligatory reference for
padding of spousal citation count); Alison Williams Lewin, "Cum Status Ecclesie Noster Sit".
Florence and the Council of Pisa (1409), 62 CHURCH HIsT. 178 (1993) (same); cf Austin, supra
note 529, at 831-33 (questioning the validity of citation counting).)
536. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATrI-uRNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159 (1995) (assessing
the evolution and paradoxical impact of legal realism in the twentieth century). For exam-
ples of Legal Realism, see JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (3d prtg. 1935), and
K-N. LLEwELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw AND ITS STUDY (3d prtg. 1965).
537. According to Frank, the "basic myth" underlying popular mistrust of lawyers is the
"belief that the lawyers complicate the law, and complicate it wantonly and unnecessarily,
that, if the legal profession did not interpose its craftiness and guile, the law could be clear,
exact and certain." FRANK, supra note 536, at 5. The index to Law and the Modern Mind lists
35 entries for "certainty" and another 19 for "uncertainty." Id. at 363, 368. Duxbury
explains:
The realist reaction against legal formalism was not straightforwardly a reac-
tion against the idea of legal certainty, but rather a reaction against the particular
certainties which formalism promoted. Legal realism sought a qualitatively differ-
ent type of certainty-certainty, that is, in the form of a purported juridical au-
thenticity; and this it did by looking to the social sciences.
DUXBURY, supra note 536, at 96-97.
538. "Lawyers do not merely sustain the vulgar notion that law is capable of being made
entirely stable and unvarying; they seem bent on creating the impression that, on the
whole, it is already established and certain." FRANK, supra note 536, at 7.
539. In Appendix III, "Science and Certainty: An Unscientific Conception of Science,
of Law and the Modern Mind," Frank noted:
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to both Traditionalists and Realists. While Traditionalists embraced
the "reasonable man" of contracts and torts as an objective standard,
Realists welcomed the flexibility afforded by vague and fact-dependent
standards of "reasonableness. ' 54" Not surprisingly, the word "reason-
able" and the related terms "unreasonable," "(un)reasonably," and
"(un) reasonableness" featured prominently in both the Restatements of
the Law and the Uniform Commercial Code. In sum, the phrase "reason-
able medical certainty" resonated harmoniously with contemporane-
ous jurisprudential themes, thereby facilitating its adoption as a
formula for witness interrogation and as a legal standard of admissibil-
ity and proof.
The history of the genesis and dissemination of the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" validates the conception of law as a com-
plex adaptive system. The phrase evolved through the dynamical
interaction of legal doctrines, legal practices, legal publications, and
legal theories. Viewed through the lens of Complexity Theory,. the
evolution of the phrase exemplifies three key features of a complex
adaptive system: chaos, path dependence, and the stability of subop-
timal local equilibria.
The history of the genesis and dissemination of the phrase "rea-
sonable medical certainty" illustrates the role of contingency in the
evolution of legal practice and legal doctrine. The phrase arose in
response to pressures generated by efforts of Illinois attorneys to ac-
commodate the conflicting demands of two arbitrary and inconsistent
[U]nfortunately, to many persons, science is a charter of certainty, a technique
which ere long will give man complete control and sovereignty over nature. Sci-
ence seems to hold out an expectation that ultimately man will gain total relief
from uncertainty and procure elimination of chance.
Id. at 285 app. III. This dualist view of objective science in opposition to the subjectivity of
other social institutions withstood the Realist critique, and it persists today despite the
growing recognition that science is a socially constructed institution. SeeJASANOFF, supra
note 82, at xiii-xiv ("The institutional setting of the law shapes the representation of legally
relevant scientific claims at many points, beginning with the articulation of standards for
what counts as valid science within the legal process."). Witness the controversy generated
by physicist Alan Sokal's publication of a parody of postmodern criticism in the journal
Social Text. See Alan D. Sokal, Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Herme-
neutics of Quantum Gravity, Soc. TEXT, Spring-Summer 1996, at 217 (sketching the outlines
of the theory of quantum gravity and its cultural and political implications); accord Alan D.
Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies, LINGUA FRANCA, May-June 1996, at 62
(explaining his experiment to publish an article of nonsense); Steven Weinberg, Sokal's
Hoax, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Aug. 8, 1996, at 11 (discussing the meaning behind the hoax);
Sokal's Hoax: An Exchange, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Oct. 3, 1996, at 54, 54-56 (publishing letters in
response to Weinberg's article).
540. See, e.g., Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uniform
Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REv. 429, 441-42 (1997) (noting that terms such as
"reasonableness" in the U.C.C. allow for a "vagueness in the law [that] can be useful").
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rules that were promulgated almost simultaneously by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The phrase seems to have emerged by chance when
an attorney misused the terminology of the reasonable-certainty rule
pertaining to future damages in the course of interrogating a witness
with respect to causation, and the Illinois Supreme Court then implic-
itly endorsed this usage in the course of explaining why the question
violated the ultimate-issue rule. 4 x The phrase then spread through-
out the nation as a consequence of its fortuitous incorporation in a
best-selling manual on trial technique. Once attorneys and judges be-
came habituated to the phrase, it gradually insinuated itself into ex-
isting doctrines respecting admissibility and proof, more by chance
than by deliberate judicial choice.
This history also illustrates the stability of local equilibria and the
path dependence of legal evolution. Even after the Illinois courts
abolished the ultimate-issue rule that gave rise to the phrase, local at-
torneys continued to employ the phrase in the interrogation of physi-
cians,542 and the Illinois courts eventually discovered a new role for
the phrase as an indicator of the reliability of expert opinions.543 In
other jurisdictions, attorneys persisted in using the phrase even after
their highest courts held that it was unnecessary. 544 The combination
of its widespread usage, its continual republication in the Proof of Facts
series, and its regular inclusion in judicial opinions have irreversibly
541. See Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 111 N.E. 499, 502 (Ill. 1916); see also
supra notes 105-138, 152-160 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 451-460 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 461467 and accompanying text. Although these transformations
occurred over the course of decades rather than centuries, this aspect of the history bears
out Holmes' oft-quoted observation:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In
the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and inge-
nious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground
of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the
present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which
have been found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives a new
content ....
Hot as, supra note 25, at 5; accord supra note 25.
544. For example, in Matott v. Ward, 399 N.E.2d 532, 534-36 (N.Y. 1979), the court re-
fused to confine witnesses to a "single verbal straightjacket" and held that the physician's
opinion, "though not solicited or expressed in terms of the particular combination of mag-
ical words represented by the phrase 'reasonable degree of medical certainty', conveyed
equivalent assurance that it was not based on either supposition or speculation." Despite
the court's permission to forego use of the phrase, attorneys have continued to employ it.
The phrase has appeared in over 100 subsequent opinions from the New York courts.
Search of WESTLAW, Ny-cs Database (Feb. 19, 1998) ("reasonable medical certainty" "rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty" & da(aft 1979 & bef 1997)) (retrieving 115 cases).
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altered the legal landscape, preserving the stability of the phrase in
practice and in doctrine Attorneys habituated to the phrase in
practice are unlikely to question its appropriateness once they reach
the bench. Moreover, even if judges throughout the nation were to
forbid attorneys from using the phrase in their courtrooms, the
phrase would survive by virtue of its incorporation in dozens of
statutes.546
Finally, this history tends to refute the functionalist or adaptation-
ist notion that appropriate (or efficient) legal rules inevitably evolve as
the legal system progressively adapts to changing social needs.547 The
phrase "reasonable medical certainty" was not a logical or natural so-
lution to the dilemma posed by the inconsistency between the reason-
able-certainty and ultimate-issue rules. Rather, the phrase emerged
through incremental adaptation of existing forms. Similarly, the
phrase was incorporated into legal doctrine not because it best served
certain instrumental purposes, but by virtue of the judiciary's uncriti-
cal acceptance of a prevailing usage. Having no intrinsic meaning,
the phrase was not especially well-suited to its eventual dual roles as a
standard of admissibility and a standard of proof.548 Both as a mode
of interrogation and as a standard of admissibility or proof, the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty" was "jury-rigged from a limited set of
available components,"549 and thus represents a "Panda's Thumb" of
legal evolution, "a contraption, not a lovely contrivance." '55 While
each step along the path involved conscious decisions by attorneys,
authors, and judges, it would be far more accurate to describe the
current usages and doctrines that embody the phrase as artifacts of
evolution than as products of intentional design. Thus did the weed
of "reasonable medical certainty" take root in the American soil.
545. Insofar as the very pervasiveness of the phrase encourages unquestioning accept-
ance of the usage and the associated doctrines, the history of the phrase may exemplify
Roe's "strong form" of path dependence. See supra note 57.
546. See supra notes 501-517 and accompanying text.
547. See supra note 26.
548. The author will elaborate on this point in the sequel to this Article. See supra note
22.
549. GouLD, supra note 26, at 20.
550. Id. at 24.
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APPENDIX A
NUMBER OF OPINIONS CONTAINING THE PHRASE
"REASONABLE (DEGREE OF) MEDICAL CERTAINTY"
(not including variants)
NUMBER OF OPINIONS NUMBER OF OPINIONS
Year State Federal Total Year State Federal Total
1930 0 0 0 1964 35 1 36
1931 1 0 1 1965 40 5 45
1932 0 0 0 1966 46 7 53
1933 1 1 2 1967 52 9 61
1934 3 0 3 1968 57 9 66
1935 0 0 0 1969 68 12 80
1936 0 0 0 1970 54 8 62
1937 3 0 3 1971 62 7 69
1938 1 0 1 1972 70 8 78
1939 1 1 2 1973 61 4 65
1940 0 1 1 1974 72 7 79
1941 4 0 4 1975 68 2 70
1942 1 0 1 1976 61 7 68
1943 1 0 1 1977 61 9 70
1944 6 0 6 1978 72 4 76
1945 2 0 2 1979 83 9 92
1946 3 0 3 1980 87 16 103
1947 5 0 5 1981 124 18 142
1948 4 0 4 1982 117 20 137
1949 4 0 4 1983 122 23 145
1950 4 0 4 1984 122 18 140
1951 4 0 4 1985 132 22 154
1952 3 0 3 1986 140 23 163
1953 11 0 11 1987 157 23 180
1954 6 1 7 1988 142 33 175
1955 10 2 12 1989 165 61 226
1956 13 2 15 1990 169 80 249
1957 6 1 7 1991 198 90 288
1958 18 2 20 1992 185 93 278
1959 19 1 20 1993 239 62 301
1960 29 4 33 1994 219 60 279
1961 30 3 33 1995 255 52 307
1962 28 8 36 1996 217 67 284
1963 36 3 39
Based on opinions available in WESTLAW's Allstates, Allstates-old, Alifeds, and
Ailfeds-old Databases (search terms = "reasonable medical certainty" or "reasonable
degree of medical certainty").
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APPENDIX B
NUMBER OF OPINIONS (state courts only)
CONTAINING THE PHRASE
"REASONABLE (DEGREE OF) MEDICAL CERTAINTY'
AND DATE OF FIRST OPINION DOCUMENTING ITS USE
(state or federal court)
jurisdiction Opinions First Use
Alabama 40 1967
Alaska 19 1967
Arizona 63 1960
Arkansas 58 1960
California 65 1955
Colorado 29 1969*
Connecticut 30 1962*
Delaware 29 1965
District of Columbia 49 1961*
Florida 116 1958
Georgia 38 1965*
Hawaii 16 1962
Idaho 40 1958
Illinois 346 1931
Indiana 62 1948
Iowa 36 1961
Kansas 41 1959
Kentucky 21 1962
Louisiana 77 1959
Maine 13 1958
Maryland 81 1963
Massachusetts 50 1961
Michigan 32 1941
Minnesota 74 1945
Mississippi 29 1963
Missouri 277 1945
*indicates first use in a federal court opinion
Jurisdiction Opinions First Use
Montana 55 1962
Nebraska 176 1961
Nevada 4 1988*
New Hampshire 5 1970
New Jersey 50 1946
New Mexico 12 1962
New York 197 1944
North Carolina 58 1956
North Dakota 53 1960
Ohio 459 1949
Oklahoma 13 1957
Oregon 13 1990
Pennsylvania 414 1955*
Rhode Island 40 1953
South Carolina 21 1959
South Dakota 26 1965
Tennessee 217 1965
Texas 75 1944
Utah 9 1967
Vermont 7 1967
Virginia 86 1966
Washington 46 1954
West Virginia 35 1961*
Wisconsin 196 1947
Wyoming 19 1967
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